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The aim of this thesis is to enhance the understanding of the suitable measures of financial 
constraints for the case of a developing country and the effects of financial constraints on 
firm‟s activities. In this respect, we employ data for Pakistani listed non-financial firms from 
2006 to 2015, check the presence of financial constraints, evaluate measures of financial 
constraints and examine the effects of financial constraints on a firm‟s behaviour.  
 
A number of studies check the presence of financial constraints at firm level for the case of 
developed countries. However, Due to different set up of financial markets between 
developed and developing countries, the effects of financial constraints on firm‟s activity 
may differ for developing country. Moreover, the measures of financial constraints have been 
introduced in the setup of developed countries; using those measures for the case of 
developing country without evaluation can misguide the findings. Besides, literature does not 
give any accurate measure of financial constraints. By addressing these gaps, our first 
empirical chapter of this study uses two different estimation frameworks: q model and error 
correction model to check the presence of financial constraints at firm-level. The findings in 
the first empirical chapter indicate the presence of financial constraints in the listed Pakistani 
firms, where large and dividend-paying firms are found to be less financially constrained than 
small and non-dividend-paying firms. We further use the latest measures of financial 
constraints: KZ index, WW index, HP index, and assets tangibility to sort firms into 
financially constrained statuses. We find that WW index, HP index, and assets tangibility are 
performing better, showing the difficult access to external finance among Pakistani listed 
firms. In addition, to evaluate the applicability of these measures for the setting of Pakistan, 
we regress the accounting variables of the latest measures on the financial constraint status of 
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the firms. We find cash flow, total debt, age, and cash holdings as continuous significant 
determinants of a firm‟s financial status in different modelling estimations.  
 
We explore the role of financial constraints on firms‟ export entry decisions in our second 
empirical chapter. Previous studies show a link between financial health and export 
participation decision leaving a gap for us to check the role of financial constraints in export 
participation decision. Moreover, most of the previous studies examine this relationship for 
the developed economies; while studies on this relationship in the context of an emerging 
developing economy like Pakistan is very important for the policy makers of the country.  
Our empirical study finds exporters are significantly different from non-exporters in terms of 
the level of financial constraints. By using different estimators to estimate the export market 
empirical specification, a firm‟s financial constraint status appears to be a determining factor 
of an export entry decision. Consistent results are found for two different measures of 
financial constraints. In addition, we find Export entrants are less financially constrained in 
terms of assets tangibility, before entering the export market. Inconsistent with previous 
studies, we do not find that liquidity level of the firm is playing any significant role in export 
participation decisions for the case of Pakistani firms. 
  
 In the third empirical chapter, we study the relationship between financial constraints, 
political connections and performance of the firms. Some studies show a relationship 
between political connections and financial status of the firms, while some other studies show 
a relationship between firms‟ financial status and firms‟ performance. This is the first study 
which checks the direct relationship between political connections, financial constraints and 
performance of the firms. Literature shows that political relationship has been used as useful 
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resources of the firms, studies in this context for the case of developing country can be 
particularly important for policy makers to use these resources for the benefit of the firms. By 
using two different measures of political connections and instrumental variable approach, our 
study shows that firms‟ formal political connections make firms less financially constrained. 
In addition, we find strong evidence that politically connected firms are performing badly. 
These results are robust to three different measures of a firm‟s performance. We further find 
some evidences that the effects of political connections on firms performance do vary across 
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This chapter gives a synopsis of the framework of the thesis. It starts with the background of 
the research. The contribution and aim of the thesis is provided in the next section, followed 
by a section giving the structure of the thesis and summary of each empirical chapter. 
 
1. Research Background  
 
Studying the effects of finance on investment has a long history. It was started to emerge in 
the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. Meyer and Kuh, 1957; Kuh, 1963) and renewed in the 1980s 
following the advancement of investment models and empirical development in 1988 (e.g. 
Fazzari, et al., 1988). Financial constraint has been extensively defined as a result of capital 
market imperfections (information asymmetries and agency cost). Hence, these imperfections 
may halt interest rates and prices of securities from full adjustment to permit firms to 
undertake all desired investment projects; consequently, the availability of internal finance 
may pressure investment directly. Some studies define financial constraints as inelastic 
supply of capital (e.g. Almeida and Campello, 2001; Tirole, 2006; Farre-Mensa and 
Ljungqvist, 2016). The recent development in the literature of financial constraints has 
opened new avenues by exploring the effects of financial constraints on other activities of 
firms, such as firm growth, export participation decision, R&D investment, and so on. 
 
An extensive knowledge of the effects of financial constraints on firms‟ activities is equally 
crucial from both a macroeconomics and microeconomics viewpoint. The literature of 
imperfect capital markets has established a strong bond between finance and real activities. A 
good understanding of this relationship assists to withdraw such a monetary policy, which 
could efficiently affect the real activities to achieve the short run and long run objectives 
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from a macroeconomics perspective. On the other hand, from a microeconomic point of view, 
a good insight into the relationship between finance and real activities helps to understand the 
significance of corporate finance and the heterogeneity of a firm on a firm‟s activities.  
 
Despite the significance of financial constraints on firms‟ activities, a large number of studies 
are concentrating on developed countries to explore this link and introduce measures of 
financial constraints. However, this relationship and its results could be more intense for the 
case of underdeveloped countries with inefficient financial and legal systems and a higher 
level of corruption. Only a few studies have tried to explore this relationship for the case of 
Pakistan (such as Zia, 2006; Saeed and Sameer, 2015; Riaz, et al., 2016). Most of these 
studies intend to see the effect of financial constraints on investment, except for the study of 
Zia (2005), who explores the effects of subsidized export loans on financial constraints and 
the growth of a firm. The aim of this thesis is to fill this gap by not only exploring the effect 
of financial constraints on investment and export decisions, but also evaluating existing 
measures of financial constraint for the case of a Pakistani setting. We further explore the 
relationship between financial constraints, political connections, and performance of the firm, 
as political connections have been found as a source of lending bias in Pakistan. 
 
Given the significance of finance for firm growth, investment, and other activities, the 
measures of financial constraints at firm level play a vital role. The literature consists of a 
number of measures of financial constraints, but each measure has been criticised for some 
shortcomings. One of the most well-known measures of financial constraints is investment-
cash flow sensitivity given by Fazzari et al. (1988). By using firm-level data, Fazzari et al. 
(1988) estimate an investment equation on Tobin‟s q and cash flow. The argument behind 
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this approach is a firm‟s incapability to afford external funds; therefore, firms may rely more 
on internal funds. Subsequently, constrained firms will exhibit a positive and significant 
relationship between investment and cash flow. This approach classifies firms‟ priori as 
constrained and unconstrained, based on their dividend policy, age, size, and so on. The 
critics to this approach argue that the relationship between investment and cash flow could be 
the result of correlation between cash flow and mismeasured investment opportunities, 
instead of being caused by financial constraints
1
 (Bond and Cummins, 2001; Bond, et al., 
2003). The Euler equation and error correction models are used to overcome the 
shortcomings of q model, but these models have their own shortcomings. The criticism given 
by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) against the suitability of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a 
measure of financial constraints opened a new debate in literature. Following Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), some other studies (such as Cleary, 1999; Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004; 
and Cleary, et al., 2007) also found higher investment-cash flow sensitivity among the least 
financially constrained firms. Cleary et al. (2007) and Lyandres (2007) found a u-shaped 
relationship between investment and cash flow with respect to constraint.  
 
To address the limitations of existing measures, a combination of different types of variables 
is used (depicting different information on the balance sheet of the firm), such as indices to 
measure firms‟ constraints. KZ index regresses a firm‟s level of financial constraints, based 
on qualitative and quantitative information, and is regressed on a number of different 
determinants of constraints. These determinants are those features of the firms that are more 
likely to able to get external finance, while the WW index is built on Euler equation approach 
and does not require qualitative information of the firm. Whited and Wu (2006) used the 
                                                          
1
 Particularly Tobin‟s q. Q could be influenced by measurement error. Besides, an inefficient stock market can 
also lead to failing of q model.  
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structural parameter of the Whited (1992) model, the shadow cost of equity finance, which is 
regressed on observable firm characteristics. Consequently, they get a vector of coefficients, 
which are used to build the index. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) evaluated the existing two 
indices and other famous measures of financial constraints to find the most prominent 
features of the firm which could be used to categorise firms by financial status. To formulate 
HP index, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) regressed firm‟s level of financial constraints, based on 
both qualitative and quantitative information, on a number of different determinants of 
constraints. Subsequently, they build a simple size-age index using the coefficients of these 
two variables. One major concern about using these indices is that estimated coefficients 
(calculated in indices) are sample-specific, so their use to other economic realities could be 
challenging. Therefore, it is very important to first check the suitability of these measures for 
the case of the Pakistani system. 
 
Throughout the course of this thesis, this line of enquiry is pursued further by applying the 
latest and most suitable measures of financial constraints, to see the effects of financial 
constraints on a firm‟s investment, export decision, and performance.  
 
2. Contribution and Aim of the Thesis 
 
To conduct this study we use data from Pakistan, which provides a unique setting to 
investigate the nexus between financial constraints and firms‟ activities. First, despite 
undertaking a financial liberalization process with the aim to reduce the financial 
complications to the corporate sector, listed firms are still found to be financially constrained 
in Pakistan. In terms of banking sector liberalization, Pakistan is playing a leading role in 
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emerging economies (Bonaccorsi and Hardy, 2005). However, the macroeconomic indicators 
of the country are giving a gloomy picture. Fixed investment can be a driving force of the 
economy of any country but the continuous fluctuations in investment to gross domestic 
product (GDP) ratio in Pakistan is alarming. Even though the corporate sector is the largest 
borrower of banks‟ lending, the overall macroeconomic indicators are still dismal. Given the 
poor and insufficient state of a financial modernization process and a weak legal system, the 
level of financial constraints and its impact on firms‟ activities are likely to be greater in 
Pakistan when compared to other developing countries. Therefore, it is interesting to see 
whether Pakistani firms are financially constrained, and especially what types of firms are 
likely more financially constrained in this particular setting. 
 
The objective of choice to see the effects of financial constraints on investment and export 
decisions, and the effect of political connection on financial constraint, and subsequently on 
firms‟ performance as the focus of this thesis is given below.  
 
First, the development of the country mainly depends upon the investment level of the 
country. Without a continuous and consistent growth in fixed investment, it becomes 
challenging for the country to put itself on the path of development. The growth rate of 
investment in Pakistan is giving a disappointing picture; even though we can see some 
improvement in growth rate of investment, it is still not up to the mark. It is both necessary 
and interesting to see whether firms are financially constrained, which could lead to the poor 
performance of investment. If firms are financially constrained, it is of further significance to 
see what kinds of firms are more financially constrained. This research provides the policy 
makers with targeting the particular kinds of firms that are more financially constrained while 
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designing financial policies. This further provides the information to equip financial markets 
with modern techniques to make them more efficient in the lending process. Inspired by the 
need the initial part of the first empirical chapter aims to see the effects of financial 
constraints on investment. Given the significant role of financial constraint in firms‟ 
activities, the appropriate measure of financial constraint for the setup of the Pakistani 
economy is also equally important. Due to the emerging debate against the investment 
models to estimate investment on growth opportunities and cash flow of the firm, it has 
become highly important to use a reasonable measure of financial constraint. None of the 
studies has evaluated the existing popular measures for the case of the Pakistani setting; 
therefore, we try to address this issue in the second part of the first empirical chapter. The 
aim of this exercise is to get the confidence on existing measures.  
 
Second, exports are playing an invigorating role in boosting a country‟s economy across the 
globe. Export-led growth economies are the proof of the considerable importance of export 
for the country. For the case of Pakistan, the annual growth rate of export of the country 
shows a downward trend for most of the last decade. As a backdrop of the gloomy picture of 
export growth of the country, the Pakistani government has introduced a number of 
programmes and policies to extend trade promotion efforts. However, the effectiveness of 
these programmes closely relies upon the clear understanding of determinants of export. 
Chaney (2005) suggests that financially stable firms are more likely to export to international 
market because of being able to bear sunk cost and additional expenditures. There are few 
studies that check the relationship between financial health and export participation, but for 
the case of developed countries, we extend this research for the case of a developing country 
like Pakistan. We further introduce the latest measures of financial constraints to see the role 
of finance in export decision. The previous studies mainly rely on the proxies of a firm‟s 
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financial health. Our research tries to make it clear whether firms should be financially less 
constrained to participate in foreign export. Through this research, we may be able to identify 
some particular criteria that is required for firms to export; specifically, it could help the 
policy makers to take the right steps that are needed to promote firms to export. 
 
Our third empirical study is motivated by the fact of presence of lending bias among 
Pakistani capital markets on the basis of political connections of the firms (Khwaja and Mian, 
2005). The linkage between a firm‟s political connections and financial status has been 
highlighted by a number of studies (such as Charumilind, et al., 2006; Fan, et al., 2008; 
Faccio, 2009; Cooper, et al., 2010). However, the role of political connections to make firms 
less financially constrained has not been widely studied. Some studies have also argued the 
positive effects of political connections on firm‟s performance via financial advantages. The 
politics of Pakistan have been closely linked to rent seeking and corruption. In a 70-year 
history, only two elected governments could complete their five years‟ tenure in the office. 
Except for these two governments, all elected prime ministers and their respective assemblies 
have been dissolved because of the charges of corruption and political patronage. This shows 
the hold of rent-seeking activities in the country, which could also influence the firms‟ 
behaviour. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyse the effects of 
political connections on firms‟ financial constraints. Moreover, it is the first study to see the 
effects of political connections on firms‟ performances across financial status of the firms. 
The result of this research would help the policy makers to understand how the political 
connections could help the firms to achieve financial advantages, and subsequently help them 




3. Structure of the Thesis and Summary of Each Empirical Chapter 
 
Whether the level of financial constraints affects a firm‟s activities is a subject of 
econometric testing in this study. By using multifarious measures of financial constraints, we 
check the existence of financial constraints in Pakistani listed firms in chapter 2. First, we use 
q investment model and error correction model (ECM) to see investment-cash flow 
sensitivity in our sample firms. A significant and positive coefficient of cash flow shows the 
presence of financial constraints, as firms rely more on internal funds due to unavailability of 
external funds. The reason to use two different models of investment is to get robust results 
because of rising controversy around the measurement of Tobin‟s q. Our results, derived 
from both models, demonstrate that Pakistani listed firms are subject to financial constraints. 
It shows the presence of pecking order in financing patterns among listed firms. It further 
indicates the insufficient effort of the financial liberalization process to overcome the 
difficulties to raise external funds. It might also suggest the strict requirements, regulations, 
and transparency conditions for the listed firms in Pakistan that stop them from raising 
external funds. Next, we sort firms with an apriori classification scheme depending on an 
endogenous variable with respect to constraints. In our study, we categorize firms into size, 
dividend pay out ratio, and group affiliation, and then check the relationship between cash 
flow and investment. This exercise shows that size and dividend payments are significant 
factors to be associated with a firm‟s financial status. We find large firms and dividend-
paying firms are less financially constrained when compared to small and dividend non-
paying firms. Second, we assess the application of indices (measures of financial constraints) 
and assets tangibility for the case of the Pakistani economy. We sort firms‟ characteristics 
associated with difficult access to external finance into quartiles by KZ index, WW index, HP 
index, and assets tangibility to check whether these features of the firms move in the same 
direction as predicted by these indices. The movements of the variables of these indices will 
20 
 
show the functioning of these indices for the case of Pakistan. After sorting firms into 
quartiles based upon each index, we find that using KZ index demands extreme caution, as 
the mean value of q for all sample firms moves in the opposite direction. This prevents a very 
important condition being met in order for KZ index to function in the Pakistan setting. We 
further find an accurate functioning of WW index for Pakistani firms, as all financial 
variables‟ movements are consistent in having difficulty accessing external finance. We also 
find that mean values of the variables sorted by HP index and assets tangibility move 
according to their predictions. Our next step includes further evaluation of these indices by 
regressing financial variables on financial status of the firms. First, we divide firms into 
financial status on the basis of liquidity, a pattern used by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010). We then use ordered logit model to regress financial status on 
accounting variables, used by these indices, and on asset tangibility. Our results further 
support that WW index perform somehow better than other indices for the setup of a 
developing country. The results to regress financial status on HP index and assets tangibility 
are mixed.  
 
In chapter 3, we investigate the significance of financial constraints on the export decision of 
Pakistani manufacturing listed firms. Export to international market manifests a case in which 
the level of financial constraint (the difference between cost of internal finance and external 
finance) is likely to be more significant. Indeed, prospective exporters are aware of the 
expenditures related to transportation cost and competing for a higher standard of products to 
export to international market. There is also the possibility that export starters might not get 
easy access to external funding because of risk involvement to the project.  With the higher 
need of external funding in order to fulfil additional expenditures, it is more likely that 
financial constraints affect a firm‟s export decision. We concentrate only on manufacturing 
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listed Pakistani firms for this empirical chapter. In order to investigate the role of financial 
constraint on Pakistani manufacturing firms‟ export decisions, we examine the relationship 
between financial constraints and export decision of the firms over the period 2006–2014 for 
the sample firms. The rationale for this exercise is the observation that if the prospective 
exporters are less financially constrained, they are more likely to make a decision to export. 
Particularly, the financial condition of export starters behaves differently from non-exporters; 
therefore, we also check the ex-ante financial condition of starters. Given the significance of 
finance for exporters, it is also important to see how export to international market brings 
financial changes in exporters‟ balance sheets. This chapter will also check the effects of 
export on the financial condition of starters when compared to non-exporters. We find that 
exporters are categorically different from non-exporters in terms of finance. We further 
argue, on the basis of our results, that measures of financial constraints are different from 
measures of financial health, where previous literature has extensively relied on measures of 
financial health. Our results show that being financially less constrained is a significant 
determinant of a firm‟s export decision, when compared to being financially healthy. Firms 
may run out of funds to get access to international market, and possibly run out of liquid 
assets and accumulate loans on their balance sheet (indicators of financially weak firms). In 
turn, our study shows that firms should have easy access to external finance to meet 
international market criteria, but low liquidity and high leverage, or vice versa, could 
fluctuate due to many other factors. We raise our arguments on the basis of criticism for 
liquidity and leverage ratios as measures of financial constraints. We further find mixed 
evidence of becoming less financially constrained before starting to export for entrants, when 
compared to non-exporters. Our results are also consistent with previous studies that export 




In chapter 4, we examine the relationship between Pakistani listed non-financial firms‟ 
political connections, financial constraints, and performance. A firm‟s political connection is 
an important factor, where the difference in internal and external finance is clearly visible. A 
number of studies approve that firms‟ political connections assist firms in a number of ways, 
such as easy requirements to borrow loans. This easy access to loans by politically connected 
firms may make them less dependent on internal funds, or the cost of internal and external 
funds may become equal for them. In addition, political connections do not only affect 
financial aspects of the firms but they may also influence a firm‟s performance. The efficient 
use of easily available loans may enhance the performance level of the firms. Alternatively, 
the politicians‟ interference in decision-making and desire to use resources for personal 
motives could negatively affect performance. Given the assumption that a politically 
connected firm is less financially constrained, there is the possibility of variation of the effect 
of political connections on performance level across variant levels of constraint. In order to 
visualise the influences of political connections on a firm‟s financial status and performance, 
we use firm-level data for Pakistani listed non-financial firms for the period 2006–2015. The 
logic behind this exercise is the observation that politically connected firms are less 
financially constrained. By using two different measures of political connections, formal and 
informal, our results show that formal political connections (via board of director 
participation in general elections) make firms different from non-politically connected firms 
in terms of financial status and productivity. We also find that formal political connections 
bring financial advantages to firms and make them less financially constrained. It becomes 
easier for politically connected firms to access external funds. Our results further show that 
political connections influence firms‟ performances badly. These results are consistent with 
previous findings. Our study finds a few evidence that firms‟ level of financial constraints put 




In chapter 5, we conclude the thesis with the review of our main findings. We then provide 
some discussions and policy implications. Finally, we give some suggestions to extend our 
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Financial constraints have long been cited as the major hindrance for business. Therefore, a 
number of empirical studies have been conducted to see the presence of financial constraints 
at firm-level but most of the time for the case of developed countries. However, this is 
particular important for the case of developing country, as developed countries have well-
established financial markets making them less likely to suffer from severe financial 
constraints. The case of developing countries is different; the presence of underdeveloped 
financial markets on one hand, and higher chances of information asymmetries and agency 
cost on the other hand, make the level and effects of financial constraints extremely severe. 
This chapter of the thesis fill this gap by using a sample of firm-level data for Pakistani listed 
firms to check the presence of financial constraints. Pakistan, being an emerging economy 
and one of the highest performers in South Asia is a suitable candidate for this study. The 
process of financial liberalization was initiated in Pakistan in 1990s to reduce the level of 
financial limitations to corporate sector. However, recent studies indicate listed firms in 
Pakistan are financially constrained (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). This study provides evidence 
to policy makers to review the process of financial liberalization from the perspective of 
financial hurdles to the corporate sector.  
 
Besides this, previous studies (such as Fazzari, et al., 1988; Hubbard, et al., 1995; Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997; Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008; Chen, 2008; Guariglia and Knight, 2013) 
have mainly relied on investment models to see the effects of finance on investment to check 
financial constraints in firms. However, the limitations of all these investment models (q 
model, Euler equation, and ECM) leave a gap for new researchers to use advanced and more 
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accurate measures of financial constraints. Our study is trying to fill this gap. To test the 
presence of financial constraints and to investigate the sensitivity of the empirical findings to 
the choice of alternative specifications, in this chapter we use two different models of 
investment. Departing from these traditional investment models, we further sort firms into 
financial status by KZ index, WW index, HP index and Assets tangibility to check the 
performance of these latest measures for a developing country like Pakistan. We further argue 
that it is very important to see the suitability of existing popular measures and indices for the 
case of a developing country. Even though a few studies (such as Riaz, et al., 2016) have 
used indices to calculate the level of financial constraint in Pakistan, none of the studies has 
tested the suitability of these indices for the setting of developing countries. We argue that 
most of the proxies of financial constraints (including indices) have been developed in the 
setup of developed countries. Using those indices for the case of developing countries is an 
open question
2
. Our study contributes to the literature by evaluating these popular latest 
measures of financial constraints for the case of a developing country.    
 
In this chapter, we will discuss two fundamental research questions. First, whether Pakistani 
firms are financially constrained or not.  Further, whether the level of financial constraints 
vary across different status of firms (such as across firms‟ size, dividend policy and group 
affiliation).  Second, whether popular measures of financial constraints including sorting 
variables (such as age, size and Assets tangibility) and indices (such as WW Index, KZ Index 
and HP Index) are suitable to use for the environment of developing country.  In order to 
investigate the first question, we will initially use investment – cash flow sensitivity as a 
measure of financial constraints by using q investment model. Due to the possibility of error 
in calculation of q as highlighted by previous studies (such as Erickson and Whited, 2000 ; 
                                                          
2
 However, there are a number of empirical studies that are using these popular measures for the case of 
developing countries (such as Guariglia and Yang 2016; Riaz, et al., 2016). 
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Summers 1981), we will also use Error Correction Model (ECM) to check investment-cash 
flow sensitivity at firm level. To check the level of investment cash flow sensitivity across 
different type of firms, we priori sort firms according to size, group affiliation and dividend 
policy and then check the level of investment cash –flow sensitivity
3
.  In order to investigate 
the second empirical question, we will sort firms according to the latest measures of financial 
constraints, such as indices (KZ, WW and HP) and Assets tangibility. In doing so, we will see 
whether characteristics of the firms which indicate the level of financial constraint are 
associated with external financial constraints. We will then follow the methodology used by 
Hadlock and Pierce(2010) and use Ordered Logit model to check whether these sorting 
financial variables are truly linked to the status of financial constraints for the case of 
developing country. We will regress firms‟ quantitatively determined financial constraint 
status (based on liquidity level of firms) on the financial variables of these indices and assets 
tangibility. This practice will give a confidence to future researchers to use latest measures of 
financial constraints for the setup of developing country.  
 
Our empirical results find that Pakistani listed financial firms are financially constrained. We 
further find that large and dividend-paying firms are less financially constrained. When we 
sort firms in to quartiles on the basis of indices and assets tangibility, we find that firms‟ 
characteristics, categorized by WW and HP indices, are more appropriate to associate with 
difficult access to external finance. One of the most important variables (q) of KZ index 
moves differently for Pakistani firms, which goes against the structural prediction and 
functioning of the index. This cast doubt on the sorting factors given by KZ index for the case 
of Pakistani firms; whereas, we find all the financial variables of WW and HP indices move 
according to the expectations of the indices. It means the functioning of these two indices for 
                                                          
3
 As size and group affiliation are found to cause lending bias in Pakistan‟s financial system. The detailed 
explanation is provided in the section 3. 
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the case of developing countries like Pakistan is more appropriate. Evaluating these indices 
and assets tangibility on the basis of estimation results, we find most of the variables of WW 
index are significant and in agreement with the index when compared to the KZ and HP 
indices. Asset tangibility also appears significant but with the opposite sign. It means WW 
index is better to associate to the difficult access of external finance to the Pakistani firms.  
 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 presents a brief theoretical and 
empirical review of measures of financial constraints. Section 3 provides background and 
stylized facts about the Pakistani financial system and corporate sector. Section 4 develops 
the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the results. The chapter will be concluded in 
section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The objective of this section is to lay the foundation of this chapter by introducing financial 
constraints and the theoretical background of imperfect capital markets, and to critically 
evaluate different measures of financial constraints. More specifically, this section is 
organised as follows: it starts with the definition of financial constraints following the 
antecedent of financial constraints, then gives the review of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
as a measure of financial constraints, and the application of different investment models in 
this regard. To conclude, we give an overview on different sample splitting criteria and 
indices as measures of financial constraints. 
 In short, section 2.1 gives a theoretical background of capital market imperfections and an 
overview of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints. Section 
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2.2 presents a review of three extensively applied empirical models to test the effects of 
financial constraints on investment: the q model, the Euler equation, and the error correction 
model. It further discusses the shortcomings of each of the empirical models. Section 2.3 
provides contradictory analysis against investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of 
financial constraints, and reviews other measures of financial constraints in detail: sample 
splitting criteria, assets tangibility, KZ index, WW index, and HP index.  
 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997, p6) define financial constraints as  
„A firm as being financially constrained if the cost or availablity of external funds 
precludes the company from making an investment it would have chosen to make had 
internal funds been available. In other words, there is a wedge between the internal 
and external costs of fund‟. 
 
The literature of financial constraints on investment associate them with external financial 
constraints, as firms find it hard to generate funds for particular investment projects because 
of expensive external funds (such as Whited, 1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Love, 2003). 
The theories of imperfect capital markets define more financially constrained firms in terms 
of greater investment-cash flow sensitivity (Fazzari, et al., 1988). Tirole (2006) explains the 
same idea in different terms as frictions in the supply of capital, mainly because information 
asymmetry between investors and firms causes financial constraints. These resistences of 
capital market decrease the elasticity of the supply curve of external capital curve. Almeida 
and Campello (2001, p11) also confirm that “constrained firms are at the point where the 
supply of capital becomes inelastic”. Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) further explain the 
characteristics of financially constrained and unconstrained firms in terms of a firm‟s capital 
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supply curve. The more the firm is financially constrained, the steeper (more inelastic) the 
supply curve is. The above-mentioned definitions given by different authors associate 
financial constraints with difficult access of external finance due to numerous reasons e.g. 
information asymmetries in capital market. We will use the same definitions for our empirical 
studies in this thesis.  
 
2.1 Antecedent of financial constraints 
 
The literature of financial constraints dates back to  Modigliani and Miller‟s (1958) theorem 
on the irrelevance of capital structure. This theorem states that in the absence of transaction 
cost, information asymmetry, and agency cost, a firm‟s investment decision relies upon 
expected performance of the company
4
. It is so a firm‟s internal and external sources of funds 
are perfectly substituted in the neoclassical world; therefore, a firm‟s investment decision is 
not stimulated by the method of financing. This theorem exists only in the perfectly 
competitive capital markets. However, capital markets are imperfect in the real world due to 
factors such as transaction cost, bankruptcy cost, and taxation. 
 
Capital market imperfection 
 
Most of the theoretical work of the 1970s‟ era highlighted that the assumptions of Modigliani 
and Miller‟s (1958) theorem do not exist in the real world. In the real world, markets are 
imperfect due to the problems of asymmetric information and agency cost. Under these 
circumstances, a firm‟s investment spending may be influenced by the condition of a firm‟s 
balance sheet. If potential investors are less informed than managers of the firms about the 
                                                          
4
 This theorem assumes that both the decision maker of the firm and the external fund supplier have equal 
information about the investment opportunities, riskiness of the project, and profit. 
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prospective investment opportunity, the cost of issuing equity may increase. This difference 
of shadow price between internal finance and external finance may cause cost disadvantage 
of external finance. This problem of asymmetric information was first highlighted by Akerlof 
(1970) with the „lemons problem‟
5
. Relating the problem of asymmetry information to the 
issue of equity finance is applied by Myers and Majluf (1984), who introduced a situation 
where a firm‟s manager has some additional information about the prospect project but the 
investor is unaware of this information. As a result, a less informed investor may demand 
premium on equity for balancing the losses encountered from financing a „lemon‟ firm (bad 
project). This premium makes an imperfect substitution between internal finance and external 
finance. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) relate the same idea of information asymmetry to the 
problem of credit rationing in the debt market
6
. As a result of asymmetric information and 
undervaluation of the equity issue, there is a possibility that new investors may take more of 
the net present value (NPV) of the project, causing a net loss to existing shareholders. In this 
scenario, rejection of the project seems likely even if the NPV is positive.  
 
The agency cost theory argues that the conflict of interest between the ownership and 
management leads manager indulging in self-interest. This ultimately results in the decline of 
the firm‟s value. Jensen and Meckling (1976) give two types of conflicts in agency 
relationship. First, the conflict exists between shareholder (principal) and manager (agent). 
Second, the conflict occurs between debt holder and equity holder. There are possibilities that 
managers may use delegated rights and resources for their personal motives rather than 
                                                          
5
 Akerlof (1970) highlights the situation where sellers of cars have some additional information regarding the 
quality of cars. This information asymmetry can cause malfunctioning of the market and a complete breakdown 
of the market in the extreme case. 
6
 As lenders may not be aware of the good borrower and bad borrower, they fix a high interest rate, which forces 





maximizing the value of firms. This reduction in welfare incurred by the principal as a result 
of divergence of interest of the manager will be called „residual loss. Jensen (1986) also 
highlights that a changed objective of management and interest of shareholder initiates 
suboptimal or substandard investment. 
 
Hierarchy of finance 
 
Due to the occurrence of an imperfect capital market, it becomes challenging for firms to get 
external finance easily at the time of need. In turn, firms may indulge in the problem of 
financial constraint. Projects for which equity is issued are undervalued because of 
information asymmetry; this causes net loss to shareholders. In this situation, projects are 
rejected even though they have positive NPV. This underinvestment can only be avoided by 
the idea given by Myers (1984), that cheap internal finance should be preferred over 
expensive external finance. The reason for avoiding external financing is the higher issuing 
cost of equity, which includes administrative and underwriting costs. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) also argue that firms seem to choose internal financing over external financing, and if 
firms need to do external financing, they should prefer bonds to stock. If firms can only issue 
risky debt, firms may refuse even a positive NPV investment opportunity, because average 
opportunity loss is lower with debt finance when compared to equity finance; therefore, firms 
always prefer debt over equity. Under these circumstances, firm investment decisions are 







Investment cash flow sensitivity and financial constraints 
Empirically, financial constraint has been gauged by the investment-cash flow sensitivity
7
. 
This concept of a link between internal funds and capital investment, in the case of 
informational imperfections, is explained by figure 2.1. The supply curve, S, represents the 
supply of funds to the firm, while the demand curve, D, represents the demand for capital by 
the firm with net worth. The cost of capital is on the vertical axis, while the quantity of 
capital stock is on the horizontal axis. The supply curve, S, in neoclassical investment model, 
is the horizontal segment at the market real rate of interest (r). In this case, at K*, the 
expected marginal profitability would be equal to the investment. As the movement of D 
relies on the firm‟s investment opportunities (expected future profitability of capital), the 
position of S is determined by the cost of capital (the market interest rate). In the simple 
world of perfect capital market, there will be no link between a firm‟s internal funds and 
investment decision. The market interest rate would act as an opportunity cost of internal 
funds. Firms will easily borrow at that interest rate to obtain the optimal investment; 
subsequently, underinvestment will not occur. 
 
As the features of imperfect capital market lead outsiders to demand premium on external 
funds, an upward sloping supply curve emerges, which shows the funds above the level of 
internal funds. Let us consider a firm with net worth of W1 and investment demand curve D. 
The firm will be able to invest up to the point K0 only because of an imperfect capital market. 
                                                          
7
 For instance, see Fazzari etal.,1988 ; Kaplan ,1997. Cash flow is normally measured by the level of internal 
funds in the empirical literature. 
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This shows the significance of financial constraints on investment, as lack of finance on 
expensive external finance leads a firm to fail to obtain its optimal investment level. The 
increase in net worth from W1 to W2, holding the investment opportunities unchanged, leads 
to an increase in investment from K0 to K1. The slope of S(W) curve relies on the level of 
information problems faced by firms. The firms with a higher level of information problems 
indicate the much steeper S(W) curve. This means the cost of external funds is higher than 
the internal funds. This logical reasoning builds the relationship between investment-cash 
flow to see the existence of financing constraints in the studies. 
 
Figure 2.1: Relationship between internal funds and capital investment 
               Cost of Funds                  




                                     r 
 
 
                                                                                                   W0       K0       K1        K*                  Capital Stock 
                                                                                                 Source: Hubbard (1998, p 4)               
 
2.2 Models for financial constraints and investment 
 
Myer and Kuh (1957) first introduced the concept of the role of finance in business 
investment. Even though, most of the research of the 1960s separates the role of finance from 
investment decision (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).  Jorgenson (1971) introduced the idea of 
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user cost of capital in 1963 and developed the first neoclassical model. Despite its simplicity 
and popularity, this model could not establish its validity in empirical tests. This challenge to 
empirical researchers was first answered by Fazzari et al. (1988), who used Q model to check 
the impact of net worth on investment
8
. Fazzari et al. (1988) criticized the existing models, 
which only depicted the pattern of mature companies. For these companies, internal finance 
and external finance can be perfect substitutes, but for other firms, external capital is not a 
perfect substitute for internal capital. In their influential paper, Fazzari et al. (1988) test the 
relationship between investment and cash flow (internal finance) by using q model of 
investment for the case of US manufacturing firms. They find that even after controlling for 
investment opportunities via Tobin‟s q, a firm‟s cash flow is a significant determinant of a 
firm‟s investment decision. Fazzari et al. (1988) reveal that high dividend firms have less 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and low dividend firms have high investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. They interpret high investment-cash flow sensitivity as evidence of financial 
constraints. A large number of papers in the literature following the Fazzari et al. (1988) 
terminology find similar results. Hoshi et al. (1991) used the same methodology to scrutinize 
the behaviour of 24 manufacturing companies that were affiliated with KEIRETSU 
(industrial group) and 121 independent firms that were not members of KEIRETSU in Japan. 
The study concludes that stand-alone firms are more financially constrained, as they have 
severe investment cash flow sensitivity. Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) explored 99 NYSE-
listed firms and 21 over-the-counter firms. This study also used Q investment model to check 
the effect of cash flow on investment. The results are that a group of young firms that sell and 
buy stocks over the counter; show a higher sensitivity between investment and cash flow than 
the mature firms. 
                                                          
8




Derivation of the Q model 
 
By following Blundell et al. (1992) and Whited (1992), we derive q model as follows: 
 In the q theory of investment a forward looking firm which faces costs in adjusting its capital 
stock behaves to maximise the present value of future net receipts R, given by: 
      ,∑     
 
             -        (1) 
        Where    Rit = pt [F(Kit , Lit) – C(Iit, Kit )] – wtLit – Pt
I
 Iit 
        and       ∏  
 
         
        for s=  1,2,…..,∞   and ϒt =1 
subject to capital accumulation constraint: 
     (   )                   (2) 
where i and t denote the firm and time period, E[./Ωit]  shows the expectation conditional on 
information available to firm i and at time t; rt+j   is the nominal discount rate between  period 
t+j-1 and t+j ; ϒt+s is the discount factor between period t and t+s; pit is the price of output; Kit   
is the capital stock; Lit is a vector of variable factor inputs; wt is a vector of prices of these 
variable factors ; pt F(Kit , Lit ) is the revenue function, that is, the production function F(Kit , 
Lit ) multiplied by the product price; Iit is investment ; pt
I
 is the price of capital goods; pt
I
Iit is 
the purchase cost of investment goods; C(Iit, Kit ) is the cost of adjustment function, 
increasing and strictly convex in Iit and decreasing in Kit; and δ is the constant rate of 
depreciation. It is assumed that the firm is price taker in both output and input markets. It is 
further assumed that there are no taxes or debt finance. 
We set up Lagrangian, where λ denotes multiplier of Lagrangian 
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The first order condition for maximizing (3) with respect to Lit gives 
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The first order condition for maximizing (3) with respect to Iit gives 
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The first order condition for maximizing (3) with respect to Kit gives 
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Substituting for Rit, equations (4), (5) and (6) become 
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Rearranging equation (6b) gives 
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Equation (7) depicts the result of standard neoclassical theory. The firm will use the capital to 





Equation (5b) can also be written as 
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Where qit  = λit /P
I
t  =  
(
    
       
)
(    )  
         (9) 
equation (9) is known as marginal q, shows the ratio of the market value of an additional unit 
of capital to its replacement cost. 
From equation (8) we get that, in the absence of adjustment costs (i.e. CI (Iit,  Kit ) = 0), the 
firm invests up to the point where marginal q obtains the value of unity.   With strictly 
convex adjustment costs, the level of investment is an increasing function of the deviation of 
marginal q from unity.  
To get an investment specification from the first order in equation (8), a functional form of 
for the cost of adjustment function is required.  A widely used parameterization in literature 
assumes that  
                                                          
9
 See Jorgenson (1963). 
39 
 








      1
 
         (10) 
This has the properties that adjustment costs are strictly convex in Iit and homogeneous 
degree one in (Iit , Kit). Total adjustment costs are quadratic about some „normal‟ rate of gross 
investment ci (at which adjustment costs average zero), and marginal adjustment costs are 
linear in the observed rate of investment. The coefficient b can be as parameterizing the speed 
of adjustment. Ԑit  represents unobservable factors in adjustment costs.  
Substituting the adjustment cost function into equation (8), and solving for investment gives 






    
 
 (    )
  
  
                       (11) 
Since the shadow value λit can not be observed and marginal qit is also not directly 
observable. We can only observe average q, namely the ratio of the market value of existing 
capital to its replacement cost. However, Hayashi(1982) shows if the firm is price taker in all 
markets and both the production function and adjustment cost functions are linearly 
homogeneous in their arguments, then average q and marginal q are equal. Using the 
properties of linear homogeneous functions (e.g. F(K,L) =KFK + LFL ) and equations 4(b), 
equation 6(b) can be re-written as:  
   (   )           (   ) 0
          
  
 1         (12) 
Solving equation (12) forward by repeated substitution then gives 
    




    
       
)
(    )  
                           (13)      
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where Vit  a value of the firm and (1-δ)pt
I
 Ki,t-1 is the replacement value of the capital stock. 
Using average q constructed from financial market data as a measure of marginal q, the 






    
 
 
                        (14) 
Ԑ is the summation of three means zero elements 
Ԑit = vi +ui +wit 
Where vi is a proxy for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. ui is account for the cyclical 
factors. wit is stochastic disturbance to the firm. 
 
Equation (14) represents an investment model derived under frictionless capital markets. To 
test the impact of financial constraints, recent studies have used Q model included with a cash 
flow term, proxying for the change in net worth. Q controls for the market evaluation of the 
firm‟s investment opportunities. The traditional procedure is to include a variable depicting 
the condition of internal funds – usually cash flow. Under this q model, none of the variables, 
including cash flow, should be significant. If cash flow appears significant, this means failure 
of the frictionless q model. It supports the existence of financial constraints.  
 
The other explanations for the significant cash flow are doubts regarding the failure of q 
model to capture firms‟ investment opportunities. In the real world, there is distortion of the 
assumptions of q model, so the equality between average q and marginal q is not possible. 
Cummins et al. (2006) highlight the measurement error problem with calculation of average 
q. This can occur if present value of expected future net distribution diverges from the stock 




Another challenge to the performance of q theory is given by Carpenter and Guariglia (2008), 
who argued that q model only forecasts outsiders‟ assessments of investment opportunities. It 
does not assess insiders‟ estimation of opportunities. For this purpose, this paper tests 
whether financial constraint is due to information asymmetry of capital market or is due to 
the deficiency of q theory, which does not estimate insiders‟ evaluation of opportunities. 
Results for all three estimation methods give positive and statistically significant coefficients 
of cash flow (CF). This paper includes a new variable called contractual obligation for future 
investment in the regression model. Results of econometric techniques of this new regression 
give the same positive relationship between cash flow and investment, which supports the 
already prevailing literature that financial constraint is due to information asymmetries of 
capital market. 
 
The big challenge to this model arises in the situation where average q is not equal to 
marginal q. In order to overcome the shortcomings of q model, another approach, Euler 
equation, is used in investment. To separate the specific role of financial constraint in the 
investment process, Euler equation has been applied in a similar manner as it is used in 
Consumption
10
 literature. Euler equation can control expectational influences on investment 
decisions. These expectational influences are shown in error terms. This equation is a relation 
between investment rates in succeeding periods, which can be applied under the presence of 
symmetric and quadratic cost of adjustment. By using Euler equation, the problem of 
measuring average q is also avoided. In what follows, those firms that are not listed on the 
stock market can also be investigated.  
 
                                                          
10
 Euler equation was first used by Stephen P Zeldes in Consumption. 
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Derivation of the Euler equation 
 
Euler equation is derived from the value maximization problem of the firm. By following 
Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994), we combine equations (5) and (6) to derive 















     
     -        (13)   
Indicating the error was made when forecasting ϒt+1 (∂R / ∂I )I, t+1 based on information 
available in period t by: 
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To obtain an empirical investment model, it then requires only that the marginal revenue 
product of capital and the marginal adjustment costs are specified in terms of observables. 
Substituting for the net receipts R gives: 
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If FK (Kit , Lit) is constant returns to scale and C(Iit , Kit )is linearly homogeneous  in Iit  and 
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Where Π is gross operating profits, that is sales pt[F(Kit, Lit) – C(Iit, Kit )] minus variable costs 
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We assume competitive markets and quadratic cost of function forms as : 
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Where the rate of gross investment c is assumed constant across firms and non-stochastic, the  
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Is the real user cost of capital in the sense of Jorgenson, Φt+1 = pt /[pt+1(1-δ)ϒt+1] is a real 
discount factor, and Ԑi,t+1  = -Ԑi,t+1/(bpt+1ϒt+1). The coefficient on the lagged investment rate is 
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positive and greater than one. The coefficient on the lagged square investment rate is negative 
and greater than one in absolute value. Under the assumptions of perfect capital markets, the 
common coefficient on the lagged gross operating profits and the user cost terms is negative 
and depends on the magnitude of the adjustment costs. If this assumption is correct, 
investment may be positively related to profits through the effect of liquidity constraints, and 
the basic Euler equation in (21) would be misspecified. 
 
Whited (1992) uses Euler equation to check the effect of liquidity and debt constraint on a 
firm‟s discount rate. Bond and Meghir (1994) apply Euler equation to test the hierarchy of the 
finance model for UK manufacturing firms
11
. Bond et al. (2003) also apply Euler equation 
model to examine the influence of finance on investment for firms in Belgium, France, 
Germany, and UK.  
 
Derivation of the Error Correction Model 
 
Recently, error correction model has been used as an alternative model to test the hypothesis 
of financial constraint (Bond et al. (2003) and Guariglia (2008). The model was initially 
introduced by Bean(1981) into the literature of investment.  The model specifies a long- run 
level of capital stock and allows a flexible specification of the adjustment dynamics to be 
estimated from the data. Assuming that in the absence of adjustment costs, the firm‟s desired 
capital stock will take the form: 
 
                         (16) 
                                                          
11
 This model assumes that internal funds are available at lower cost than external funds. 
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Kit is log of capital stock. Sit is log of firm sale, jit is user cost of real capital and Vit is a firm-
specific effect. 
 
However, in the presence of adjustment costs, it is not easy for the firm to achieve its desired 
capital stock immediately; therefore, to control the slow adjustment of capital stock, we use a 
dynamic adjustment mechanism between capital and sales called Autoregressive Distributed 
Model, with two lags, in which equation (16) is nested as a long run equilibrium. It is also 
assumed that variation in capital stock is controlled by the time-specific component of the 
error term; we can obtain an expression for the logarithm of the firm‟s capital stock: 
 
                                                               (17) 
 
Ki,t-1 and Ki,t-2 are autoregressive components in equation (17). Sit, Si,t-1, Si,t-2 are distributed 
lag components.  dt is a time-specific component. ηi is a firm-specific effect. ηjt a time-
specific effect that varies across industries. vit is an idiosyncratic error term. Equation (17) is 
autoregressive distributed lag model ADL(2,2). We subtract Ki,t-1 from both sides of the 
equation (17) then add and subtract (α1-1)Ki,t-2, β0Yi,t-1, (β0+β1)Si,t-2 and (α1+α2-1) Si,t-2 on the 
right hand side of the equation. We apply unit elasticity that (β0+β1+β2)/(1-α1-α2) is equal to 1 
in long run.  
 
                 (   )               (     )        (     




We use ∆Kit ≈Iit/Ki,t-1 –Ș approximation and include a cash flow term (CF/Ki,t-1), then our 
empirical model will look like 
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Where Z1= (α-1) , Z2= β0, Z3= β0+β1 , Z4 =(α1+α2-1) and Z5= Z4(1-Ԑ) here Ԑ = -( β0+β1+β2)/ Z4 
shows long run elasticity.  
It is important to note that in order to be consistent with the error correction behaviour, the 
coefficient associated with (Ki,t-2 –Si,t-2) should be negative , i.e. if the level of capital stock is 
lower (higher) than its desired level, the future investment should be higher to catch up with 
the desired level of capital stock and vice versa.  
 
A number of studies have used ECM to check the changes in financial conditions on the level 
of investment. Bond et al. (2003) used ECM to check the effects of financial constraint on 
investment under different financial systems. Chen (2008) intended to see the role of cash 
flow to determine firms‟ levels of investment in the transition economy of China. Using 
ECM, significant cash flow coefficient showed sensitivity between cash flow and investment. 
 
2.3 Contradictory analysis and other measures of financial constraints 
 
In general, the evidence of empirical studies following Fazzari et al. (1988) associates 
financial constraints with the investment-cash flow sensitivity. However, the work of Kaplan 
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and Zingales (1997) casts doubts about the use of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a gauge 
of the existence of financial constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) reassessed 49 low-
dividend-paying firms from the sample of Fazzari et al. (1988).. The findings contrast the 
results of Fazzari et al. (1988), as high sensitivity of investment to cash flow was not found 
among the most financially constrained firms. Cleary (1999) also supported the results of 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Cleary (1999) highlighted that less creditworthy firms, which 
are associated with severe financial constraints, show lesser investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) also supported the results of contradictory studies. They 
used negative cash flow as a proxy of financially weak firms. They found that financially 
weak firms have less investment-cash flow sensitivity. Cleary et al. (2007) also found a u-
shaped function between firms‟ investments and internal funds. Guariglia (2008) uncovered 
the same results for the panel of UK firms. 
 
However, the argument of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and his supporters were well 
answered by Fazzari et al. (2000) in following years.  Fazzari et al. (2000) pinpoint that more 
financially constrained firms, categorized by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), are actually 
financially distressed firms. These firms are possibly restricted by creditors to use internal 
funds for investment purposes, and consequently show low responsiveness of investment and 
cash flow. In general, the results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) also suffer some other 
problems. Such as the criteria they use to divide the firms into the degree of financing 
constraints for such a small sample is inappropriate. Moreover, the reliance on managers‟ 




The study by Moyen (2004) links the contradictory results with using different sample 
splitting criteria by both studies. He finds that when firms are categorized according to 
Fazzari et al.‟s (1988) methodology , as firms with low dividend are most constrained and 
firms with high dividend are least constrained, results of the regression are consistent with 
their findings. If firms are categorized by Kaplan and Zingales‟ (1997) criterion, as firms 
without access to required funds are likely constrained and firms with access to ample funds 
are never constrained, results are found to be consistent with their findings.  
 
In a nutshell, these contradictory results conflict the conventional wisdom, but are driven by 
the fact that when the firm is in severe cash shortfall, its investment does not respond, even to 
internal funds. 
 
Sample splitting criteria as a measure of financial constraint 
 
From the previous discussion, it is clearly found that empirical evidence of investment-cash 
flow sensitivity seems to be quite sensitive to the sample splitting criteria, which means it is 
an essential element in the test of financial constraints hypothesis. The logic behind splitting 
the sample firms into different groups is to categorize them according to those characteristics 
that seem closer to the capital market imperfections (such as information asymmetry and 
agency problems). As financial constraints are the result of these capital market 
imperfections, these sample splitting criteria are being used extensively to gauge financial 




Different types of constraints can have a distinct impact on investment. Some studies have 
used internal financial constraints, such as cash flow and coverage ratio, for categorizing 
firms to scrutinize the implication of financial constraint on investment. Other studies have 
applied external financial constraint, such as dividend ratio, size, and age as control variables 
to see their impact on the financial constraint of firms. Table 2.1 below summarizes different 
controlled variables that have been extensively used in literature.  
 




 Authors Country Finding 
Dividend payout Fazzari et al. 
(1988) 





High investment-cash flow 
sensitivities for low-div firms. 
Euler equation model is rejected for 
low-div firms. 
Affiliation to the 
industrial group 
or bank 
Hoshi et al. (1991)   
Cho (1998)  





Affiliated firms have lesser 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Size (of firm) Carpenter and 
Guariglia (2008) 





Larger firms have lesser investment-
cash flow sensitivity. 
Smaller firms have lesser investment-
cash flow sensitivity. 
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Guariglia (2008)  
UK 
The investment of smaller firms is 
more sensitive to cash flow. 
 
Age (of firm) Guariglia (2008) UK The investment of younger firms is 
more sensitive to cash flow. 






Relationship between investment and 




Whited (1992) US The firms without access to bonds 





Sun and Yamori 




Variation in investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is sensitive to regional 
development. 
Leverage ratio Agung (2000) Indonesia High leverage firms show higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
 
These sample splitting criteria have been used to gauge the level of information asymmetry 
that the firm faces. However, some of these sample splitting criteria have been criticized in 
the literature so far. Evidence for size, which has been widely used to partition the sample, is 
mixed. In general, large firms tend to show less investment-cash flow sensitivity (such as 
Fazzari, et al., 1988; Hu and Schiantarelli, 1998; Jaramillio, et al., 1996). In contrast, 
Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) and Chow and Fung (1998) found that large firms are 
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more financially constrained on the basis of higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Nonetheless, these splitting criteria provide us with an insight into studying a firm‟s 
heterogeneity.  
 
Moreover, these criteria have been criticised in the literature on the following bases. First, 
previous studies kept financially constrained and unconstrained groups fixed in all sample 
periods, whereas, financial constraint cannot necessarily prevail in all sample periods; 
therefore, firms may transit across different financial times (Schiantarelli, 1996). However, 
recent studies are assigning firm years into different groups, which allows them to transit 
between different financial times, and this resolves the problem somehow. Moreover, 
literature also shows less satisfaction towards using a single criteria to divide the firms. It is 
believed that this is not enough of a statistic, but nonetheless, a number of empirical studies 
have been using these criteria, as they believe that these provide some insights to study the 
relationship between firms‟ characteristics and their behaviour.  
 
Assets tangibility as a measure of financial constraint 
 
There is another popular measure of financial constraint in the literature given by Almeida 
and Campello (2006), who extend a theoretical argument that tangibility of a firm‟s assets is 
such a factor that encourages/sustains external financing because of having the ability to 
reduce the contractibility problems. This, in turn, increases a firm‟s ability to access external 
finance. According to their theoretical expectation, firms with more tangible assets are less 
likely to be financially constrained. By using data from COMPUSTAT over the period 1985–
2000, their paper shows that, at a low level of assets tangibility, investment-cash flow 
sensitivity increases. This paper uses a detailed firm-level measure to gauge the expected 
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liquidation value of firms‟ main categories of operating assets. At the firm level, asset 
tangibility is measured by the following formula
12
: 
                   (                                                    
                                                                          )                                     (20) 
 
Where Cash is a firm‟s cash holdings; Receivables consist of a firm‟s accounts receivable; 
Inventory is the value of a firm‟s inventory; Capital is the value of a firm‟s fixed assets; and 
total assets is a firm‟s book value of total assets. Higher tangibility means firms are less 
financially constrained. However, asset tangibility may have strong industry-related effects 
and fewer firms-related variations. In addition to standard industry fixed effect, asset 
tangibility as a measure of financial condition of the firm may also rely on a firm‟s position 
within industry. To get rid of industry-related effects, we will use the ratio of the firm 
tangibility over industry level median. We will use an industry-adjusted level of asset 
tangibility for our empirical studies. 
 
Indices as a measure of financial constraint 
 
In addition to investment-cash flow sensitivity and other splitting criteria of firms, three 
indices are very popular in the literature to overcome the shortcomings of the already existing 
measures of financial constraints. These indices are a summation of multiple financial ratios 
of the firms. The detail of these indices are provided below. 
                                                          
12
 Almeida and Campello (2006) borrow this measure from Berger et al(1996) to construct a firm-level measure 
of expected asset liquidation values. Berger et al(1996) find a dollar of book value produces , on average, 72 





KZ index  
 
The actual KZ index is given by Lamont et al. (2001). They developed an index on the 
regression coefficients generated by Kaplan and Zingales, who classified firms into five 
categories of financial constraints and then used an ordered logit regression to estimate the 
accounting variables. Lamont et al. (2001) give an index consisting of a linear combination of 
five accounting ratios: cash flow, market value, debt, dividends, and cash holdings, and each 
is scaled by total capital. Following is the KZ index: 
                                                             
                                                                 (21)  
Where CF is the ratio of cash flow to capital; Q is Tobin‟s q; TD is ratio of long term debt to 
capital; Div is ratio of dividend to capital; and CASH is ratio of cash to capital.  
A higher index value suggests a firm that is more financially cosntrained. Subsequently, 
financially constrained firms have low cash flow, high q, high debt ratio, low dividend 
payments, and low cash.  
 
KZ index is found to be the most popular measure of financial constraints if judged by 
Google Scholar citations. This index is also generated by the influential debate between 
Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zinagales (1997), as explained previously. However, 
there is considerable criticism about the error in q value calculation, which is used to 
calculate the index. Moreover, suitability of the index for a large sample is also an open 
question because this index is actually built on a small sample given by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997). Kim and Park (2015) check the correlation between firm‟s measure of financial 
distress and three popular measures of financial constraints (KZ index, WW index, and HP 
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index) in order to distinguish financial constraint from financial distress. Their empirical 
study finds KZ index is linked more to financial distress than financial constraints.  
 
WW index  
 
This structural approach overcomes the problem of traditional approach where measurement 
of Tobin‟s q involves serious difficulties (Erickson and Whited, 2000; Bond and Cummins, 
2001; Cooper and Ejarque, 2003). There were also some concerns about KZ index related to 
the size of the sample, as Kaplan and Zingales (1997) use only 49 firms from Fazzari et al. 
(1988), known as „constrained firms‟, while Lamont et al. (2001) apply the exact coefficients 
on data from a broad sample of firms to construct a „synthetic KZ index‟. Therefore, using 
the same coefficients for a much larger sample of firms in a different period leaves an open 
question as to whether this index is truly capturing the financial constraints. 
 
Whited and Wu (2006) used a distinct approach. Based on a standard intertemporal 
investment model, this study constructs an index drawn from a structural model. The model 
predicts that external finance constraints affect the intertemporal substitution of investment 
today for investment tomorrow, via the shadow value of scarce external funds. This index is 
based on the coefficients acquired from the structural model. It is measured as an estimation 
of cost of external funds on the following variables: cash flow to assets, a dummy capturing 
whether the firm pays a dividend, long-term debt to total assets, size, firm sales growth, and 
industry sales growth.  




                                                           
                                                                   (22) 
 
Where CF is ratio of cash flow to total assets; DIVPOS is a dummy variable that takes one if 
firm pays cash dividends; TLTD is ratio of long-term debt to total assets; LNTA is natural log 
of total assets; ISG is the firms‟ 2-digit industry sales growth; and SG is firms‟ sales growth.  
By construction, firms with a high WW index are considered more financially constrained, 
containing low cash flow, low dividend, high leverage, low total assets, high industry sales 
growth, and low firm growth rate.   
HP index  
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) revise Kaplan and Zingales‟ (1997) approach by collecting the 
information from annual reports and 10-K filings of 356 randomly selected firms over the 
period 1995–2004
13
. Alongside the qualitative information, they also include quantitative 
data on dividend payment, repurchases, and cash balances to partition the firms into financial 
status. Their methodology includes to first evaluating the existing measures of financial 
constraints, i.e. KZ index, WW index, and firm-specific characteristics. In doing so, Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010) divided the sample into five categories and three different schemes. The 
first scheme divides the firms only on quantitative information. Scheme 2 is similar to 
Scheme 1, except to ignore the liquidity problem signals. Scheme 3 includes both qualitative 
and quantitative information to categorize firms into financial status. They estimate an 
Ordered logit model in which financially constrained status is modelled as a function of the 
five components of KZ index. Similar regression is run for the components of WW index and 
                                                          
13
 10-K is a broad summary report of a company‟s performance, which is submitted annually to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Generally, 10-K consists of much more detail than the annual report.  
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four sorting variables of Almeida et al. (2004). A firm‟s cash flow, leverage, age, and size are 
found significant components of a firm‟s financial status in all estimations. This study 
chooses age and size as more appropriate characteristics to sort the firms into financial status, 
as these are more exogenous and highly related to constraints in the sample. The coefficients 
of age and size are found to be always significant and of the expected negative signs in all 
estimations. On the basis of all preceding tests, this study constructs its own index by using 
size and age. This paper further estimates an ordered logit in which a firm‟s financial 
constraints status is modelled as a function of size, size squared, and age. The estimates are 
used to create an index. This index is calculated as follows: 
 
                                                             (23)  
 
Where Size is log of book assets and Age is the number of years the firm has been on the 
database with a non-missing stock price. In calculating this index, values of size have been 
replaced with log ($4.5 billion) if the actual value is exceeded by log ($4.5 billion). Age has 
also been capped at 37 years. 
 
Regardless of containing some shortcomings, a number of the latest empirical studies in the 
growing literature of finance and investment are using indices to categorise the firms into 
being financially constrained and unconstrained (such as Almeida, et al., 2013; Guariglia and 




3. Overview of the Pakistani Economy 
 
This section will first review the role of the financial system in the corporate sector of 
Pakistan, particularly in the aftermath of the financial liberalization process, and then we will 
review the macroeconomic performance of the country during the same period. We will also 
briefly discuss the financial disclosure practices in Pakistan. At the end, this section will 
discuss the role of size and group affiliation of the firms as a cause of market imperfections. 
 
3.1 Pakistani financial system and corporate sector 
 
The process of financial liberalization was undertaken in the 1990s, and is considered a 
landmark in the history of the Pakistani financial system. Through these reforms, the 
influence of politicians over credit allocation and loan recovery schemes was controlled by 
the participation of the private sector. The vibrant set of reforms included interest rate 
deregulation, privatisation of state-owned banks, changes in the institutional framework, and 
entry deregulation for foreign banks. These modifications started a steady process of 
improvement in the capital market SBP (1990–2002).  
 
The share of listed companies comprised of only 1.8 per cent of total registered companies by 
2000. Even inside the capital market, only four companies (PTCL, Hubco, PSO, and ICI) 
were dominating, with an 80 to 85 per cent share in total trading volume. Table 2 gives an 
overview of the Pakistani equity market. Column 1 of table 2.2 shows an increase and fall in 
the number of listed companies over the period 1991–2016. One can see a very positive 
influence of financial reforms over capital markets in Pakistan. The number of listed firms 
increased from 497 to 762 in a decade. However, a decline in the number of listed firms 
began after 2003, mainly related to the increasing number of terrorist activities and poor law 
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and order conditions in the country. The second column of table 2.2 shows an increase in 
market capitalization. This shows that the size of the firms has been increasing over the 
period. Column 3 of table 2.2 gives statistics on market capitalization as a percentage of 
GDP. Market capitalization as a percentage of GDP evaluates the size of the stock market 
relative to the size of the economy. Statistics of this column show that it remains under 50 per 
cent of GDP over the whole history of the equity market. The performance of the stock 
market was remarkable in 2007, when the share of market capitalization as a percentage of 
GDP rose to 46.1 per cent. It started to decline after that. It kept declining until reaching 19.4 
per cent in 2012. To understand the factors behind this decline, unsatisfactory progress of 
financial sector reforms, issues of political turmoil, a poor law and order situation, and an 























Number of listed 





Market capitalization as 
per cent of GDP 
(3) 
1991 497 90.0 16.1 
1992 596 218.4 16.5 
1993 652 214.4 22.5 
1994 683 404.6 23.7 
1995 746 293.3 15.3 
1996 783 365.2 16.8 
1997 782 496.1 17.6 
1998 779 262.4 8.7 
1999 769 287.9 11.1 
2000 762 394.4 8.9 
2001 759 341.8 6.8 
2002 725 411.6 14.1 
2003 705 755.81 19.9 
2004 666 1428.1 29.6 
2005 659 2068 42.0 
2006 658 3065.8 33.2 
2007 652 3777.7 46.1 
2008 652 2143.2 13.8 
2009 652 2732.4 19.8 
2010 639 3315.8 21.5 
2011 591 3548.9 15.3 
2012 569 5502.2 19.4 
2013 559 5050 20.5 
2014 559 7116 22.5 
2015 554 6928.497 26.2 
2016 558 9628.514 27.6 
          Source: Financial Sector Assessment (1990-2005) & 14Pakistan Economic Survey (2006-2014) 
             Web link: http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/fsa.htm   http://www.sbp.org.pk/FSR/2016/pdf/Chap-2.pdf 
                                                                                                Web link: http://www.finance.gov.pk/ 
 
                                                          
14
Pakistan Economic Surveys available on Ministry of Finance website. 
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The banking sector has always remained a predominant source of corporate financing in 
Pakistan. Financial Stability Review (2006) reports the dominant role of the local private 
sector over public sector and foreign banks. The local private sector was dominant, with the 
lion‟s share of 72.9 per cent in assets until 2000. As far as loan distribution of these banks is 
concerned, figure 2.2 gives sector wise loan movements. It shows the corporate sector as a 
leading borrower in the loan portfolio in 2006.  
 
Figure 2.2: Sector wise loans distribution 
 
                                                                                                 Source: Banking System Review 2006 
                                                             Web link: http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/bsr/index.htm 
 
Banks are still playing a leading role in corporate finance. Even in 2016, the borrowing of the 
corporate sector was 68 per cent, standing at PKR 3.8 trillion, of overall domestic loans
15
. On 
the other side, corporate financing via capital market stands at PKR 600 billion. Equity 
financing had been playing an active role in asset financing but it has been diminishing in 
recent years (Financial Stability Review, 2016). 
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A number of empirical studies for Pakistan also show that the corporate sector is mainly 
relying on banks‟ loans in their need for external funding. The lesser dependence on the 
equity market lies in the still underdeveloped equity markets. A study conducted by Raza et 
al. (2013) explores 323 manufacturing listed firms to see the financing pattern of the firms. 
The results show that Pakistani firms are mainly relying on debts, in which short-term debts 
account for 77 per cent of the total debt of sample firms. Sheikh and Wang (2010) also 
confirm that Pakistani firms rely on bank debt because of an undeveloped bond market. 
These studies further confirm the implication of the pecking order theory in Pakistan. 
 
The synopsis of the Pakistani financial system shows the predominant position of banks 
lending to the corporate sector in external funding. The equity financing is growing but still 
lags behind.  
 
3.2 Macroeconomic performance 
 
The overall macroeconomic performance of the country and corporate sector performance are 
interdependent on each other. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 give annual GDP growth rate in per cent, 
and gross fixed capital formation growth in per cent respectively, as GDP growth rate shows 
how well and poorly an economy is performing. Figure 2.3 shows that, overall, the growth 
rate is unstable; however, it reaches its highest, at 7.7, between 1992 and 2005. After 2005, 
its performance is dismal, but it has an upward trend again in 2011. If we look at figure 2.4, 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) annual percentage growth rate is also giving a gloomy 
picture. It was at its peak in 2006 and at the bottom between 2008 and 2010. The downfall of 
these macroeconomic indicators of the economy from 2008 to 2010 can be associated with 
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the impacts of the global financial crisis on the Pakistani economy. However, macroeconomic 
indicators of both figures show an improvement in the economy after 2014. 
 
Figure 2.3: GDP growth (annual %) 
 
                                                                                       Source: World Bank: Data Bank for Pakistan 
                                                                     Web link: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
 
 
Figure2.4: Gross fixed capital formation (annual % growth) 
 
 
                                                                                       Source: World Bank: Data Bank for Pakistan 






























































Investment rate and investment to GDP ratio 
 
Investment plays a pivotal role in the economic growth of Pakistan. In the 1990s (era of 
financial liberalization), both public and private sectors started to participate in investment. 
Table 2.3 illustrates that investment rate has been increasing over the years, but not evenly. 
Investment was at its peak in 2007 and started to decline after that. We cannot associate this 
decline with financial markets‟ failure only, as the emergence of energy crises in the country 
at the same period bears the responsibility as well. However, participation of the private 
sector has been increasing when compared to public sector investment. We can see the 
improvement in the statistics of investment data from 2014, showing an increase in 
investment rate in the country.  
Table 2. 3: Investment to GDP ratio 
Years Gross fixed investment Public investment Private investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
1995 16.8 8.2 8.6 
1996 17.4 8.3 9.1 
1997 16.5 6.9 9.6 
1998 15.2 5.3 9.9 
1999 13.4 5.3 8.0 
2000 13.5 5.4 8.1 
2001 15.8 5.7 10.2 
2002 15.5 4.2 11.3 
2003 15.3 4.0 11.3 
2004 15.0 4.0 10.9 
2005 17.5 4.3 13.1 
2006 17.19 4.6 12.6 
2007 17.6 4.8 12.8 
2008 15.9 4.3 11.7 
2009 14.20 3.7 10.5 
2010 12.51 3.2 9.3 
2011 13.32 3.7 9.6 
2012 15.08 3.9 8.7 
2013 14.96 3.52 9.84 
2014 14.64 3.17 9.87 
2015 15.71 3.75 10.36 
2016 15.55 3.79 10.16 
                                                                                                     Source: Annual Reports of SBP(1999-2012) 
                                                                                                                  Pakistan Economic Survey(2016-2017) 
                                                                          Weblink:http://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/index.htm 






3.3 Financial disclosure practices in Pakistan 
 
Three accounting bodies, namely Institute of Chartered Accountants Pakistan (ICAP), 
Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Pakistan (ICMA), and Pakistan Institute of 
Public Finance Accountants (PIPFA), are operating in Pakistan. Companies Act of 1913 was 
kept as such until 1971, after the country gained independence in 1947. Government 
established the Security and Exchange Authority (SEA) in the 1970s to improve the 
accounting disclosure practices in the country. Companies Ordinance Act was enacted in 
1984, according to which it is made mandatory for listed firms to comply with International 
Accounting Standards (IAS).  
Another significant improvement was undertaken in 2002, as the Code of Corporate 
Governance was introduced. The aim of the code is to raise the confidence of investors via 
mitigating moral hazard problems. This effort made the firms obliged to disclose information 
related to their credit worthiness, e.g. loan default and tax evasions.  
However, all these efforts are still not up to the mark, as Ashraf and Ghani (2005) revealed 
that Company Law is considered as the least administrative law in Pakistan. Regardless of 
these efforts, financial markets in Pakistan are characterised by weak corporate governance 
and inadequate disclosure, which can enhance the problem of information asymmetries and 
agency problems.  
  
3.4 Financial constraints in Pakistan 




In the literature, a firm‟s size has been extensively correlated to the probability of being 
financially constrained (such as Fazzari, et al., 1988; Jaramillo, et al., 1996; Chow and Fung, 
1998). As small firms are more likely to have little or no track record, as they grow and have 
longer operating periods, the chances to overcome the problems of information asymmetries 
and agency cost expand. Therefore, the issue of financial constraints is more relevant to small 
firms for the following two reasons: first, small firms are likely to be more information ally 
unclear than large firms are. Second, small firms have fewer options to raise external finance 
via equity, consequently relying more on short-term debts.  
 
While looking at the industrial sector of Pakistan, one important feature is the large number 
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs are playing a crucial role in social and 
economic uplift in Pakistan. Like other developing countries, SMEs are a reflection of the 
Pakistani economy (Khalique, et al., 2011). The government of Pakistan (GOP) took a 
number of steps, such as the establishment of Small and Medium Enterprise Development 
Authority (SMEDA) in 1998, the formation of SMEs and micro finance banks, and the 
creation of specialized departments for the SME sector in most commercial banks, to 
overcome the problems related to their financial needs. Regardless of all these steps, SMEs 
have been suffering from a number of hindrances that are affecting their performance level. 
These obstacles include a low level of financial literacy, lending strategies by the banks, and 
absence of reliable business information structure (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Dar, et al., 
2017). These problems related to small firms refer to the existence of financial constraints 




The sample in our study includes only listed firms; generally, the listed firms are large firms 
in the country. Still, we will see the role of size in causing financial constraint among listed 
firms. Due to the absence of identical definition of SMEs in Pakistan, we divide the sample 




Group affiliation and financial constraints 
Affiliation to the industrial group is also an important factor, which increases the probability 
of firms to get external finance easily. Usually, firms can have access to the internal capital 
market that is created by the group. Evidence given by Hoshi et al. (1991) and Chirinko and 
Schaller (1995) for the case of Japan and Canada respectively, supports the idea that 
affiliation to an economic group reduces the problems related to information asymmetries and 
lowers the hazards related to external funds access. 
 
It is popularly known that Pakistani industrial structure is owned by 22 super-rich families 
from Pakistan. In 1995, the top 43 groups, which were created by these 22 families, 
accounted for 43 per cent of total manufacturing firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange. 
These groups do not only own manufacturing industries but also private banks, insurance 
companies, leasing companies, modarabas (financial contracts), and power plants. In addition 
to listed companies, the number of unlisted public firms and private limited companies is also 
innumerable. These groups also have companies that are incorporated abroad. They have ties 
to each other via formal and informal relations (Rehman, 2006). A book by Rehman (2006) 
reports the list of the top 38 business groups (based on their size) and their associated firms in 
                                                          
16
Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA), Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) and 
State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) have defined SMEs on different bases. SMEDA defines SMEs on number of 
employees and number of assets. PBS defines it on number of employees only. SBP defines it on number of 
employees, nature of business, and net sales value per annum. 
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Pakistan. This thesis relies on this book in an attempt to isolate the group affiliation of sample 
firms. A number of other studies (such as Ashraf and Ghani 2005; Masulis, et al., 2011) have 
used the same source. In addition, the official websites of these groups provide the list of 
affiliated firms, which have also been crosschecked.  
 
Given the popularity of well-known economic groups in Pakistan, the presence of financial 
constraints in the context of group affiliation becomes significant in Pakistan for the 
following two reasons: first, group-affiliated firms tend to be less financially constrained, as 
firms could easily access banks sponsored by the group. Second, the group-affiliated firms 
could also access the international capital market, for easy access to external finance, because 
of having a superior position. 
 
This section of the chapter gives us a background of the Pakistani financial and corporate 
sector to understand the presence of information asymmetries and agency cost leading to 
market imperfections. The process of financial liberalization is equipping financial markets to 
assist the financial needs of the corporate sector, but still there are loopholes generating the 
factors to cause capital market imperfections. 
 
4. Estimation Framework and Data 
 
This section of the chapter proceeds as follows: first, we explain the methodology to test for 
investment-cash flow sensitivity (a traditional and popular measure of financial constraint) 
for Pakistani listed firms. In this regard, we use q model and ECM for empirical 
specifications. Given the significance of a firm‟s size and group affiliation to generate 
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information asymmetry in the Pakistani corporate sector, we then describe the procedure to 
sort firms into size and group affiliation to check the variation in investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Literature has also substantially relied on sorting firms into financial status 
according to dividend policy. We will also sort firms into dividend-paying and non-dividend-
paying firms to check investment-cash flow sensitivity. Second, we explain the methodology 
to categorise the firms into levels of financial constraints on the basis of KZ index, WW 
index, HP index, and assets tangibility. Third, to evaluate the applicability of existing indices 
and assets tangibility, we explain our methodology.  
 
4.1 Investment cash flow sensitivity 
 
Q model 
Our empirical study will begin with the q theory framework to investigate the role of 
financing constraints for the investment level of the firm. We try to estimate a more general 
dynamic model including the lagged value of dependent variable. By following 
Carpenter&Guariglia(2008) and after including the lagged value of dependent variable, q 
model specification will take the following form:  
 
   
       
       
      
       
       
     
      
                       (24) 
 
where I/K is investment to fixed assets ratio. This ratio is used to see the intensity of 
investment for the firms. We define investment as change in real tangible fixed assets plus 
depreciation. In order to control possible heteroscedasticity due to size scale effect and for 
comparison purposes, we will scale the key variables with lagged fixed assets. K is capital, 
which is measured by fixed assets. Q is Tobin‟s q. CF is cash flow, as given by the ORBIS 
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database. ORBIS defines it as profit for period plus depreciation. A significant and positive 
coefficient of cash flow after controlling the investment opportunities via Tobin‟s q, will 
highlight the existence of financial constraints. vt shows time-specific effect, vi gives firm-
specific effect, vr controls for region effects, and eit gives idiosyncratic shock. 
 
Error correction model (ECM) 
 
By following Bond et al. (2003), Bond and Lombardi (2006), and Guariglia (2008), the 
version of ECM that we derived in section 2 will take the following form: 
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                                             (25) 
 
Where Iit denotes investment for firm i in period t, Kit is the value of capital stock. α is a 
constant term. Sit logarithm of real sales showing output, CFit is cash flow, vt shows time-
specific effect, vi gives firm-specific effect, vr controls for region effects, and eit gives 
idiosyncratic shock. To investigate the role of financial factors in investment, we include 
current cash flow term in the estimation equation. A significant coefficient of cash flow refers 
to the presence of financial constraints on investment. We would expect a positive and 
significant coefficient on cash flow, if firms‟ investments were influenced by the availability 






Role of size, group membership, and dividend ratio 
 
To test the impact of firm size on investment-cash flow sensitivity, we divide the sample on 
the basis of total assets. We sort the data by size. The firms with total assets above the sample 
median are in the group of large firms. The firms with total assets less than the sample 
median comprise the group of small firms. We generate a dummy variable, size dummyit, 
which is equal to 1 if firm i has total assets larger than median in year t, and 0 otherwise. We 
estimate our investment equation where cash flow variables are interacted to size dummy. We 
will use error correction model for estimation. The equation (25) will become: 
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To test the impact of group membership, we will introduce the dummy of group affiliation in 
to the main empirical specification. The group affiliation dummy is equal to 1 if firms belong 
to the top 30 industrial groups in Pakistan. 
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To test the impact of dividend ratio, we will generate the dummy variable. If the firms pay a 
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It is expected that some estimators may lead to bias because some regressors may be 
endogenously determined in our specifications
17
. In the presence of endogeneity, ordinary 
least square (OLS) estimator is likely to upward bias the estimation of lagged dependent 
variable. Fixed effect estimator may lead to a downward bias of lagged dependent variable. 
The useful estimator, which can control for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity 
problems at the same time, is generalized method of moments
18
 (GMM). We will estimate the 
empirical specification with system GMM given by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998). By accumulating an additional assumption of uncorrelation between the 
first differences of instrument variables and fixed effects, Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) improve the efficiency of original difference GMM (Roodman, 
2009). To assess the validity of the model and instruments, we will rely on the AR (2) test for 
second-order serial correlation of the residuals, and the Sargan test for over- identifying 
restrictions in the differenced equations.  
We will estimate the above given empirical specifications by OLS, fixed effect, and System 
GMM. The reason to use these three estimators is to test the robustness of these results to a 
wide variety of changes in estimation techniques and specifications.  
                                                          
17
 Cash flow and sales are taken as endogeneous variables in the investment equations, as it is understandable 
that higher investment leads to higher sales and cash flow.  
 
18




4.2 Using latest measures to calculate financial constraints 
 
We will then sort all firms in our sample into portfolios according to the KZ index, WW 
index, HP index, and assets tangibility. We will use the regression coefficients of each index 
to sort firms into quartiles. For instance, we construct KZ index by including a linear 
combination of five accounting ratios of KZ index for sorting firms into constrained and 
unconstrained groups.  After calculating the indices for each firm, we make portfolios by 
ranking all firms each year by all the indices. The lowest 25 per cent of firm years by each 
index will be considered as least constrained firms. The highest 25 per cent of each firm year 
by each index will be considered as most constrained firms and vice versa. We provide the 
definitions for all the variables used to form these indices in the appendix. For the assets 
tangibility, the highest 25 per cent of each firm year will be considered as least constrained, 
and vice versa. 
 
4.3 Evaluation of existing measures for the case of Pakistan 
 
We follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Lamont et al. (2001), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) 
to estimate a firm‟s quantitatively determined financial constraint status on numerous 
explanatory variables. Kaplan and Zingales (1995) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) divided 
firms into five categories on the basis of qualitative and quantitative information. Their 
classification scheme mainly relies on the liquidity information of the firms. These studies 
have used data from COMPUSTAT database for US firms, alongside letters to shareholders, 
discussions of liquidity, and 10-K for each firm year. For the case of developing countries, it 
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is hard to get such detailed qualitative data on liquidity status of the firms. However, we have 
data to calculate liquidity quantitatively for Pakistani firms. 
 
For categorising firms into four financial constraints, statuses 0, 1, 2, and 3, we use liquidity 
ratio to divide firms into quartiles. Liquidity has been calculated as a ratio of a firm‟s current 
assets minus its short-term debt over total assets. We form portfolios by dividing the sample 
firms in to four quartiles according to the liquidity condition of the firms. The highest 25 per 
cent of firm years by liquidity ratio will be considered as least constrained firms. The lowest 
25 per cent of each firm year by liquidity ratio will be considered as most constrained firms.  
Table 2.4 gives mean values of liquidity ratio when sorted in quartiles.  
Table 2. 4: Categories of financial constraint on basis of liquidity 
 (0) 
Most 


















Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Liquidity is calculated as a ratio of a firm‟s current assets 
minus its short-term debt over total assets. We form portfolios by dividing the sample firms in to quartiles on the 
basis of the liquidity of the firms. 
. 
Following Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we regress financial constraint status of the firms as a 
function of five explanatory variables of KZ index first. The following empirical model will 
be estimated by ordered logit model. 
 
                                                                    (29)        
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where financial status is ordered into quartiles according to the liquidity condition of the 
firms. CF is ratio of cash flow to capital; Q is Tobin‟s q; TD is ratio of total debt to capital; 
Div is ratio of dividends to capital; and CASH is ratio of cash to capital. 
 
To evaluate WW index, we model financial constraint status of the firms as a function of six 
sorting variables of WW index. 
 
                                                              
                                                                                       (30) 
Where CF is ratio of cash flow to total assets, DIVPOS is a dummy variable that takes one if 
the firm pays cash dividends; TLTD is ratio of long-term debt to total assets; LNTA is natural 
log of total assets; ISG is the firm‟s 2-digit industry sales growth; and SG is firm‟s sales 
growth. 
 
To evaluate HP index, we regress financial status of the firms on the size and age of the 
firms.  
                                  
                        (31) 
Where Size is log of book assets and Age is the number of years of firms‟ incorporation. 
We will also regress financial constraint status of the firms as a function of assets tangibility 




                                                                      (32) 
Estimator: 
By following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we will use 
ordered logit model to estimate empirical specifications from (29) to (32). As our dependent 
variable is ordinal dependent variable, categorised by least constrained, likely less 
constrained, likely more constrained, and most constrained, the best choice is to use ordered 
logit model (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
4.4 Sample selection and summary statistics 
Data  
The firm-level financial data used in this study is extracted from the ORBIS database, which 
consists of profit and loss and balance sheet data. ORBIS database is Bureau Van Dijk‟s 
publication which contains information on over 200 million private companies worldwide. 
From this database, we select Pakistani listed non-financial firms by using the US two-digit 
standard industry classification (SIC)
19
. Given the popularity of SIC in the statistics of 
economics (Mannetje and Kromhout, 2003), we classify Pakistani firms on two-digit SIC in 
our study. Two-digit SIC classifies non-financial firms into 12 categories that are too detailed 
for our study. By following Aharony et al,(2010) and Saeed et al,(2014),this study re-
distribute the two-digit SIC into eight-industry categories.  The detailed industry 
classification is given in Appendix 2A. 
 
                                                          
19
 The three industry classifications which are renowned in the world are Global Industry Classification 
Standard(GICS), Global Classification System (GCS) and Standard Industrial Classification(SIC) system. GICS 
is published by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and Standard and Poor‟s(S&P). GCS is issued by 
Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE). SIC is issued by the United States.  
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Even though, we also have the access to financial report of Central Bank (State Bank of 
Pakistan) and DataStream; however, the number of firms and years covered by these sources 
are lesser than ORBIS database. Moreover, these sources also do not provide information on 
ownership structure of the firms.  
 
The total sample available on ORBIS contains 349 non-financial listed firms. The reason to 
select only non-financial firms for the sample is a different accounting treatment of profit and 
revenue by these firms from financial firms (banks, insurance companies and investment 
firms). We clean data by removing outliers, as we only concentrate on positive values of 
sales, capital and total assets. Moreover, all those firms with missing values for the important 
variables are also removed. We include only those firms that have observations for a 
minimum of two consecutive years.  After meeting these conditions, the final sample consists 
of an unbalanced panel of 2197 firm year observations of 337 firms for the period 2006 -
2015. As the firms in the sample do not consist of same number of time-series observations, 
therefore, it is an unbalanced panel data. 
 
We use GDP Price Deflator and Wholesale Price Index to obtain real values of the variables 
used in this study. Data on the deflators have been collected from the World Bank database 
for Pakistan. Capital stock and investment are deflated by using Wholesale Price Index while 
other variables are deflated by using GDP Price Deflator. Data on group affiliated firms is 
provided by Rehman(2006). Rehman(2006) gives list of top 38 business groups (based on 
their size) and names of their affiliated firms.  However, 8 out of 38 groups consist of non-
listed and financial firms only.  We find 101 firms are affiliated to groups, whilst 236 firms 
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are stand-alone by matching the affiliated firms to those 30 business groups in our total 
sample of 337 firms.  A number of other studies (such as Masulis et al. 2011 and Ashraf and 
Ghani, 2005) have used the same source to identify the business groups in Pakistan.  
 
4.5 Summary statistics 
 
Table 2.5 gives summary statistics for the key regression variables for the total sample of the 
firms. The second row in table 2.5 reports the investment to tangible fixed assets ratio. This 
ratio is used to see the intensity of investment for the firm. Based on this ratio, the investing 
intensity of overall listed firms in Pakistan is 6 per cent. Tobin‟s q is a ratio of total market 
value of firm to total asset value.  It is 0.5 for full sample of firms in our case which is low, 
means stocks are under-valued. The cash flow to capital ratio shows how much capital 
expenditure requirements are fulfilled by cash flow of the firms. It is 17 per cent for the full 
sample of listed firms in our sample. Sales to capital ratio measures the operational efficiency 
of the firm, it is 3.14 for the case of our sample firms. 
 
Table 2.6 gives summary statistics for the key regression variables for the firms sorted by 
size, group affiliation, and dividend, as explained in section 3. The large and small firms are 
investing 10 and 2 per cent of their tangible assets each year respectively. The difference is 
also highly significant at 1% level. The group-affiliated and stand-alone firms are investing 5 
and 6 per cent of their total tangible fixed assets respectively. However, the difference is 
statistically not significant. The firms that pay dividends are investing 8 per cent as compared 
to the 3 per cent of investment of those firms that do not pay dividends. The difference is also 
statistically highly significant.  If we compare the investment opportunities of these firms, we 
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find that non-affiliated and dividend-paying firms have higher value of Tobin‟s q, as 
compared to affiliated and dividend paying firms. These differences are also highly 
significant. In contrast, the difference between large and small firms in term of investment 
opportunities is not statistically significant. The differences in cash flow and sales ratios are 
also statistically insignificant between large and small firms.  Cash flow ratio is higher for 
non-affiliated and dividend paying firms as compared to affiliated and non-dividend paying 
firms. This difference is highly significant. The sales to capital ratio is higher for non-
affiliated and dividend paying firms as compared to affiliated and non-dividend paying firms. 
This difference is statistically significant too. The overall differences among accounting 
ratios are statistically more significant when the firms are sorted on the basis of dividend 
payment and affiliation. It highlights that market imperfections are more prominent when 
firms are divided on the basis of dividend policy and affiliation to economic groups as 
compared to size of the firms. 





Min Max Obs 
Iit/Ki,t-1 .062 .005 .270 -.973 1.97 2197 
Q .558 .242 1.04 .004 12.6 2197 
CFit /Ki,t-1 .174 
 
.116 .292 -.973 1.98                      2197 
Salesit/Ki,t-1 3.14 
 
1.87 5.90 .0015 114.6 2197 
Notes: I represents real investment. Investment is measured as the change in real tangible fixed assets plus 
depreciation. K represents real fixed assets. Capital is measured by real tangible fixed assets. Q represents 
Tobin‟s q, is a ratio of market value of the firm over total assets.. CF represents cash flow.  Cash flow is defined 


































































































No of obs 1202 995  1536 661  892 1305  
Notes: The table reports sample mean, and corresponding standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
Sizedumit=0 represents small firms. Sizedumit= 1 represents large firms. Group affit =0 represents stand-alone 
firms. Group affit =1 represents group-affiliated firms. Divdumit=0 represents firms that do not pay dividends. 
Divdumit=1 represents firms that pay dividends. I represents real investment. Investment is measured as the 
change in real tangible fixed assets plus depreciation. K represents real fixed assets. Capital is measured by real 
tangible fixed assets. Q represents Tobin‟s q, is a ratio of market value of the firm over total assets.. CF 
represents cash flow.  Cash flow is defined as net income for the year plus depreciation. Sales represent net 
sales. 
 
In table 2.7, we report the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value 
of KZ index, WW index, HP index and Assets Tangibility. In table2.8, WW Index and HP 
index give low value for large and dividend paying firms as compared to small and non-
dividend paying firms. The differences are also statistically significant. While KZ index is 
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small for non-affiliated firms and non-dividend paying firms which is also statistically 
significant.  Only dividend paying firms give higher statistically significant tangible assets as 
compared to non-dividend paying firms. However, the differences in tangible assets are 
statistically insignificant by KZ index and WW Index. Overall when the firms are divided on 
the basis of dividend ratio, dividend paying firms have lower values of indices and higher 
value of tangible assets as compared to non-dividend paying firms. These results are also 
consistently statistically significant. Most of the times differences are insignificant when 
firms are sorted on the basis of size and group affiliation. It means that sorting of firms into 
financial status on the basis of dividend ratio is more appropriate (as backed by the 
predictions of indices and assets tangibility) than on the basis of size and group affiliation.   













KZ index -1.10 .135 4.158 -20.57 6.61 1529 
WW index -.049 -.049 .2827 -10.57 .294 1529 
HP index -10.84 -10.8 .956 -13.98 -7.23 1529 
Assets Tangibilty .9818 .999 .1288 .3070 1.45 1529 
Note: KZ index is summation of five variables; cash flow, total debt, cash, q and dividend ratio. WW index is 
summation of six variables: cash flow, dummy of dividend, total debt, firms‟ sales growth, industry sales growth 
and total assets. HP index is summation of age and size. Assets tangibility is summation of inventory, 





























































































No of obs 889 643  1042 490  661 871  
Notes: The table reports sample mean, and corresponding standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
Sizedumit=0 represents small firms. Sizedumit= 1 represents large firms. Group affit =0 represents stand-alone 
firms. Group affit =1 represents group-affiliated firms. Divdumit=0 represents firms that do not pay dividends. 
Divdumit=1 represents firms that pay dividends. 
 
In table 2.9, we present summary statistics for subsamples grouped by the level of constraints 
using liquidity ratio. A number of interesting differences appear between most constrained 
and least constrained firms. The least constrained firms have high cash flow, low debt, high 
dividend payments, low investment opportunities, high cash holdings, low industry, and firm 
sales growth, are older in age and have low tangible assets as compared to the most 
financially constrained firms. The proportion of total assets remains the same between least 






Table 2. 9: Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics by yearly financial constraints 
status (Liquidity Ratio) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





























































































 383 383 383 383 
Notes: The figures in columns 1 to 4 are mean values of the indicated variables. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. A firm‟s financial constraint status for each year are least constrained, likely least constrained, 
likely most constrained, and most constrained, based on quantitative data of liquidity ratio. Liquidity has been 
calculated as a ratio of a firm‟s current assets minus its short-term debt over total assets. The highest 25% of 
firm years by liquidity ratio makes a group of least constrained firms; the lowest 25% of firm years by liquidity 










Table 2. 10: Correlation between Measures of Financial Constraints 
 KZ Index WW Index HP Index Assets 
Tangibility 
Liquidity Ratio 
KZ Index ------     
WW Index 0.0801 
(0.001) 
----------    
HP Index 0.099 
(0.000) 
0.2725 
(0.000)   






(0.000)   
0.1028   







(0.000)   
-0.1822   




Note: Table reports Pearson‟s r correlation coefficients. P values are reported in parenthesis. 
 
The correlation between the measures of financial constraints is reported in table 2.10. KZ 
index, WW index and HP index are strongly positively correlated, meaning that these three 
measures of financial constraints go hand in hand. The correlation between indices and 
Assets tangibility is also positively correlated. It means higher the value of indices, higher the 
assets tangibility of the firm is. Even though, the predictions of these indices and assets 
tangibility as measures of financial constraints do not support this positive correlation. As 
higher indices mean high level of financial constraints, while higher assets tangibility refer to 
lower level of financial constraints. Moreover, firms‟ liquidity shows a negative relationship 




5. Results and Discussion 
 
5.1 Investment cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints 
Q model 
Table 2.11 gives the estimates of empirical specification (equation 24) for a full sample. 
Equation (24) is estimated by OLS, fixed effects, and System GMM estimators. The focus of 
the estimation is the coefficient of cash flow. We find positive and significant coefficients of 
cash flow by all three estimators. This is the first evidence showing that listed firms in 
Pakistan are financially constrained, as investment is positively and significantly influenced 
by cash flow of the firms.  
 
Table 2. 11: Baseline specification of q model estimation 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Iit/ Ki t-1 OLS  Fixed effect  System-GMM 
Iit-1/ Ki t-2 0.0485** -0.0401 .0234*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0255) (.0029) 
Qt-1 0.0184* 0.0358** .0359*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0157) (.0035) 
CFit/Kit-1 0.170*** 0.175*** .2130*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0555) (.0131) 
Sargan (p)   0.066 
AR (2) (p)   0.155 
Region dummies YES NO NO 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES NO NO 
Observations 1,906 1,906 1,906 
R-squared 0.159 0.126  
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Sargan test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions 
asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. AR(2) is a test for second-order 
serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, under the null of no second-order serial correlation. If the 
instruments are acceptable, the p-value of Sargan test and AR(2) should be greater than 0.05. The System GMM 
estimator uses lagged values of all right side variables dated t-3 as instruments. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
I represents real investment. Investment is measured as the change in real tangible fixed assets plus depreciation. 
K represents real fixed assets. Capital is measured by real tangible fixed assets. Q represents Tobin‟s q, is a ratio 
of market value of the firm over total assets.. CF represents cash flow.  Cash flow is defined as net income for 





Error correction model (ECM) 
 
To overcome the shortcomings of q investment model and the robustness check, we also use 
ECM to check investment cash flow sensitivity. Table 2.12 reports the estimates of equation 
(25) for the full sample of the firms. The error correction term is correctly specified by OLS, 
fixed effect, and System GMM. Lagged dependent variable affects the investment by fixed 
effect. Current sales growth affects investment by all three estimators. Lagged sales growth 
affects the investment, when estimated by OLS, fixed effect, and GMM. The coefficient of 
cash flow is positive and significant by all three estimators. Column 3 of table 2.12 also 
reports Sargan test and AR(2) test for GMM. The regression estimates pass both tests 



















Table 2. 12: Baseline specification of ECM estimation 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Iit/ Ki t-1 OLS Fixed effect System GMM 
Ii,t-1 / Ki,t-2 0.0111 -0.108*** .0100 
 (0.0229) (0.0297) (0.034) 
∆ Sit 0.0119*** 0.0125** .0067** 
 (0.00376) (0.00592) (.0034) 
∆ Si,t-1 0.0196** 0.0273*** .0095** 
 (0.00782) (0.0103) (.005) 
Ki, t-2 – Si, t-2 -0.00908* -0.0203** -.0059 
 (0.00546) (0.0101) (.0061) 
CFit/ Ki, t-1 0.195*** 0.231*** .269*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0644) (.0852) 
Sargan(p)   0.303 
AR(2)  (P)   0.340 
Region dummies YES NO NO 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES NO                 NO 
Observations 1,515 1,515 1,515 
R-squared 0.171 0.137  
   
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Sargan test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions      
asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. AR(2) is a test for second-order 
serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, under the null of no second-order serial correlation. If the 
instruments are acceptable, the p-value of Sargan test and AR(2) should be greater than 0.05. The System GMM  
uses lagged values of cash flow, sales and Ii,t-1 / Ki, t-2 dated t-3 as instruments. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. I 
represents real investment. Investment is measured as the change in real tangible fixed assets plus depreciation. 
K represents real fixed assets. Capital is measured by real tangible fixed assets. Q represents Tobin‟s q, is a ratio 
of market value of the firm over total assets.. CF represents cash flow.  Cash flow is defined as net income for 
the year plus depreciation. Sales represent net sales. 
 
Regression results for different types of firms 
We now estimate empirical specification given in equation (26) by first-difference GMM. 
Column 1 of table 2.13 gives the result of the firms with size dummy. Our coefficient of the 
interaction term of cash flow and dummy of firm size is negative and significant (-0.116). It 
means large firms are less financially constrained, as they have 11 per cent less investment-
cash flow sensitivity as compared to Small firms. Our results support the findings of previous 




Column 2 of table 2.13 presents the results of empirical specification given in equation (27) 
by System GMM, with dummy of affiliation with industrial groups. The coefficient of 
interaction term (CF*Group-aff) is insignificant. It shows that group affiliation does not 
cause any difference in a firm‟s financial status.   
 
Column 3 of table 2.13 gives the result of equation (28), when firms are sorted on the basis of 
dividend payments estimated by System GMM. The coefficient of the interaction term of 
cash flow and dummy of dividend is significant and negative (-0.220). It implies a firm‟s 
dividend policy affects investment-cash flow sensitivity for Pakistani listed non-financial 
firms. In other words, dividend ratio is associated with Pakistani firms‟ financial status. The 
results are in line with the findings of previous studies (such as Fazzari, et al., 1988; Hubbard, 












Table 2. 13: Sorting of firms according to size, dividend, and group affiliation 
Dep variable =  








































































Dividend dummyit   -0.190 
(0.187) 
 
CFit/ Ki, t-1* Dividend 
dumit 
  -0.220* 
(0.924) 
 
Sargan(p) 0.603 0.998 0.136 
AR(2) (P) 0.478 0.441 0.159 
Region dummies NO NO NO 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Industry dummies NO NO NO 
Observations 1,515 1,515 1,515 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Sargan test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions 
asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. AR(2) is a test for second-order 
serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, under the null of no second-order serial correlation. If the 
instruments are acceptable, the p-value of Sargan test and AR(2) should be greater than 0.05. The System GMM 
estimator use lagged values of all right side variables dated t-2 as instruments.  I represents real investment. 
Investment is measured as the change in real tangible fixed assets plus depreciation. K represents real fixed 
assets. Capital is measured by real tangible fixed assets. Q represents Tobin‟s q, is a ratio of market value of the 
firm over total assets.. CF represents cash flow.  Cash flow is defined as net income for the year plus 
depreciation. Sales represent net sales.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
So far, our results show that Pakistani firms are financially constrained, as tested by both q 






5.2 Firms sorted by indices 
 
Table 2.14 provides mean values of financial variables for a group of firms when firms are 
sorted into quartiles by KZ index. A firm is characterized as constrained by KZ index by 
having high leverage, low dividend, low cash earnings, high q, and low cash flow. Low cash 
flow and low dividend payments could be associated with external finance. However, the 
high level of q is related to q‟s partial correlation with cash flow (Kaplan and Zingales, 
1997), as a firm is classified as being likely financially constrained and conditional on having 
a low cash flow, only if it has more investment opportunities (q). The high leverage is 
associated with poor financial health of the firm whose balance sheet is full of debt. When we 
sort firms according to the KZ index in table 2.14, we find that most constrained firms have 
less cash flow (.009), higher leverage ratio (.569), lower dividend ratio (.001), lower q value 
(.206), and lower cash (.042), as compared to least constrained firms. Except for the value of 
q, all other financial variables of financially constrained firms move according to the 
indication of KZ index. The level of q is decreasing with the level of financial constraints, 
while the level of investment drops with the level of financial constraints. As more 
investment opportunities are conditional on low cash flow, which is a very important 
characteristic of KZ index, we cannot ignore this. This causes doubts to arise about the 
application of KZ index for Pakistani firms.  
 
Liquidity ratio of the firms decreases substantially in the level of constraint (from .244 to -
.113). This is associated with the difficult access of external finance and running out of 
internal funds. Asset tangibility increases slightly in the position of most financially 
constrained (from .920 to 1.03). This is against the prediction of Almeida and Campello 
(2006), who argue that tangible assets increase the access to external finance by meeting the 
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conditions of contracts; therefore, financially least constrained firms have more tangible 
assets. However, we could associate this with an inverse relationship between liquidity ratio 
and assets tangibility of firms somehow.  We also see in row 2 that least constrained firms by 
KZ index have high investment – capital ratio.  
Table 2. 14: Firms sorted by KZ index 





KZ index -7.44 -.320 .446 1.74 
It / Kt .037 .025 .015 -.032 
Cash flow/Real capital .437 .169 .064 .009 
Debt/Real capital .099 .109 .188 .569 
Dividend/Real capital .185 .013 .003 .001 
q 1.29 .338 .219 .206 
Cash/Real capital .312 .063 .026 .042 
Liquidity .244 .018 -.124 -.113 
Assets tangibility .920 .985     1.01 1.03 
Notes: Total debt is a ratio of real long-term debt over capital. Dividend is a cash dividend paid by the firm. I 
represents real investment. Investment is measured as the change in real tangible fixed assets plus depreciation. 
K represents real fixed assets. Capital is measured by real tangible fixed assets. Q represents Tobin‟s q, is a ratio 
of market value of the firm over total assets.. CF represents cash flow.  Cash flow is defined as net income for 
the year plus depreciation. Sales represent net sales. Liquidity is calculated as a ratio of a firm‟s current assets 
minus its short-term debt over total assets. Assets tangibility is summation of inventory, receivables and capital 
of firms. 
 
Table 2.15 provides mean values of financial variables when firms are sorted into quartiles by 
WW index. According to the WW index, constrained firms should have high leverage, low 
dividend, low cash flow, high industry, low sales growth rate, and low total assets. We find 
that most constrained firms have high leverage ratio, low dividend payments, low cash flow, 
low firm growth, high industry growth, and low total assets. All six variables of financially 
constrained firms move according to the indication of WW index.  Most constrained firms 
have belonged to low sales growth but have high industries sales growth. Investment level 
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also goes down with high level of financial constraints. It gives evidence that even though the 
coefficients of WW index are calculated for firms available on COMPUSTAT database, they 
are still applicable for Pakistan
20
. Moreover, the liquidity level of firms goes down with the 
increase in financial constraints. However, asset tangibility of the firms go up with the higher 
level of financial constraints, similar to the case of KZ index. A possible explanation could be 
that more tangible assets enable firms to borrow more. 








WW index -.176 -.073 -.016 .066 
It / Kt .061 .051 .010 -.042 
Cash flow/Total assets .116 .082 .067 .019 
Debt/Total assets .122 .109 .127 .224 
Dividend dummy .919 .770 .504 .081 
Firm growth rate 1.03 .046 .023 -.079 
Industry growth rate .001 .037 .078 .089 
Ln (Total assets) 16.5 15.3 14.5 13.5 
Liquidity .087 .068 .023 -.152 
Assets tangibility .947 .991 .999 1.01 
Notes: Total debt is a ratio of real long-term debt over capital. Dividend dummy is equal to 1 if firms pay cash 
dividend and 0 otherwise. I represents real investment. Investment is measured as the change in real tangible 
fixed assets plus depreciation. K represents real fixed assets. Capital is measured by real tangible fixed assets. Q 
represents Tobin‟s q, is a ratio of market value of the firm over total assets.. CF represents cash flow.  Cash flow 
is defined as net income for the year plus depreciation. Sales represent net sales. Liquidity is calculated as a ratio 
of a firm‟s current assets minus its short-term debt over total assets. Assets tangibility is summation of 
inventory, receivables and capital of firms. 
 
When we sort firms according to HP index quartiles in table 2.16, we see that most 
constrained firms are smaller in size and younger in age. This is consistent with the prediction 
                                                          
20
 COMPUSTAT covers over 56,000 companies globally, over 45,500 non-North American securities, 




of HP index. Leverage ratio goes up and liquidity ratio goes down in the most constrained 
firms, which is consistent with the general poor financial health of the firms. However, assets 
tangibility goes up from .98 to 1.00 in a higher level of financial constraints, against the 
theory of Almeida and Campello (2006). 
 








HP index -12.0 -11.1 -10.5 -9.62 
It / Kt .046 .026 .011 -.057 
age 29.5 39.3 34.3 26.4 
Ln(Total assets) 16.7 15.3 14.4 13.4 
Leverage .371 .406 .431 .504 
Liquidity .033 .048 .029 -.084 
Assets tangibility .967 .983 .996 1.00 
Notes: Leverage is calculated as ratio of a firm‟s short-term debt over total assets. Liquidity is calculated as a 
ratio of a firm‟s current assets minus its short-term debt over total assets. Assets tangibility is summation of 
inventory, receivables and capital of firms. 
 
We sort firms according to assets tangibility in table 2.17. Most constrained firms have less 
tangible assets as compared to least constrained firms (Almeida and Campello, 2006). We see 
that least constrained firms that have high assets tangibility, have higher KZ, WW, and HP 
indices as compared to most constrained firms. Overall, the results so far show that all three 
indices are moving in the same direction consistently, but assets tangibility is moving in the 
opposite direction. We further find that least constrained firms have high leverage and low 
liquidity ratio when firms are sorted according to assets tangibility. Some studies in the 
literature (such as Harc, 2015) show a positive relation between tangible assets and leverage 
ratio, as higher tangible assets increase the borrowing of loans due to the lesser problem of 
collateral. However, we do not find any study that shows a fixed trend between assets 
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tangibility and liquidity of the firms. Our results imply a negative relationship between 
tangible assets and liquidity ratio. Supporting these results can be the idea that firms with 
higher tangible assets may get loans easily at the time of need and do not need to hold liquid 
assets all the time. The indices such as HP index and WW index are comprehensive measures 
taking into account several aspects of firm finance, whereas assets tangibility measures one 
aspect. Therefore, we do not regard our results as conflicting evidence for the measures, 
rather the measures proxy for different aspects of firm finance.  








Assets tangibility 1.14 1.02 .976 .817 
It / Kt-1 .017 .006 .011 -.001 
KZ index -.570 -.094 -.469 -4.45 
WW index -.035 -.039 -.038 -.088 
HP index -10.8 -10.9 -10.7 -10.9 
Leverage  .496 .413 .382 .421 
Liquidity -.033 -.026 -.014 .099 
Notes: Assets tangibility is summation of inventory, receivables and capital of firms.Leverage is calculated as 
ratio of a firm‟s short-term debt over total assets. Liquidity is calculated as a ratio of a firm‟s current assets 
minus its short-term debt over total assets. 
 
 
Hence, we find that characteristics of the firms sorted by WW index and HP index are 
consistent with the prediction of these indices for the case of Pakistani firms. However, one 
of the important features of KZ index, the movement of q, is moving opposite and creates 
doubts for the full functioning of this index for the case of Pakistan. Assets tangibility builds 
a sensible relation with leverage ratio but is not consistent with the indices. In sum, the firms 
categorised as most financially constrained by WW index and HP index have the features that 
are associated with difficult access to external finance.  Moreover firms categorised as most 
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financially constrained by the indices and assets tangibility have low investment level, which 
is clearly associated with the presence of financial constraints.  
 
5.3 Evaluation of existing measures of financial constraints 
Here we report the results drawn from ordered logit model by regressing financial constraint 
status on the explanatory variables. Our choice of explanatory variables comes from the 
previous approaches to measuring financial constraints. For categorising firms into four 
financial constraints status 0, 1, 2, and 3, we sort firms into quartiles by liquidity ratio as 
explained in section 4.  
 
Column 1 of table 2.18 reports the results when a firm‟s financial constraint status, based on 
liquidity ratio of the firms, is regressed on five financial variables of KZ index. Our results in 
column 1 illustrate that least financially constrained firms have more cash flow, more cash 
holdings, and a low value of q, as compared to most financially constrained firms. The 
coefficients of debt and dividend are insignificant. The original KZ index predicts that least 
financially constrained firms have high cash flow, low q, low debt, high dividend payments, 
and more cash. Tobin‟s q, which is a significant component for the proper functioning of KZ 
index, is significant and appears with an appropriate sign for Pakistani firms.  
 
Column 2 of table 2.18 reports the results when a firm‟s financial constraint status, based on 
liquidity ratio, is regressed on six accounting variables of WW index. Our results indicate that 
least financially constrained firms have high cash flow, less leverage, fewer total assets, 
higher dividend payments, and less industry growth as compared to the most financially 
constrained firms, which have low cash flow, high leverage, high total assets, low dividend 
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payments, and high industry growth. The coefficient of a firm‟s growth is insignificant. 
Whited &Wu (2006) used industry and firms‟ sales growth rates to control investment 
opportunities instead of Tobin‟s q in the empirical specification. The sign of industry growth 
is significantly inconsistent with the prediction of WW index. Our sign of coefficient of total 
assets is inconsistent with the index but is significant.  
 
Column 3 of table 2.18 reports the results when a firm‟s financial constraint status is 
regressed on financial variables of HP index (age and size). Our results show the coefficient 
of age is significant and the sign is consistent with the index, as the least financially 
constrained firms are older in age in Pakistan.  
 
Column 4 reports the results when a firm‟s financial constraint status is regressed on assets 
tangibility, size, and age. The results report that least financially constrained firms have fewer 
tangible assets as compared to most constrained firms. This is, however, against the 
prediction of Almeida and Campello‟s (2006) theoretical base, which argues that a firm‟s 
tangible assets reduce the problem of contractibility and increases a firm‟s access to external 
funds. Supporting this result, we argue that our criterion is to categorize firms into financial 
status based upon liquidity ratio, and we have previously found a negative relationship 
between liquidity and assets tangibility. The negative coefficient of tangibility can be a 
possible result of this relationship. However, assets tangibility is significant, which means it 




In column 5, we report the results when a firm‟s financial constraint status is regressed on all 
ten financial variables alongside time and industry dummies. We still find significant 
coefficient on cash flow, total debt, total assets, cash, age, dividend, and assets tangibility, 
even though the signs of total assets and assets tangibility are not in line with the prediction 
for Pakistani firms. The coefficients of q and industry growth become insignificant.   
 
We also report marginal effects in table 2.19. Table provides marginal effects of each 
variable with respect to each index and Assets tangibility. Marginal effects are provided for 
each four categories of financial status from 0 to 3 (most financially constrained to least 
financially constrained).  For instance, column (1) reports the marginal effect of cash flow 
under KZ index for „0‟ category in the first row. It tells if cash flow increases by 1 unit firms 
are about 86 per cent less likely to be financially most constrained. 
 
In sum, we find three out of five variables of KZ index ( cash flow, cash and q) are generally 
in agreement with the index. We find five out of six variables of WW index(cash flow, total 
debt, dividend, industry growth and size) in agreement with the index. We find one out of 
two variables of HP index (age) in agreement with the HP index, even though, when we run 
the regression with all variables together on financial status of the firms, we find cash flow, 
total debt, dividend, cash holdings, asset tangibility, age, and total assets as significant factors 
to categorize firms by financial status. On the basis of our results, we argue that, due to the 
formation of these indices for developed countries‟ data, the functioning of these indices 
varies with the financial and economic conditions of developing country. Overall, we find 
WW Index perform better for the case of developing country as compared to other indices. 
However, Total assets (size) and Assets tangibility appear significant but with wrong signs.   
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Size of the firm has been considered an important indicator of constraint status in the 
literature; we have also found that large firms are financially less constrained as having low 
investment –cash flow sensitivity in our sample firms previously. Besides, when we sort 
firms by the indices we also see that least financially constrained firms have higher total 
assets. When regress six components of WW index and two components of HP index on 
firm‟s level of liquidity constraints, we find that least financially constrained firms have low 
total assets. We can associate these contradictory results to the variances and covariances 
between the factors of WW index (and HP index) in a given sample.  Moreover, this negative 
sign can be the result of relationship between total assets and liquidity ratio
21
. The wrong sign 





On the basis of our estimation results, we can conclude that performance of WW index is 
better than KZ index and HP index for the case of developing country like Pakistan.  
 
                                                          
21
 The mean value of total assets in four financial statuses of the firms (based on liquidity) is slightly higher in 
least constrained firms as compared to most financially constrained group. While, the mean total assets is higher 
in likely least constrained category and likely most constrained group as compared to most constrained firms 
and least constrained firms.  
22
 We check the mean value of assets tangibility in four financial statuses of the firms (based on liquidity), we 
find less assets tangibility in those firms which have higher level of liquidity. It confirms a negative relation 
between liquidity and assets tangibility. On the basis of this, we will not argue that Assets tangibility is not an 
important sorting factor to partition firms into financial status.  
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Table 2. 18: Ordered logit model: using different explanatory variables to predict financial constraint status 
 KZ index WW index HP index Assets tangibility Year + time 
dummies 
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
Cash flow 6.742*** 10.85***   11.00***  
 (0.414) (0.715)   (0.823)  
Total debt -0.194 -1.837***   -0.917**  
 (0.197) (0.349)   (0.371)  
Ln(total assets)  -0.198*** 0.0215 -0.0176 -0.224***  
  (0.0389) (0.0343) (0.0351) (0.0433)  
Dividend 0.521 1.021***   1.036***  
 (0.910) (0.114)   (0.122)  
Cash  3.590***    3.770***  
 (0.554)    (0.605)  
q -0.137*    -0.0867  
 (0.0714)    (0.0696)  
Industry growth rate  -0.972***   -0.232  
  (0.293)   (0.381)  
Firm growth rate  -0.0111   -0.0189  
  (0.0143)   (0.0135)  
Age   0.0132*** 0.0144*** 0.0106***  
   (0.00247) (0.00252) (0.00279)  
Assets tangibility    -4.889*** -2.338***  
    (0.415) (0.574)  
Constant cut1 -0.366*** -3.370*** -0.341 -5.782*** -6.548***  
 (0.0930) (0.572) (0.523) (0.704) (0.967)  
Constant cut2 1.105*** -1.879*** 0.779 -4.610*** -4.891***  
 (0.0964) (0.569) (0.524) (0.701) (0.964)  
Constant cut3 2.748*** -0.421 1.896*** -3.392*** -3.128***  
 (0.120) (0.565) (0.525) (0.696) (0.957)  
       
Observations 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520  
 Note: All estimates are derived from an ordered logit model, where a dependent variable is based on liquidity level of the firms as an integer varying from 0 – most 
financially constraint up to 3 – least financial constraint for firms. The outcome measure in this analysis is financial status – least constrained, likely least constrained, likely 
most constrained, and most constrained. Our response variable, financial constraint status has a natural ordering from least constrained to most constrained – 0 to 3. Cut1, 
cut2 and cut3 are cut points on the latent variable. Cut1 is used to differentiate least financial constraint 0 from 1, 2 and 3. Cut2 is used to differentiate 0 and 1 from 2 and 3. 




Table 2. 19:  Marginal Effects 
Note: All marginal effects are derived from an ordered logit model, where a dependent variable is based on liquidity level of the firms as an integer varying from 0 – most 
financially constraint up to 3 – least financial constraint for firms. The outcome measure in this analysis is financial status – least constrained, likely least constrained, likely 
most constrained, and most constrained. Our response variable, financial constraint status has a natural ordering from least constrained to most constrained – 0 to 3. 
 
 
                  KZ Index                WW Index                  HP Index      Assets tangibility 
Financial Status 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
Cash flow -.859     -.796      .536       1.12       -1.73       -1.03       1.16       1.605               
Total debt .0118      .011 -.007       -.015        .305      .182        -.205       -.283              
Ln(total assets)     .033       .019       -.022      -.031       .0008      .0003            -.0003       -.0007       .008       .003      -.003      -.008       
Dividend -.0432       -.0400       .027      .056       -.165       -.082       .106       .1411               
Cash -.4434      -.4106      .277       .577                   
Q .0177       .0164       -.011       -.023                   
Industry growth 
rate 
    .0001       .0001      -.0001      -.0001               
Firm growth rate     .0277      .0165      -.0186       -.0257               
Age         -.0024       -.0008       .0009       .0023       -.003       -.001 .001 .003       





Based on the Pakistani listed firm-level dataset over the period 2006–2015, using multiple 
measures of financial constraints and different methods of estimation, we investigate whether 
Pakistani firms are financially constrained. 
By using q model of investment and ECM, we find strong evidence that Pakistani firms are 
financially constrained. By dividing firms into size, dividend ratio, and affiliation to group, 
we find the presence of lending bias among large and dividend paying firms. We find large 
and dividend-paying firms are financially less constrained as they show low investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. We do not find the evidence to claim that group-affiliated firms are 
financially less constrained.  
We also use indices and assets tangibility to categorise firms into financial status. We then 
investigate whether the movement of the indices is consistent with their predictions for the 
case of Pakistan; more specifically, whether the firms categorised as constrained by these 
indices show the characteristics that would be associated with difficult access of external 
finance to firms. Our results indicate the malfunctioning of KZ index for the case of Pakistani 
firms. One of the most important conditions to function the KZ index does not fulfil, as low 
cash flow for constrained firms is conditional on high investment opportunities. For the case 
of Pakistani listed firms, we find that investment opportunities are decreasing in the case of 
more financially constrained firms. We find WW index and HP index are performing better 




In order to further evaluate these indices and assets tangibility as a suitable measure of 
financial constraint for Pakistani firms, we regress a firm‟s financial constraints status on the 
accounting variables of these indices and assets tangibility. We sort firms into financial 
constraints status according to the liquidity situation of the firms. After categorising firms 
into quartiles (least constrained, likely least constrained, likely most constrained, most 
constrained) on the basis of liquidity ratio, we first regress financial status on five variables of 
KZ index. We find significant coefficients of cash flow, q, and cash holdings. Moreover, the 
signs of these coefficients also agree with the index. We then regress financial status on six 
variables of WW index. For the case of WW index, cash flow, total assets, dividend ratio, 
debt ratio, and industry growth are significant. However, total assets and industry growth 
appear with the opposite signs, against the prediction of WW index. For HP index, only age 
is significant and the sign is consistent with the index. For assets tangibility, the coefficient is 
significant but appears with a negative sign. We associate the negative sign of the coefficient 
of assets tangibility with the negative relationship between liquidity holdings and tangible 
assets of the firms. On the basis of our results, we argue that the results show concisely that 
accounting variables of WW index are those which associate to financial status of the firms 




Data Appendix 2A: 
 
A.1. Table: Industry classification 




Food &Tobacco 1,2, 9, 20,21,54 38 11 
Basic industries including 
petroleum 
10, 12, 13, 14, 24, 26, 28, 29, 33 54 17 
Construction 15, 16, 17, 32, 52 35 10 
Textile & Trade 22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59 135 40 
Consumer durable 25, 30, 36, 37, 39, 50, 55, 57, 34, 
35, 38 
33 10 
Transportation 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47 11 3 
Services 72,73,75,76,80,82,87,89 4 1 
Others No specific SIC code 27 8 
Total Sample  337 100 
 
Data Appendix 2B: 
 
B.1. Definition of variables: 
Iit: Investment is measured as the change in real tangible fixed assets plus depreciation. 
CFit: Cash flow is defined by ORBIS as net income for the year plus depreciation. 
Kit: Capital is measured by real tangible fixed assets. 
Q: Q is defined by ORBIS as ratio of market value of the firm over total assets. 
Sit: Sales is the real net sales defined by ORBIS. 
103 
 
Total assets: Book value of total assets. 
Dividend: Dividend is proxied by cash dividend paid by the firm. 
B.2. Definition of components of KZ index: 
 
Cash flow: Ratio of cash flow to capital. 
Q: Ratio of firm‟s market value over total assets. 
Total Debt: Ratio of real long-term debt over capital. 
Dividend: Ratio of cash dividend payment to capital. 
Cash: Calculated by cash in hand of the company. 
A.2 Summary statistics of components of KZ index 
 Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Debt/K 1532 .2412593     .4389543           0 13.37691 
Cash flow/K 1532 .1700263     .2755706   -1.360872    2.194326 
Dividend/K 1532 .0503124     .1504398           0 2.344669 
Cash/K 1532 .1108145     .3742479    3.71e-06    5.474133 
Tobin’s q 1532 .5147676     .9924327           .004 12.58 
 
B.3. Definition of components of WW index: 
CFit: Ratio of cash flow to total assets. 
DIVPOSit: Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm pays dividend, and 0 otherwise. 
TLTDit: Ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
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LNTAit: Natural log of total assets. 
ISGit: Firm‟s two-digit industry sales growth. 
SGit: Firm‟s sales growth. 
A.3: Summary statistics of components of WW index 
 Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Debt/assets 1532 .1457129     .2129914           0    5.189272 
Cash flow/assets 1532 .0708944     .1132141   -1.113075    1.423806 
Div dummy 1532 .5685379      .495442           0 1 
Firms sales 
growth 
1532 .2556751     7.760929          -1    302.1199 
Industry sales 
growth 
1532 .0512842     .1687316   -.7831785     .718526 
Ln (Total assets) 1532 14.94245     1.391673    9.327146    19.33008 
 
B.4. Definition of components of HP index: 
Age: Calculated by firm‟s year of incorporation. 
Size: Calculated by log of book value of total assets.  
A.4: Summary statistics of components of HP index 
 Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Age 1532 27.69909     8.550854           1 35 
Ln (Total 
assets) 












Chapter 3: Financial Constraints and the 
Export Participation Decision for the Case 









Exporting has been considered a significant driving force of economic growth. Export exerts 
positive externalities for the domestic economy in the form of economies of scale, 
technological spillovers, reallocation of existing resources, and participation in the world 
economy. The impressive examples of China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Republic of 
Korea further support export-led growth hypothesis. Policy makers across the globe are 
making an effort to accelerate the implementation of trade promotion policies. In this regard, 
understanding the significance of determinants of export decision of the firms is second to 
none.  
 
Contemporary development in trade has considered sunk start-up costs and productivity 
differentials as prominent factors behind a firm‟s decision to export (Roberts and Tybout, 
1997; Bernard and Wagner, 2001; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). According to these studies, 
firms counter the challenge of sunk cost alongside the contest of size, age, and productivity 
for entering the foreign market. Exporters are paying an entry cost, which consists of 
accumulating information on foreign market, establishing new market channels, cost of 
packaging, and innovations in product quality. Consequently, only profitable firms that can 
bear the sunk cost enter the foreign market to compete for foreign products. Emerging 
literature has recently provided the foundation of the relationship between financial health 
and export behaviour of the firm (see for example Chaney, 2005).   
 
Das et al. (2007) estimate the size of sunk costs for Columbian firms at around 400,000 US 
dollars. This study further explains that existing exporters, who have paid sunk costs, have a 
70 per cent higher probability to export to foreign markets. In addition to sunk entry costs, 
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exporters also need to pay trade costs, which include transportation costs, policy barriers, 
information costs, contracts, and currency costs. In order to fulfil all these expenditures, 
financially constrained
23
 firms would not be able to bear the sunk costs to fulfil the 
requirements of the foreign market.  
 
A number of attempts have been made to explore this relationship, but there is still a dearth of 
empirical studies in this context for developing economies. This chapter endeavours to fill 
this gap by using a sample of firm-level data for Pakistani listed firms for the period of 2006 
to 2014. Pakistan may be taken as a suitable region to conduct this study for the following 
reasons: first, the unsatisfactory export share to its GDP, with 12.3 per cent to GDP in 2014, 
which makes it important to examine the role of finance for boosting export level of the 
firms. Second, Pakistani financial markets are still underdeveloped. The study conducted by 
Saeed and Sameer (2015) highlights that even large listed firms are financially constrained in 
Pakistan; therefore, the study exploring the need for finance for the decision to export will 
have significant policy implications. 
 
We examine the significance of being financially less constrained to the extensive margin of 
export for Pakistani firms by using measures of financial constraints. We introduce financial 
constraints as a factor of firm‟s heterogeneity in the literature of determinants of export 
participation decision. A number of studies have empirically tested the relationship between 
financial condition and export decision of the firm (such as Greenaway, et al., 2007; Bellone, 
et al., 2010; Nagaraj, 2014; Kiendrebeogo and Minea, 2017). In doing so, these studies have 
mainly relied on liquidity ratio and leverage ratio to see the role of finance in export decision. 
We argue that previous studies mainly rely on measures of financial health but not on the 
                                                          
23
 A firm is called financially constrained if the cost of external funds stops the company from undertaking the 
investment project. In other words, the cost of internal and external finances is not perfectly substituted (Kaplan 
and Zingales, 1997). 
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measures of financial constraints. These two measures have been criticised in the literature on 
the following bases: first, a firm‟s high level of liquidity does not refer a good financial 
situation of the firm. Almeida et al. (2004) report that financially constrained firms are 
inclined to hoard more cash. This study proves theoretically and empirically that financially 
constrained firms increase their propensity of cash in the case of macroeconomic shocks. 
Increase in liquidity cannot necessarily be associated with being less financially constrained. 
Second, there is no clear theoretical foundation of a relationship between liquidity ratio and 
financial constraints, or a relationship between leverage ratio and financial constraints 
(Bellone, et al., 2009). Third, these two measures have been better known as measures of 
financial health rather than measures of financial constraints (Almeida, et al., 2004)
24
. Fourth, 
access to external finance (debt) means firms are financially less constrained as they have 
easy access to external finance, but, according to the literature, firms are considered 
financially constrained if they have higher leverage ratio, which creates doubts against the 
applicability of this measure. Critics argue that leverage and liquidity ratios are not 
representing the condition of financial constraints (where firms are just running out of enough 
funds to finance investment). Therefore, we introduce the latest measures of financial 
constraints to investigate the relationship between financial constraint and export decision of 
the firms. These measures are WW index and asset tangibility
25
.   
 
Moreover, Bellone et al. (2009) have used an index, given by Musso and Schiavo(2008), to 
calculate firm level of financial constraints
26
. Our study uses WW index and assets tangibility 
                                                          
24
 We can differentiate financially weak firms from financially constrained firms as follows: financially weak 
firms are those that are on the verge of collapse or bankruptcy. On the other hand, financially constrained firms 
are those firms that are running out of funds but can still be financially healthy. 
25
 WW index is a measure to calculate financial constraints given by Whited and Wu (2006) – a combination of 
six significant financial variables of the firm. Assets tangibility is a measure of financial constraint given by 
Almeida et al. (2004), which measures a firm‟s financial condition with its level of tangible assets. 
26 This index is not popular in the literature of the study. It is built on seven different variables, which have been 
selected on the basis of their performance and the level of comfort to access the external funding.  
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to measure financial constraints. These measures are more comprehensive than the index 
given by Musso and Schiavo(2008). Judging by the Google Scholar citations, the WW index 
is the most popular among our measures, followed by assets tangibility, HP Index (Hadlock 
and Pierce, 2010) and then Musso and Schiavo(2008) index. 
 
We argue that it is important to see whether firms should be financially healthy or financially 
less constrained to export to foreign export market. We believe that leverage ratio and 
liquidity ratio are better to visualise firms‟ financial policies. We also use leverage ratio and 
liquidity ratio alongside WW index and assets tangibility for comparison.  
 
The previous literature has mainly used random-effect probit, fixed effect, and first-
differenced GMM to estimate the determinants of export market participation decision. The 
reasons to choose these estimators in the literature are the binary nature of dependent variable 
and omitted variable bias in terms of firm-level unobservables (e.g. Nagaraj, 2004; 
Greenaway, et al., 2007; Bellone, et al., 2009). However, we argue that these three estimators 
have limitations to estimate such a type of empirical model. First, one of the assumptions 
upon which Random Effect depends, demand plant-related effect should be uncorrelated from 
the regressor. Therefore, Random Effect will become an unsuitable estimator in this case 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Second, fixed effect may give biased parameter estimates, especially for 
the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2002). We have lagged 
dependent variable in our model as current export decision may depend on previous year 
firms‟ export status. Third, first-difference GMM may fail to properly capture the curvature 
of the regression function in the proximity of 0 and 1 due to the binary nature of dependent 
variable (Greenaway, et al., 2007). The dependent variable in our empirical model is of 
binary nature.  Given the shortcomings of each estimator which has been used in the 
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literature, we will use Random logit model to estimate our empirical specification. However, 
to get robust results when neither of the estimator is free from limitations in our case, we will 
prefer to estimate the effects of financial constraints on export decision with four different 
estimators; Random logit model, Random Probit model, System GMM and Fixed effects.  
 
This chapter addresses four fundamental questions related to international trade and finance. 
First, are exporters different from non-exporters in the context of finance? Second, is the 
financial condition of a firm a significant determinant of export decision? Third, does the 
financial condition of the firm improve before entering the international export market? 
Fourth, does international trade improve the financial condition of the firm after entering the 
export market? The above questions are tested by using a sample of firm-level data for 
Pakistani non-financial listed manufacturing firms for the period 2006–2014. We find that 
exporters are categorically different from non-exporters in terms of finance, and a firm‟s 
financial status is an important determinant of its export market entry decision. Our study 
also highlights that being financially less constrained is more important for the firm‟s 
decision to enter the export market than being financially healthy. For the case of developing 
countries, the measures of financial constraints are more appropriate to highlight the position 
of finance for export decision. Consistent with previous studies, we find some evidence that 
export starters‟ financial statuses differ from non-exporters before entering the export market 
because of sunk cost requirement. Likewise, our results do support the findings of previous 
studies that exporting does not bring financial benefits to firms in the short run.   
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: in the next section we give a concise 
overview of Pakistan‟s international trade trends. In section 3, we review theoretical and 
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empirical literature. Section 4 builds hypothesis, informs about dataset, and gives summary 




2. Exports in Pakistan 
 
The exporting sector of Pakistan has not shown a good performance since its independence in 
1947. Except for the first nine years of favourable balance of trade, the performance of 
international trade remains disappointing. This section gives a brief review of the trends and 
patterns of the trade of Pakistan as a background of our empirical study. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows annual growth rate of export and import for the period 2006–2014. The 
average annual growth rates for exports and imports are 5 per cent and 6 per cent between 
2006 and 2014 respectively.  The trends in export and import growth rate remain very 
unstable during this period. Between 2006 and 2008 the import growth rate is higher than 
export growth rate but between 2008 and 2010, export growth rate remains higher than 
import growth rate. The export growth rate starts to fall down sharply in 2011, even though it 
starts to increase in coming years but still could not get the height it got in year 2010. We 
relate this instability in export growth rate with political turmoil and energy crisis of the 
country.   Figure 3.2 and figure 3.3 show contributions of trade to the GDP of the country. 
The trade share of GDP grows between 2006 and 2007, but it starts to decline afterwards. If 
we look particularly at the per cent share of exports to GDP during this period, in figure 3.3, 




Figure 3.4 reports the trade balance of Pakistan between 2006 and 2014. Pakistan continues 
to run a trade deficit. We may relate this poor condition of trade of balance, which mainly 
emerges after 2000, to a number of geopolitical circumstances of the country. A poor security 
situation, continuous terrorist attacks, meagre law and order conditions, and an energy crisis, 
on the one hand, while participation with the world in the war against terrorism, on the other 
hand, reduced foreign direct investment inflow to the country and slowed down the domestic 
industrial sector performance manifold. This all turned in to the worst ever balance of trade 
situation in the country in 2000s.  
 
Figure 3.5 highlights the structure of the export sector of the country. It tells the share of 
different sectors in total export in per cent. P stands for primary products. SM stands for 
semi-manufactured products. M stands for manufacturing items, and O stands for the rest of 
the items. Pakistan‟s export mainly depends upon manufactured goods, while the share of 
raw and semi-manufactured goods to overall export is very low. The contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to overall export of the country is the highest when compared to the 
contribution of other sectors, and was around 55.4 per cent in 2014. This poor and unstable 











Figure 3.1: Export and import growth rate(million U.S.$)     Figure 3.2: Trade to GDP ratio                                                                                                                                              
                   
Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics and author‟s calculation                      Source: World Bank database                                                                                                                                
  Web link: www.pbs.gov.pk/trade-tables                                               Web link: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx   
                                                                                
Figure 3. 3: Exports of goods and services(% of GDP)      Figure 3.4: Trade balance (million U.S.$)                                                                                        
         
Source: World Bank database                                                                  Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics and author‟s calculation                       
                                                                                                              Web link: www.pbs.gov.pk/trade-tables                                                                                                                                                                                    
Figure 3.5: Composition of export 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance Pakistan Economic Survey (06-14)                                                                                             
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3. Financial Constraints and Export: Literature Review 
 
The significant role of finance for the investment of the firm provides insights to explore the 
role of finance as a determinant of export. Researchers have widely discussed firm 
heterogeneity and the role of fixed costs with other determinants of the export decision. 
However, there are only a few studies examining the interaction between financial constraints 
and foreign export decision at a firm‟s level. This section of the chapter will briefly review 
existing literature on the determinants of foreign export decision of the firms in general, and 
finance as a determinant of export decision in particular. 
 
3.1 Firm heterogeneity and the role of fixed cost in export decision 
Firm heterogeneity in terms of size, quality of work force, productivity, and financial health 
has been considered the determinant of the export decision in the literature. Previous 
evidence shows that exporters are different from non-exporters as the former are more 
productive, larger, and are capital intensive and technology intensive. Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) find in their sample of US firms that labour productivity is 12 to 24 per cent higher 
and capital intensity is 7 to 22 per cent higher in exporters as compared to their counterpart 
firms. This study also highlights that exporters start to perform excellently before entering the 
foreign market.  
 
Besides these superior characteristics, exporters are also considered financially healthier 
(Greenaway, et al., 2007; Bellone, et al., 2009), as firms overcome the challenge of sunk cost 
alongside the contest of size and age for entering the foreign market (Roberts and Tybout, 
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1997). This empirical study develops a dynamic model of the export decision of a profit-
maximizing firm. It further proves that prior export market experience positively affects the 
current decision to export. However, this effect lessens quickly over time. The probability of 
plant to export is increased by 60 per cent in the current year among previous exporters. If the 
plant remains outside the foreign market for two years, its probability of exporting in the 
current year differs from the non-exporters. This difference in probability of exporting is 
mainly due to paying sunk cost.  
 
Bernard and Wagner (2001) also verify that successful firms export. This success is not only 
in the level of productivity, in terms of quality of labour and size, but also in terms of 
financial condition, as firms have to pay sunk cost to enter the foreign export market. By 
using dynamic binary choice model of the decision to enter the foreign export market, 
Bernard and Wagner (2001) unveil the substantial entry cost for entrance to the market. 
Moreover, previous exporting experience increases the probability of current exporters by 50 
per cent in this study.  
 
3.2 Theoretical base of nexus between financial constraint and export 
So far, we have seen different determinants of export decision – how exporters perform 
differently to non-exporters. The second part of the literature sheds light on the interaction 
between firm level of liquidity and international trade. Two theoretical models of 
heterogeneity of firms have been developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). 




Only productive firms, which may bear the fixed costs associated to foreign export, will 
proceed (Melitz, 2003). Melitz uses a monopolistic competition framework and fixed costs 
related to export to develop a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms. His model 
shows how only more productive firms can export to foreign market as compared with less 
productive firms. This phenomenon induces a reallocation of market shares towards the more 
productive firms because of gaining additional export sales. Likewise, profits are also 
reallocated to more productive firms. This model of trade, integrating a firm‟s diverse 
productivity level, under the assumption of monopolistic competition and highlights the 
significance of firm heterogeneity and sunk cost as determinants of a firm‟s export 
participation decision.  
 
Chaney (2005) extended the model of Melitz (2003) to include the effect of liquidity 
constraint. In addition to the already existing concept of trade hysteresis in literature, Chaney 
(2005) connected liquidity constraint to firm heterogeneity. The most productive firm earns 
more profit from extended sales to conquer any liquidity constraint. On the other hand, the 
less productive firm would be inhibited to enter the market because of the liquidity constraint. 
A firm faces two kinds of costs to gain access to foreign markets: fixed cost and variable cost. 
The firm that intends to export need to pay an entry cost. Subsequently, the prospect exporter 
has to bear both domestic and foreign expenses. This fixed entry cost includes the expenses to 
get foreign market information, setting up a distribution network, and so on. The model sets 
up two productive thresholds for exporters and non-exporters. Non-exporters must have non-
negative profits from domestic sales to survive, while exporters must also have non-negative 
profits in the foreign market to continue export. Both heterogeneity and monopolistic 
competition create this division between exporters and non-exporters. As the firms are in 
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monopolistic competition, the elasticity of substitution between varieties determines the 
export decision. While incorporating the concept of liquidity constraint, the model assumes 
that a firm faces liquidity constraints only for exporting activities, as domestic investors do 
not trust firms for exporting to foreign market. On the other hand, foreign investors are also 
not willing to finance domestic exporters. Firms may become financially constrained to cover 
fixed entry cost to foreign market from their domestic sales.  
  
3.3 Empirical evidence 
Indirect test of financial constraint and export 
Financial development, specifically access to external finance, predominantly influences 
trade balance and export shares in manufacturing firms. Beck (2002) tests the hypothesis that 
countries with more sophisticated and developed financial institutions have a higher volume 
of export share and trade balances for the sample of the manufacturing sector. This study 
works on the sample of 65 countries over the period of 30 years from 1966 to 1995. The 
theoretical basis of Beck‟s (2002) uses savings to the private sector as a proxy of efficiency 
of the financial sector. The results of this study show that efficiency of financial sector 
reduces liquidity constraints of manufacturing firms.  This may enhance the specialization of 
the economy and emergence of economies of scale. This process gives manufacturing firms a 
comparative advantage over financially constrained firms. The empirical test of this study 
assumes that manufacturing firms experience higher scale of economies in comparison to 
their counterparts, with credit to the private sector as a share of GDP is taken as a proxy of 
financial development. Manufactured exports, imports, their differences relative to GDP, and 
the share of manufactured exports (imports) in total merchandise exports (imports), are taken 
as a proxy of trade in manufactured goods. To estimate the empirical model, this study uses 
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GMM and dynamic panel techniques. The results highlight that countries with developed 
financial institutions are having higher export shares.  
 
Another study investigating the relationship between a firm‟s status of trade and a firm‟s 
financial status is given by Campa and Shaver (2002). This study highlights that there is not 
only a one-way relationship between a firm‟s specific characteristics
27
 and the decision to 
start export. Exporting may also positively affect a firm‟s capital investment. By using the 
data of Spanish manufacturing firms, the study compares the level of liquidity constraints 
between the set of exporters and set of non-exporters over the entire sample period. The 
results indicate more stable cash flow and capital investment among exporters in comparison 
to the group of non-exporters. The more stable cash flow of exporters is associated with the 
diversification benefit of selling in different nations. In return, the financial condition of 
exporting firms becomes more stable after exporting to international market.  
 
Guariglia and Mateut (2010) check the effect of being an exporter and foreign-owned on the 
financial health of the firms. This study uses inventory investment rather than fixed 
investment. The reasons to choose inventory investment include high liquid and low 
adjustment cost in applying inventory items, and higher chances of fixed investment equation 
to suffer from misspecification due to measurement error in q. The study investigates the role 
of global engagement status of firms on their financial health over a large panel of UK 
manufacturing firms between 1993 and 2003. They find that financial factors affect the 
inventory investment, but only for those firm years when these firms export, which means 
                                                          
27
 i.e age, productivity and size. 
119 
 
that exporting helps exporters to alleviate the level of financial tensions of their balance 
sheet.  
 
Global engagement and financial variables play a pivotal role in firm survival probability. By 
using a sample of 9420 UK firms for the period 1997–2002, Bridges and Guariglia (2008) 
explore the link between global engagement and firm survival probabilities. They highlight 
two sources of global engagement: one is foreign-owned and the other is export. They find 
that financial health matters for the firm‟s survival regardless of their relation to global 
entities, but when the sample is divided according to ownership, they find that financial 
factors are not affecting firm survival if they are globally engaged, which means globally-
engaged firms are not letting firms be financially constrained, and increase their chances of 
survival. 
 
Global exchange of goods and services mainly depends upon the efficient financial markets. 
Manova (2013) applies the heterogeneous-firm model with cross-country differences in 
financial development and cross-industry variation in financial vulnerability over a panel of 
bilateral trade for 27 industries. She finds the export rate of financially developed countries is 
higher in intangible assets and external capital. Moreover, economies with weak financial 
institutions are exporting to fewer destinations and have fewer product varieties, which, in 
turn, reduce the overall volume of trade.  
Although the above studies are not directly scrutinizing the relationship between financial 
constraint and export, these studies shed light on the relationship between financial 
development and international trade as a foundation of our empirical study. 
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Direct test of financial constraint and export 
Greenaway et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between firms‟ financial health and their 
decision to export to foreign markets, for the sample of UK manufacturing firms between 




 and firm‟s riskiness
30
 as 
measures of a firm‟s financial health. The results show that exporters are more liquid and less 
levered, meaning exporters are less financially constrained. This study further explores the 
difference between continuous exporters and entrants in terms of financial situation, where 
the entrants are found to be financially weak. The weaker financial situation of starters is 
associated with payment of sunk cost in comparison with continuous exporters. Furthermore, 
ex-ante financial advantage of future exporters was not found, but ex-post financial 
advantages over exporters are clearly found. This study concludes that continuous exporters 
undoubtedly possess lower leverage and higher liquidity, proving that exporters are less 
financially constrained.  
 
Bellone et al. (2010) further attempt to answer whether less financially constrained firms 
determine the decision of firms to start exporting, making firms less financially constrained. 
Based upon Chaney‟s (2005) model, Bellone et al. (2010) conducted an empirical study for 
French manufacturing firms between 1993 and 2005. By using a different measure of 
financial constraint based upon Musso and Schiavo (2007) (alongside leverage and liquidity 
ratios), this study finds that financially stable firms are more inclined to export. Moreover, 
                                                          
28
 Leverage ratio = firm‟s short term debt/firm‟s current assets.  
29
 Liquidity ratio = (firm‟s current assets – current liabilities) /firm‟s current assets. 
30
 Firm‟s riskiness is measured by labelled Quiscore. This measure is based upon the information related to 
firm‟s credit rating and probability of company‟s failure in last 12 months.   
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the study rejects the argument that exporting impedes financial restraints of the firms in 
future.  
 
Muûls (2015) checks the effect of credit constraint on the dynamics and growth of 9000 
Belgian manufacturing firms between 1999 and 2005. He examines the impacts of credit 
constraints on destinations of export, volume of export, and number of exporting products of 
the exporters. Coface is used as a measure of credit constraints
31
. This study finds that less 
financially constrained firms explore new destinations of export, and therefore have access to 
multiple foreign markets. This study further proves the validity of pecking order theory of 
trade that less constrained firms will export to the less developed and furthest economies. 
 
More recently, Nagaraj (2014) has examined the impact of financial constraint on extensive 
(new exporters) and intensive margin (volume exported by exporters) for the Indian 
economy. This study also uses liquidity ratio and leverage ratio as measures of financial 
constraints. The results support the importance of financial smoothness for decision to export. 
This study does not find evidence for the role of financial health on the volume of export of 
already exporting firms.  
 
Impact of export promotion activities and ownership on firm export 
Export promotion activities help firms to enter the foreign market. Zia (2008) uses loan-level 
dataset for the textile sector of Pakistan to check the role of subsidized credit in alleviating 
                                                          
31
 Coface is a direct measure of credit worthiness used by financial institutions while lending loans. 
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financial constraints at firm level; moreover, how competently this credit is distributed to 
targeted firms. Firms are considered financially constrained if their export level is sensitive to 
subsidized credit. The study examines the effects of subsidies, which are ceased for a 
particular commodity of textile firms. The results show a decline in export of that particular 
cotton product as a result of the removal of subsidized credit. However, this effect was 
heterogeneous across different kinds of firms. Large listed firms remained unaffected as their 
export level remained the same, while the export level of private firms was substantially 
influenced. Even in the subsample of private firms, the small private firms are found to be 
more financially constrained as these firms‟ export levels declined considerably. In addition, 
this study underlines the misallocation of export subsidies in Pakistan. These export subsidies 
have been provided to the firms that are not actually financially constrained.  
 
Multinational companies are considered a natural channel of foreign market information, 
such as foreign consumers and foreign technology. Aitken et al. (1997) support the presence 
of multinational companies in the industry, as these promote the probability of export for 
other firms in the same industry.  
 
Greenaway et al. (2004) explore the premise given by Aitken et al. (1997) for the case of the 
UK firms. This study supports the existing argument that multinational companies (MNCs) 
help the firms to start exporting in host countries via demonstration effect, exporting 
strategies and techniques. They also regard export spillover as the secondary determinant of 
export decision, as these spillovers are an indirect conduit through which MNCs increase a 




Li and Yu (2009) explain the positive role of a foreign-owned firm to increase the export 
level of the firm. They highlight the fact that foreign-owned firms depend less on domestic 
financial intermediaries for funding, but easily get funding from a foreign parent firm in the 
time of need. The empirical results of this study show that foreign-affiliated firms are less 
dependent on domestic external funding and export more.  
 
Manova et al. (2015) find that foreign affiliated exporters export 62 per cent more and joint 
ventures export 50 per cent more than domestic firms. In addition, this study examines the 
effect of financial frictions on different trade margins. They find that financial frictions 
reduce exporters‟ global sales, product variety, number of destinations, and sales within each 
destination. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology and Data 
4.1 Estimation methods 
As the literature has already shown that exporters are different from non-exporters in terms of 
size, age, and productivity based upon the theoretical arguments given by Chaney (2005), we 
will examine if there is a difference in terms of level of financial constraints too. We compare 
the difference between exporters and non-exporters by following Bernard and Jensen (1999). 
We estimate the following model by pooled (OLS) estimator:  
                                                                     (1) 
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 Where i and t denote firm and year; Xit is one of the four proxies of financial measure: WW 
index, assets tangibility, leverage ratio, and liquidity ratio; Expdum is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when firm exports and 0 otherwise. We include age and size to control the size and 
age. We also include industry, time, and regional dummies to control for industry, time, and 
regional specific effects.  
 
We then estimate the empirical model for the determinants of the export decision of the firms. 
Following Bellone et al. (2010) and Nagaraj (2014), we model the firm‟s export decision as:   
 
                                                                           
                                      +                                 (2) 
 
Expdumit is a dummy representing a firm‟s export status, which is equal to 1 if the firm 
exports and 0 otherwise. We also include lagged dependent variable in our model. Those 
firms that were already exporting in previous years will not bear sunk cost in the current year; 
this may create a dependence of current year exporting on the previous year exporting status. 
Age, size, wage, and productivity are used as controls in export decision (e.g. Bernard and 
Wagner, 2001; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Isgut, 2001; Melitz, 2003; Bernard, et al., 2007). 
Size is measured by the natural log of number of employees. We expect a positive link 
between a firm‟s size and a firm‟s decision to export. Age is calculated by the current year 
minus the year of incorporation of the firm. Wage rate is calculated by natural log of cost of 
employees. TFP is a natural log of total factor productivity. To estimate TFP, we use dynamic 
production function derived from Cobb-Douglas production function. The details of the TFP 
125 
 
estimation are described in appendix 3B.3.  In the literature, productivity is positively related 
to export decision. Subsid s a time-invariant dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has 
more than 1 business unit, and 0 otherwise. We include this variable as a firm with 
subsidiaries is considered extensive and affects the firm‟s decision to export. By following 
the literature by Bellone et al. (2009), we expect a positive link between a firm‟s dummy of 
subsidiaries and a firm‟s decision to export.  
 
We also include foreign ownership dummy, and regional, time, and industry dummies. Firms 
with foreign ownership, and located in more developed regions, are more likely to export; 
therefore, we also include foreign ownership dummy and regional dummies to control for 
these effects. Foreigndum is a time-invariant dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is foreign-
owned. By following Saeed and Sameer (2015), we define a firm as foreign-owned if it has 
50 per cent or more foreign shareholders. We expect that foreign ownership has a positive 
impact on firms‟ exporting decisions. We also include regional dummies. We expect that 
firms in large provinces (Punjab and Sindh) to be larger, older, and more productive. The 
dummy variables for these regions are expected to be positively associated with the export 
decision. We also add industry dummies to control for sectorial fixed effects. Time dummies 
are also added to control for business cycle trends and effects. 
 
Our main variable of interest is Fini,t-1, which is the indicator of a firm‟s financial constraint. 
These are measured by WW index, assets tangibility, leverage ratio, or liquidity ratio. The 
higher the value of WW index, the more a firm is financially constrained (Whited and Wu, 
2006). We expect WW index to negatively relate to the decision to export. Almeida and 
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Campello (2006) argue that firms with more tangible assets are less likely to be financially 
constrained. We expect a positive relationship between a firm‟s tangible assets and export 
decision. Firms are considered less financially constrained if they have higher liquidity ratio 
and lower leverage ratio in the literature (such as Greenaway, et al., 2007). However, our 
study argues that these two variables proxy for financial health; therefore, we will see how 
they perform in our case. 
 
To address the issue of endogeneity, we lagged all the explanatory variables once, except for 
time-invariant variables, to control for the possibility of endogeneity as a general practice in 
literature (such as Bernard and Jensen, 1999; 2004; Greenaway, et al., 2007; Nagaraj, 2014).  
We use fixed effect to control the issues of correlation between firms observed characteristics 
and firm‟s unobservable. We also use Random Probit effect and Random Logit effect 
estimators as our dependent variable, exporting decision, is a binary variable. However, 
firm‟s current period probability to export correlates to previous year‟s export status as 
existing exporters do not need to pay sunk cost in the current year. This may cause 
endogeneity because of autocorrelation between the errors. Therefore, we will also estimate 
the empirical specification with system GMM given by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). By accumulating an additional assumption of uncorrelation 
between the first differences of instrument variables and fixed effects, Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) improve the efficiency of original difference GMM 
(Roodman, 2009) in System GMM. Even though, these estimators have limitations too to 
estimate this kind of empirical model
32
. To get the robust results, we estimate our empirical 
                                                          
32
 Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable a pooled probit estimator, which controls for clustering, has  
been used by Greenaway et al. (2007). However, clustering observe the fact the observations within the same 
firms are not independent. Hence, unobserved heterogeneity is not fully controlled in Pooled Probit. Random 
effect takes the unobserved heterogeneity into account; however, the random effect probit requires that firm 
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specification with  these all estimators; fixed effect model, System GMM, Random-probit 
and Panel - logit model.  
 
  
We then compare the ex-ante financial situation for export starters and non-exporters. In 
doing so, we will have a deep insight into the role of financial status in exporting. The aim is 
to find out whether entrants become less financially constrained up to two years before 
entering export markets. The econometric specification is taken from Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) and Bellone et al. (2007). We only focus on non-exporting firms and export starters 
for their level of financial status one and two years before starting export. Hence, t is the year 
when a firm enters into the foreign market. We estimate the following specification: 
 
                             ϒ                                    ( )     
 
Where Fin is one of our four measures of financial status. Starters is the dummy for export 
status where the firm does not export in the first year and switches only once in the remaining 
period. Size is number of employees, and TFP is total factor productivity. These are firm-
specific controlled variables. Time dummies and industry dummies are also included.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
specific unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the regressors.  The standard estimator that is used to eliminate 
the potential bias caused by omitted heterogeneity is the fixed effect estimator (Wooldridge, 2002), although 
fixed effects gives biased and inconsistent parameters estimates, especially for the coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variables. GMM has also been used in panel data when the model includes a lagged dependent 
variable along with an unobserved effect (Wooldridge, 2002). However, GMM may fail to properly capture the 
curvature of the regression function in the proximity of 0 and 1. Greenaway et al. (2007) has used first 
difference GMM to estimate export decision (binary dependent variable). 
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Finally, to check whether exporting improves the financial condition of the firms after entry, 
we focus only on the starters and non-exporters to check for the ex-post advantages that 
exporting might provide to exporters in terms of financial benefits. We follow Bernard and 
Jensen (1999) and Bellone et al. (2010) and estimate the following model: 
 
    
  
 
   
                   ϒ                          (4) 
Where ∆FINi, t/t+s captures the change in financial variable between t + s and t period. Here, s 
varies between t+1 and t+3 as t is the period when the firm starts exporting. Starter is the 
dummy indicating export status. The other control variables are size and productivity. We 
also include time and industry dummies in the estimated specification.   is our key 
coefficient of interest in equation 4, which shows the growth in the exporting firm‟s financial 
status in comparison to non-exporters. 
 
4.2 Measures of financial constraints  
The first measure of financial constraint for this empirical study is WW index, developed by 
Whited and Wu (2006). We use this index as it is built on the structural model of financial 
constraints rather than on the traditional regression of investment on Tobin‟s q, as there is a 




Our second measure of financial constraint is taken from the concept of asset tangibility, 
which is given by Almeida and Campello (2006). Their theoretical argument considers 
                                                          
33
 The calculation of WW index is provided in chapter 2. 
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tangibility of a firm‟s assets is the factor that encourages external financing because of having 
the ability to reduce the contractibility problems
34
.  
Leverage and liquidity have been widely used before as proxy for financial health in 
literature. We also use these two measures in our study to compare the results. Leverage ratio 
is measured by ratio of short-term debt to total assets. Liquidity ratio is measured by ratio of 
total current assets minus current liabilities to total assets. 
 
4.3 Data  
The main source of data collection remains the same as explained in chapter 2. For this 
chapter, we exclude transportation and public utilities, services, public administration, and 
non-classifiable establishments from the sample to concentrate on the manufacturing sector 
only. The detailed industry classification is given in appendix 3B.2. We only look at firms 
with positive values of sales, capital, and total assets. We include only those firms that have 
observations for a minimum of two consecutive years. The final sample consists of an 
unbalanced panel of 1316 firm-year observations of 298 firms for the period 2006–2014.  
Since this database does not provide export sales information, we collect this information 




                                                          
34
 The calculation of asset tangibility is provided in chapter 2. 
 
35
 State bank of Pakistan provides financial statement analysis of non-financial KSE listed firms from 1999 to 




4.4 Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 reports mean and standard deviation for the entire sample and for the exporters and 
non-exporters for main variables. It also reports mean differences for the exporters and non-
exporters. Column 1 refers to the entire sample; column 2 refers to firms that export to the 
international market; column 3 refers to firms that never exported in the entire sample period; 
and column 4 reports the mean difference between exporters and non-exporters. Summary 
statistics confirm the stylised facts found by others in the literature, that exporters are 
different from non-exporters.  
At the mean exporters are older, larger, pay higher wages and are more productive, 
differences in column 4 are also highly significant at the 1 per cent level.  
Comparing firms by financial status, the mean difference between exporters and non-
exporters on the basis of liquidity is insignificant. However, exporters are more levered; this 
difference is also statistically significant. Exporters also have a lower WW index and higher 
assets tangibility. The differences between the mean values are also statistically significant, 
showing that exporters are financially less constrained.   
Comparing firms by ownership, the average export intensity of foreign multinationals are 
slightly higher than non-exporters, from .07 to .10. Moreover, firms with subsidiaries have a 
considerably higher intensity to export than single firms do. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for key regression variables 






































Real wage 376792.9 
(920422.2) 
449247.4 
(1111846)      
258547.1     
(436922.2) 
-190700.3*** 





































.07   
(.26)   
-.030** 
(.016) 








Observations 1316 816 500  
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Expdum =1 represents exporters. Expdum =0 represents non- 
exporters. Liquidity ratio is measured by ratio of total current assets minus current liabilities to total assets. 
Leverage ratio is measured by ratio of short-term debt to total assets.. WW index is summation of six variables: 
cash flow, dummy of dividend, total debt, firms‟ sales growth, industry sales growth and total assets. Assets 






5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Comparison of exporters and non-exporters in terms of financial condition 
To confirm the differences between exporters and non-exporters in terms of finance, we 
begin by regressing the firm‟s financial variable on its export status, while controlling the age 
and size alongside (equation 1). Table 3.2, columns 1–4, presents the results from the 
estimation of linear probability model (regression 1) by pooled OLS estimator. Column 1 
gives the regression results when WW index as a measure of financial constraint is used. The 
coefficient of export dummy is significant and negative (-.0086), which means exporters are 
less financially constrained than non-exporters. We also find that age of the firm is also a 
significant factor of the firm‟s financial status. Column 2 gives the estimation results using 
assets tangibility as the measure of financial constraint. The coefficient is significant with a 
positive sign. It means exporters have higher tangible assets than non-exporters, and are less 
financially constrained as a consequence. So far, the regression results confirm that exporters 
are less financially constrained.  
Column 3 shows the results for leverage ratio. The results show that exporters are more 
highly leveraged than non-exporters. It shows that exporters are borrowing extensively, 
perhaps to pay the sunk cost to enter the export market. It further shows that exporter‟s 
financial condition is different from non-exporters. In contrast to previous study (Greenaway, 
et al., 2007) which was conducted for developed country UK, we find that exporters are 
highly leveraged in the case of developing country.  
Column 4 reports the results when using liquidity ratio as a measure of financial health. We 
find that exporters are highly liquid. In contrast to the measure of leverage ratio, firms are 
healthy in terms of liquidity (hoarding cash) in Pakistan.  
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These results highlight that exporters are financially less constrained as they are able to take 
out loans. The higher leverage ratio of exporters confirms that exporters are borrowing 
extensively. Moreover, exporters are more liquid. 
 
Table3.2: Difference between exporters and non-exporters in terms of financial status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 WW index Tangibility Leverage Liquidity 
     
Export dummy -0.00861** 0.0226** 0.0531*** .0249** 
 (0.00404) (0.00905) (0.00918) (.014) 
Age 0.000155* 0.000294* -0.000189 .0009 
 (9.01e-05) (0.000155) (0.000234) (.0004) 
Log of employees -0.0404*** -0.00930** 0.00109 .015 
 (0.00188) (0.00438) (0.00478) (.008) 
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310 
R-squared 0.443 0.108 0.184 0.137 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Export dummy is equal to 1 if firm exports and „0‟ 
otherwise.   *** p< .01 , ** p<.05, * p<0.1. Liquidity ratio is measured by ratio of total current assets minus 
current liabilities to total assets. Leverage ratio is measured by ratio of short-term debt to total assets.. WW 
index is summation of six variables: cash flow, dummy of dividend, total debt, firms‟ sales growth, industry 
sales growth and total assets. Assets tangibility is summation of inventory, receivables and capital of firms. 
 
5.2 Relationship between financial status and exporting decision 
To estimate the effects of financial condition on the extensive margin, we will estimate the 
linear probability model for equation (2). We report the results acquired by four different 
estimators: Fixed effect, System GMM, Random probit, and Panel logit model for two 
measures of financial constraints: WW index, tangibility, leverage, and two measures of 




Table 3.3 reports the results when WW index is used as a measure of financial constraint. We 
find that lagged export status has a strong and significant impact on the firm decision to 
export. Size, wage, and productivity are also significant by fixed effect and GMM estimators, 
but not consistently. Our primary interest is coefficient on WW index. Three out of four 
estimators give significant and negative coefficients of WW index, confirming firms‟ level of 
financial constraint is a significant determinant of export decision of the firms, and exporters 
are less financially constrained.  
 
Table 3.4 reports the results when assets tangibility is used as a measure of financial 
constraints. Our key interest is coefficient of assets tangibility. Except fixed effect, all other 
estimators give significant and positive coefficient of assets tangibility. It proves that 
exporters are financially less constrained as they do have higher tangible assets to get external 
funds. Dummy of lagged export status is also consistently significant with positive sign.  
 
Table 3.5 reports the results when leverage ratio is used as a measure of financial policy. 
Three out of four estimators give significant and positive coefficient of leverage ratio in 
columns 1, 3, and 4. It means that exporters have higher debt ratio.  It shows financial 
policies of the exporters are different from non-exporters. Exporters are borrowing heavily. 
This further shows the higher debt ratio of the exporters, showing exporters are not 
financially healthy. The high debt ratio can be the result to fulfil additional expenditures to 
export to international market.  Our results for leverage ratio contradict to the prediction of 
(Greenaway, et al., 2007) who find a negative relationship between the propensity to export 
and leverage ratio for the case of UK firms. However, our study covers the sample of 
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developing country; therefore, results could differ for the different financial policies of the 
exporters of developing country.  
 
Table 3.6 reports the results when liquidity ratio is used as a measure of financial health. 
None of our estimators give significant coefficient of financial variable (liquidity ratio). It 
shows that Liquidity ratio is not playing a prominent role in a firms‟ decision to export for the 
case of exporters in Pakistan. The results contrast the results of (Greenaway, et al., 2007) who 
find a positive relationship between the firms‟ propensity to export and firms‟ liquidity ratio. 
Our results do not indicate that exporters are holding too much cash or struggling to pay short 
term debt. So it does not show any different financial shape of exporters as compared to non-
exporters in terms of holding liquid assets.  
 
Taken together, our results of empirical specification show that there is an advantage to 
capturing more comprehensive aspects of financial constraints by using WW index and assets 
tangibility rather than the measures of financial policies, i.e. leverage ratio and liquidity ratio.  
Our measures of financial constraints clearly show that exporters are financially less 
constraints as compared to non-exporters. It further shows easy access of exporters to 
financial markets to raise external source of funds, as exporters are borrowing heavily. The 
results also confirm that the role of leverage and liquidity ratios is different in the exporting 
decision for the case of Pakistani listed firms. Pakistan is developing economy with 
underdeveloped financial and capital markets; therefore, the implication of financial policies 
could be different from developed countries. We argue that we uncover the significant impact 
of being financially less constrained on the export entry decision of firms. WW index and 
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assets tangibility, as measures of financial constraints, indicate the significant role of being 
financially less constrained for firms to enter to foreign market.  
Table3.3: Determinants of the decisions to export: WW index 












     
Expdumt-1 0.205*** 0.542*** 2.755*** 4.936*** 
 (0.0701) (0.0168) (0.149) (0.311) 
Employeet-1 -0.0133 0.0659*** 0.0878 0.198 
 (0.0511) (0.0117) (0.102) (0.198) 
TFPt-1 -0.0698 -0.220*** 0.381 0.752 
 (0.0785) (0.0534) (0.841) (1.649) 
Waget-1 0.0144 0.0187*** 0.0432 0.0237 
 (0.0210) (0.00314) (0.115) (0.215) 
Age 0.0737 -0.00119 0.00225 0.00325 
 (0.151) (0.00132) (0.00302) (0.00560) 
WW indext-1 -0.00463 -0.0016*** -0.0720** -0.141** 
 (0.00369) (0.000475) (0.0305) (0.0607) 
Foreigndum   -0.104 -0.123 
   (0.242) (0.494) 
Subdum    0.280 0.634* 
   (0.171) (0.342) 
Sargan(p)  0.06   
AR2(P)  0.607   
Observations 995 995 946 946 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The Sargan 
test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, under the 
null of no second-order serial correlation. If the instruments are acceptable, the p-value of Sargan test and AR(2) 
should be greater than 0.05. The two-step system GMM estimator uses lagged values of all right side variables 
dated t-3 as instruments. The dummies of foreign ownership and subsidiary are dropped by Fixed effect and 





Table3.4: Determinants of the decisions to export: Assets tangibility 








         3 
Logit 
model 
       4 
     
Expdumt-1 0.206*** 0.519*** 2.662*** 4.765*** 
 (0.0701) (0.0174) (0.139) (0.288) 
Employeet-1 -0.0142 0.102*** 0.159 0.331* 
 (0.0520) (0.0101) (0.0993) (0.192) 
TFPt-1 -0.0864 -0.205*** 0.454 0.952 
 (0.0803) (0.0488) (0.843) (1.654) 
Waget-1 0.0134 0.0150*** 0.0465 0.0377 
 (0.0207) (0.00368) (0.111) (0.208) 
Age 0.0896 -0.00407*** 0.000855 0.000860 
 (0.157) (0.00133) (0.00301) (0.00563) 
Tangibilityt-1 0.0336 0.247*** 1.207* 2.460** 
 (0.186) (0.0436) (0.635) (1.252) 
Foreigndum   -0.0812 -0.144 
   (0.231) (0.463) 
subdum   0.332* 0.746** 
   (0.170) (0.337) 
Sargan(P)  0.317   
AR (2)  0.548   
Observations 995 995 946 946 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The Sargan 
test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, under the 
null of no second-order serial correlation. If the instruments are acceptable, the p-value of Sargan test and AR(2) 
should be greater than 0.05. The two-step system GMM estimator uses lagged values of all right side variables 
dated t-3 as instruments. The dummies of foreign ownership and subsidiary are dropped by Fixed effect and 







Table3.5: Determinants of the decisions to export: Leverage ratio 








          3 
Logit model 
         
        4 
     
Expdumt-1 0.204*** 0.613*** 2.643*** 4.713*** 
 (0.0696) (0.0132) (0.138) (0.284) 
Employet-1 -0.0166 0.0457*** 0.122 0.247 
 (0.0515) (0.00918) (0.0992) (0.193) 
TFPt-1 -0.0454 -0.161*** 0.520 0.882 
 (0.0845) (0.0380) (0.825) (1.616) 
Waget-1 0.0128 0.0188*** 0.0521 0.0515 
 (0.0208) (0.00359) (0.112) (0.210) 
Age 0.0933 -0.00131* 0.00124 0.00206 
 (0.150) (0.000745) (0.00302) (0.00571) 
Leveragt-1 0.153* -0.0173 1.017** 1.860* 
 (0.0868) (0.0201) (0.497) (0.980) 
Foreigndum   0.0130 0.0595 
   (0.225) (0.462) 
Subdum   0.285* 0.629* 
   (0.165) (0.325) 
Sargan(p)  0.191   
AR(2)  0.516   
Observations 995    995 946 946 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The Sargan 
test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, under the 
null of no second-order serial correlation. If the instruments are acceptable, the p-value of Sargan test and AR(2) 
should be greater than 0.05. The two-step system GMM estimator uses lagged values of all right side variables 
dated t-3 as instruments. The dummies of foreign ownership and subsidiary are dropped by Fixed effect and 





















           





Expdumt-1 0.206*** 0.550*** 2.681*** 4.782*** 
 (0.0699) (0.0133) (0.137) (0.284) 
Employeet-1 -0.00681 0.0535*** 0.134 0.279 
 (0.0504) (0.00889) (0.0975) (0.189) 
TFPt-1 -0.00746 -0.193*** -0.00261 -0.206 
 (0.0782) (0.0277) (0.925) (1.816) 
Waget-1 0.0107 0.0312*** 0.0781 0.116 
 (0.0204) (0.00342) (0.115) (0.220) 
Age 0.0970 -0.00115 0.000478 -0.000440 
 (0.147) (0.00115) (0.00299) (0.00557) 
Liquidityt-1 -0.148 0.0561** 0.302 0.800 
 (0.0981) (0.0269) (0.375) (0.767) 
Foreign dum   -0.0178 -0.00708 
   (0.224) (0.459) 
Subdum   0.274* 0.620* 
   (0.164) (0.325) 
Sargan(p)  0.098   
AR(2)  0.529   
Observations 995 995 946 946 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The Sargan 
test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, under the 
null of no second-order serial correlation. If the instruments are acceptable, the p-value of Sargan test and AR(2) 
should be greater than 0.05. The two-step System GMM estimator uses lagged values of all right side variables 
dated t-3 as instruments. The dummies of foreign ownership and subsidiary are dropped by Fixed effect and 
GMM due to the time-invariant feature of these.  
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5.3 Financial status of firms before entering export markets 
The above discussion highlights the importance of financial condition for export entry. To 




Columns 1 and 2 of table 3.7 provide results when WW index is used in equation (3) to 
estimate this empirical specification. The results do not show that starters become less 
financially constrained one or two years before exporting. Size is found to be significantly 
associated with export status of starters but with negative sign, showing starters are not large 
firms in size in comparison to non-exporters. Previously, we found in tables 3.3 to 3.6 that 
exporters are larger in size in comparison to non-exporters. The negative sign with the 
coefficient of size variable of starters is possibly that these firms are small in size in the 
beginning but extend their size in the future.  
Columns 3 and 4 of table 3.7 give the results when we apply assets tangibility as a measure of 
financial constraints. The results show that starters appear less financially constrained one 
year and two years before entering the export market. The significant and positive 
coefficients 0.0245 and 0.0306 in columns 3 and 4 respectively indicate that starters have 
higher assets tangibility before entering to export, which increases their access to external 
funds. 
Columns 5 and 6 of table 3.7 give results with leverage ratio. We do not find significant 
coefficients for entrants. It shows that debt ratio has an insignificant role in a firm‟s decision 
to export. Columns 7 and 8 give results when liquidity ratio is used. We find insignificant 
coefficient of starters dummy showing that starters do not show differences in liquidity in 
comparison to non-exporters.  
                                                          
36
 Entrants are the firms that do not export in the first year and switch only once in the remaining period. 
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These results weakly support the previous findings (such as Greenaway, et al., 2006; Bellone, 
et al., 2009), which argue that export starters behave differently in terms of liquidity and 
leverage ratio before starting to export. However, we find that starters become less financially 
constrained in terms of assets tangibility before entering the export market. It further shows 
that starters are able to raise external funds for additional expenditures, but debt ratio and 
liquidity level do not show the variations in the beginning. 
 
5.4 Ex-post effects of trade on the firm’s financial status 
To detect the ex-post effects of trade on finance, we estimate equation (4) with OLS 
estimator.  
The results in table 3.8 do not give any evidence to support the argument that export entrants 
improve a firm‟s financial condition or financial health in the near future. We check the 
change of financial conditions over a first year period and third year period after entering the 
export market. None of the measures of financial conditions provide significant coefficient 
for entrants.  
However, these results of ex-post effects of export do not rule out any financial advantage to 
the exporting firms in the long run. Our data limitations do not allow us to look at the long 
run, but nevertheless, it appears that firms do not have financial benefits from exporting in 
the short run for this case of Pakistani listed firms. This evidence is consistent with previous 





Table 3.7: Ex-ante effects of export 
 WW index Assets tangibility Leverage ratio Liquidity ratio 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
Starter -0.310 -0.331 0.0245* 0.0306** -0.00669 -0.00189 -0.0170 -0.0238 
 (0.289) (0.355) (0.0136) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0155) (0.0220) (0.0223) 
Employeet-1 -0.413***  -0.00520  0.0156**  -0.0351***  
 (0.0928)  (0.00466)  (0.00617)  (0.00818)  
TFPt-1 -0.940  -0.127**  -0.259***  0.737***  
 (0.802)  (0.0511)  (0.0660)  (0.101)  
Age 0.00101 0.000345 0.000205 0.000249 0.000542** 0.00074*** 0.000615* 0.000414 
 (0.00345) (0.00377) (0.000146) (0.000166) (0.000270) (0.000277) (0.000362) (0.000364) 
Employeet-2  -0.400***  -0.00618  0.0100  -0.0291*** 
  (0.112)  (0.00505)  (0.00679)  (0.00942) 
TFPt-2  0.0158  -0.117*  -0.290***  0.741*** 
  (0.955)  (0.0609)  (0.0743)  (0.126) 
Observations 624 475 633 481 644 488 644 488 
R-squared 0.313 0.300 0.213 0.251 0.269 0.290 0.338 0.349 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Entrant is the dummy of those firms that do not export in the first year 
and switch only once in the remaining period. Liquidity ratio is measured by ratio of total current assets minus current liabilities to total assets. Leverage ratio is measured by 
ratio of short-term debt to total assets.. WW index is summation of six variables: cash flow, dummy of dividend, total debt, firms‟ sales growth, industry sales growth and 






Table 3.8: Ex-post effects of export 
 WW index Assets tangibility Leverage ratio Liquidity ratio 
 t+1 t+3 t+1 t+3 t+1 t+3 t+1 t+3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Entrant -0.0345 -0.723 -0.000596 -0.00165 -0.0204 -0.0399 0.000741 -0.000317 
 (0.536) (0.745) (0.00560) (0.00924) (0.0140) (0.0274) (0.0151) (0.0321) 
Employeet -0.00034 -0.00023 0.000006 0.000004 0.000123 0.00032 -0.00023 -0.00012 
 (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.0000001) (0.0000002) (0.000010) (0.000001) (0.000011) (0.000010) 
TFPt -0.00555 0.00786 -0.000186 -0.000900 -0.00133 0.00113 0.00308*** -0.00132 
 (0.0381) (0.0505) (0.000403) (0.000639) (0.00101) (0.00167) (0.00109) (0.00222) 
Constant -1.284 2.080 -0.0458*** 0.0175 0.0277 0.00792 -0.0351 -0.0303 
 (1.418) (1.973) (0.0120) (0.0178) (0.0300) (0.0656) (0.0325) (0.0619) 
Observations 571 289 600 300 600 300 600 300 
R-squared 0.321 0.285 0.370 0.166 0.039 0.051 0.069 0.079 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Entrant is the dummy of those firms that do not export in the first year 
and switch only once in the remaining period. Liquidity ratio is measured by ratio of total current assets minus current liabilities to total assets. Leverage ratio is measured by 
ratio of short-term debt to total assets.. WW index is summation of six variables: cash flow, dummy of dividend, total debt, firms‟ sales growth, industry sales growth and 







This chapter uses a sample of manufacturing listed firms from Pakistan for the period 2006–
2014 to scrutinize the relationship between financial constraint and export decision at firm 
level. We use two different measures of financial constraints; WW Index and Assets 
tangibility. By following literature and for the comparison, we also use leverage ratio and 
liquidity ratio as financial health of the firms to see the role of these on export decision of the 
exporters.  
We find that exporters are financially less constrained in terms of WW Index and Assets 
tangibility. Leverage ratio is found significant determinant of the export decision of Pakistani 
firms too. Our results show that exporters have higher level of debt ratio as compared to non-
exporters. The higher borrowing of exporters may indicate their additional expenditures to 
participate in foreign export market. Our results further suggest that level of firms‟ liquidity 
is not a significant determinant of firms‟ export decision.  
We do not find any clear evidence of ex-ante financial advantage to future exporters. 
Coefficients of assets tangibility are significant; they indicate that starters have high tangible 
assets one and two years before starting to export. However, the coefficients of WW index, 
leverage, and liquidity ratios are not significant at either one or three years before starting to 
export. The evidence is mixed and varies alongside different measures of financial status. 
Our study does support already existing evidence that export does not bring financial benefits 
to export entrants. Exporting to the international market does not provide easy access to 
external finance for entrants, at least in the short run. It is important to highlight that we 
cannot extend these results into the long run. The hypothesis, that internationalization leads to 




Overall, our empirical study backs the models of international trade, which is based on firm 
heterogeneity and sunk entry cost for the case of developing country. On the basis of these 
results, policy makers of the country can draw such policies, which can help the efficient but 








3B.1. Definitions of the variables used 
Expdum: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports a positive amount, and 0 otherwise. 
Leverage ratio: A ratio of a firm‟s short-term debt over current assets. 
Liquidity ratio: A ratio of a firm‟s current assets minus its short-term debt over total assets. 
WW index: A combination of following variables. 
Cash flow: Measured as sum of net income and depreciation. 
Divpos: A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm pays cash dividend, otherwise 0. 
Long term debt: Long-term financial debts to credit institutions (loans and credits). 
Total Assets: Book value of total assets. 
Firm sales growth: Sales is net sales. 
Industry Sales growth :  it is 2-digit industry sales growth rate 
Assets Tangibility:  At the firm level, asset tangibility is measured by the following formula: 
                   (                                                    
                                                                          )                    
Where 
Cash : cash in hand of the company 
Receibales: firm‟s accounts receivable.   
Inventory: value of a firm‟s inventory. 
Capital: value of a firm‟s fixed assets. 







3B.2. Table: Industry classification 




Food &Tobacco 1,2, 9, 20,21,54 38 11 
Basic industries including 
petroleum 
10, 12, 13, 14, 24, 26, 28, 29, 33 54 17 
Construction 15, 16, 17, 32, 52 35 11 
Textile & Trade 22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59 135 42 
Consumer durable 25, 30, 36, 37, 39, 50, 55, 57, 34, 
35, 38 
33 10 
Others No specific SIC code 27 9 
Total Sample  322 100 
 
3B.3. Calculation of total factor productivity 
To measure TFP, we use log linear production function stemmed from Cobb-Douglas production function. By 
following Olley and Pakes (1996), the model is estimated in log linear form. It takes following shape: 
                                                             (1) 
Where yit , log of value added of firm i is a function of the  log of firm‟s state variable capital and age, and a 
variable input, labour. The error structure includes wit, firms unobserved productivity, is a state variable and 
influences firms‟ decision of investment and exit. Because unobserved productivity is not directly observed in 
the data and productivity and input choices are likely to be correlated , estimating equation (2) is affected by 
simultaneity and selection biases. To tackle the biases, we follow model of unobserved productivity given by 
Olley and Pakes (1996). The productivity function is determined by a firm‟s capital Kit  ,Age ait , investment iit , 
and economic environment rit . It is mentioned as wit = ft (iit , Kit , ait , rit ) . By following Rizov and 
Zhang(2013), we extend the Olley and Pakes (1996) model of unobserved productivity and adjust the model of 
productivity to allow for exporting status. Hence the productivity function will become as wit = ft (iit , eit , Kit , ait 
, rit ).  Substitution of this productivity function into equation (1) gives us: 
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                              (                    )              (2)                     
By following Olley and Pakes (1996), we require the constant, Kit  and ait to be combined into a function Φt (iit , 
eit , Kit , ait , rit ) such that equation  (2) becomes 
              (                    )                                    (3) 
Equation (3) represents the first stage of estimation algorithm and is estimated by OLS. The first stage estimate 
labour coefficient and Φt for using in second stage. 
                                                                     (4) 
 The capital and age coefficients are identified in the second stage of our estimation algorithm. Firm‟s decision 
to exit directly depend upon wit, therefor, the second stage of estimation is influenced by endogenous selection.  
By following Olley and Pakes (1996), we add survival propensity in f(.) function to account for endogenous 
selection on productivity:  
       wit = fˆ (wit-2, wit-1, Pˆ) + ηit                                                                        (5) 
Pˆ is survival propensity score which controls for the impact of selection on the expectation of wit. The second 
stage of  our estimation gives the coefficient of capital and age. We put equation 4 and 5 into equation 1 which 
gives us: 
                            (                                                   )          (6) 
Where β0 is encompassed into the non-parametric function, fˆ(.) and two error terms Ԑit and ηit are included into 
   . Equation (6) is estimated by non-linear least squares(NLLS), which give βˆk and βˆl . 











Chapter 4: Political Connections, Financial 
Constraints and Performance: Firm-level 










The complex nexus between political and business connections of the firms and patronage 
treatment from the government goes back to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, 
which brought into the spotlight the distinction of the relationship-based economic and 
financial system and the arm‟s length market-driven system (Charumilind, et al., 2006). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) introduce a model of bargaining between politicians and 
managers to explain how politicians grant resources towards favourite firms in the 
relationship-based system. Misallocation of investment, distortion of incentives, and 
prevalence of corruption are considered the prominent features of a relationship-based 
system. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Li et al. (2009) highlight those inadequacies in 
formal institutions that act like breeding grounds for the birth of a relationship-based 
economic and financial system. A growing amount of empirical literature acknowledges that 
the advantages acquired through the political connections are significant in a relationship-
based system. These studies (e.g. Charumilind, et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2008; Faccio, 2009; 
Cooper, et al., 2010) prove the potential linkages between political connection and financing 
policy of the firms. 
 
In the world of Modigliani-Miller (1958), a firm‟s investment decision was independent of a 
firm‟s financial position in the case of perfect capital markets. However, capital markets are 
not perfect in the real world due to the problem of information asymmetries; therefore, cost of 
internal finance and cost of external finance are not perfect substitutes (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981a; Myers and Majluf 1984; Myers, 1984). The existence of information asymmetry and 
agency cost makes the capital markets imperfect. Firms may face the problem of financial 
constraints, and they might not invest in a particular project due to the expensive cost of 
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external funds. A growing body of the literature records the economic benefits of the political 
connections to the firms (such as Faccio, 2006; Cooper, et al., 2010). Firms with political 
connections need to fulfil fewer requirements such as collateral to borrow loans, in 
comparison to those without connections. It is argued that political connections will also 
make firms less financially constrained. The existing empirical evidence supports the 
argument that politically connected firms rely more on easily available external funding than 
internal funds (Xu, et al., 2013). Song et al. (2015) also argue that firms with political 
patronage are more likely to be less financially constrained.  
 
The preferential treatments may further affect a firm‟s performance as its financial condition 
may affect its performance (Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Goldman, et al., 2009). Existing 
empirical evidence recognizes both positive and negative impacts of political connections on 
a firm‟s performance. The first school of thought considers that political connections improve 
a firm‟s performance through preferential access to credit (such as Braggion and Moore, 
2011). Moreover, politicians as outside directors are considered better because of examining 
all the policies as an external and giving better suggestion. Besides that, they have additional 
experience of being a politician and playing a prominent role in policy-making at country 
level. In this setting, it is expected that politicians affect a firm‟s performance positively 
(Niessen and Ruenzi, 2009). The second school of thought argues that politically connected 
firms may have lower performance because of the following reasons: politically connected 
managers indulge in personal motives, misallocation of resources, and distortion of market 
economy. This will lead the manager to ignore to maximise the profitability of firm and 




The impacts of political connections on a firm‟s behaviour have been widely explored. 
Despite the fact that a firm‟s political bond affects its financial condition and its performance, 
only a handful of empirical studies have formalized the link between political connections of 
the firms and a firm‟s level of financial constraints. It is also important to see the impact of 
political connections on a corporation‟s performance across different financial conditions of 
connected firms. To the best of our knowledge, none of the studies have tested the impact of 
political connections on a firm‟s performance under different financial constraints. Our study 
attempts to fill these gaps using a sample of micro level data for Pakistan between 2006 and 
2015.   
 
Pakistan is particularly suitable for the study. First, there is widespread political corruption 
within the system. Three elected governments were dismissed in the past because of 
corruption. Recently, Prime Minister Nawaz Shareef has been removed by the Supreme Court 
of Pakistan because of involvement in corruption. Famous politicians are also running family 
businesses. This shows that the relationship between politicians and firms is quite strong in 
Pakistan. Empirical studies by Khwaja and Mian (2005) and Rehman (2006) argue that there 
are unlimited and uncontrolled levels of political connections of firms in Pakistan. Second, 
there is an insufficient level of development of financial institutions in Pakistan. It is likely 
that the impact of political connections on financial situation and firm performance may be 
more prevalent than in other countries. Third, previous studies related to developing countries 
usually assess the effects of affiliation with one single political party (e.g. Suharto in 
Indonesia and Mahatir in Malaysia). In the setting of Pakistan, we can assess the impact of 
political connections via affiliation with different political parties, and also affiliation with 
winning and losing political parties. In the previous decade, the Government of Pakistan has 
undertaken a number of steps to curb the corruption. Introduction of the National Anti-
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Corruption Strategy (NACS) in 2002 and  introduction of a law that public officials must 
declare their assets are the practical reforms that were taken to control the level of corruption. 
Nevertheless, these reforms themselves fell victim to corrupt politicians and government 
officers. It is important to see the effects of political connections on firms‟ financial 
situtations and, in turn, on the performance level of firms.  
 
This chapter addresses four fundamental questions: first, whether politically connected firms 
are different from non-connected firms in terms of finance and productivity; second, whether 
the firms with political connections have easy access to external finance – in other words, 
whether politically connected firms are less financially constrained; third, whether political 
connections of the firms influence a firm‟s level of performance; fourth, does the impact of 
political ties on firm performance vary across different levels of a firm‟s financial condition? 
 
This study contributes to the literature in three main aspects. First, this study extends the 
research on the effects of political connections on financial constraints of the firms. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is only one study, by Xu et al. (2013), which directly examines 
the effect of political connections on financial constraints and investment level for the case of 
Chinese firms. This study regresses investment on Tobin‟s q and other controlled variables.  
We do not use Tobin‟s q model because of scepticism raised by Erickson and Whited (2000) 
related to the measurement error problem in q theory. Our study uses a variety of appropriate 
measures of financial constraints, including WW index, assets tangibility, leverage ratio, and 
liquidity ratio. As there is a debate about the perfect measure of financial constraints, we use 
four different measures to check the effect of political connections on the financial condition 
of the firm. Using different financial measures is not only for the sake of a robustness check, 
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but also to see how political connections affect different financial aspects of the firms. WW 
index is calculated by six financial variables of the firm. Asset tangibiity is a measure of 
financial constraint based on a specific feature of assets: widely used leverage ratio and 
liquidity ratio, which have been better called as measures of financial health. By using these 
measures in our study, we could deeply scrutinize the role of political connections for firms‟ 
financial conditions
37
.    
 
The second contribution is to use two different measures to capture the political connections 
of the firms. The first measure strictly observes the formal relationship of firm directors with 
political parties, defined as whether firms‟ directors participate in the election. The second 
measure captures the informal relationship of directors with political parties ,defined as if the 
firm belongs to 38 famous groups/families in the country
38
. Given the two different 
definitions of political connections, our study could investigate which connection has 
stronger influence on a firm‟s behaviour. 
 
The third contribution is to examine the effect of political connections on firm performance 
across different levels of financial constraints. Some studies highlight a relationship between 
financial constraints and firm‟s performance (Fowowe, 2017; Chen and Hua, 2009). Our aim 
is to see whether politically connected firms with fewer financial constraints affect a firm‟s 
performance differently. The purpose in doing so is to see whether political connections 
                                                          
37
 Financial constraints have been defined as a situation where firms do not invest in a particular project because 
of expensive external funds, but financial health is a situation that is linked with existence or collapse of the 
firm. 
38
 Rehman (2006) reports the list of top 38 business groups and their associated firms in Pakistan. Rehman 
(2006) forms these groups on the basis of their assets. This book also traces the formation of these dominating 
groups because of having an informal relation with politicians, which helps to get preferential treatment from 
government. The detailed description is given in section 2 of the chapter. 
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mitigate the level of financial constraints to a firm and improve a firm‟s performance. The 
results could be interesting for the policy makers to draw policies to curb agency problems so 
that these preferential treatments could be used to improve the efficiency of the firms.  
 
Our results show that formal political connections clearly make firms different from non-
connected firms in terms of finance; however, for productivity, our results are mixed. 
Furthermore, we find that connected firms (defined as if firms‟ directors participate in the 
election) are less financially constrained. Connected firms have a low WW index, high assets 
tangibility, high leverage ratio, and low liquidity ratio. The coefficients of all financial 
variables are significantly different, showing that formal political connections influence a 
firm‟s financial condition. Connected firms are less financially constrained, meaning that 
they have easy access to external finance, but low level of liquidity shows that they do not 
need to hold much cash to fund investment. Moreover, we find that informal connected firms 
(defined as belonging to business groups) do not influence a firm‟s financial condition 
significantly. The results are robust to potential endogeneity issues. In addition, we look at 
the effects of political connections and a firm‟s level of financial constraints on its 
performance. We use return on assets (ROA), Tobin‟s q, and TFP to measure a firm‟s 
performance. We use two different measures of financial cosntarints; WW index and leverage 
ratio, we find clear evidence that connected firms are performing worse than their non-
connected peers. The results indicate the deep hold of agency problem and misallocation of 
resources among Pakistani listed firms. We further check the effects of political connections 
on a firm‟s performance across its financial status. In other words, we try to check the 
indirect effect of political connection via financial status on the performance of connected 
firms. Some of our results support the hypothesis that politically connected firms‟ 
performances vary across different levels of financial status.  Some of our evidences show 
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that financially constrained firms affect positively the performance of politically connected 
firms. The possibile jusitification of these results could be the positive effect of financial 
pressure on firms‟ performance. However, these results are appealing and assist policy 
makers to draw such policies that could help to extract benefits from a relationship-based 
economic system.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: In section 2, we give a concise 
overview of politics business nexus in Pakistan. In section 3, we provide detailed theoretical 
and empirical literature. Section 4 builds hypothesis, informs about dataset, and gives 
summary statistics. Section 5 presents empirical results of our study. In section 6, we 
conclude the study. 
 
2. The Institutional Background 
 
Corruption, rent seeking, and clientelism have remained the prominent characteristics of 
Pakistani politics. The Index of Economic Freedom
39
 ranked Pakistan as most un-free and 
corrupt country in the world. Transparency International
40
 also ranks Pakistan among the 
most corrupted countries of the world. Pakistan lies 116th out of 176 countries, according to 
the Corruption Perceptions Index, 2016.  
 
                                                          
39
 The index covers 12 freedoms from property rights to financial freedom in 186 countries. Recently, in 2017, 
Pakistan was ranked 141 out of 186 countries in the index. More details are available at 
http://www.heritage.org/index/freedom-from-corruption. 
40
 Transparency International, a non-governmental organization, was founded in 1993 with the purpose to 
combat corruption and crimes arising from corruption.   
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Since its birth in 1947, Pakistan has had a turbulent political history, often featuring martial 
law and inefficient government. Pakistan has experienced three military coups and three 
democratically elected assemblies up to 2008. None of the elected assemblies could complete 
five-year tenure and were dissolved because of poor governance, corruption, and nepotism. 
Between 2008 and 2018, two democratically elected civilian-led governments have 
completed their five-year term in office for the first time in its history. Recently, Supreme 
Court of Pakistan has disqualified Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif due to his involvement in 
companies and properties, which were originally revealed by the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in its Panama Papers leaks.  
 
2.1 Business-politics nexus in Pakistan 
 
Since the creation of Pakistan, business and politics have been closely connected with each 
other. Bhutto‟s privatization in 1972 has been blamed for the nexus of business and politics in 
Pakistan
41
. A white paper on the economy of Bhutto unearthed bad loans of at least half a 
million rupees. Famous politicians, dictators, and 22 dominating families have been accused 
of being beneficiaries of these written-off loans. Three lists of bad loans have been published 
since 1993, which have highlighted the names of politicians and chairpersons of dominant 
business groups (Rehman, 2006). 
 
Bureaucracy has played an important role in creating a nexus between business and politics in 
Pakistan. The chairpersons of two major political parties, Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN) 
and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), have their own family businesses. Their governments had 
                                                          
41
 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was a Pakistani politician who served as Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1973 to 1977, 
and prior to that as fourth President of Pakistan from 1971 to 1973. 
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been charged with the allegation that they could not draw a line between their business 
interests and interests of the state. Since the establishment of Pakistan, businessmen and 
industrialists have played an active role in politics. Yusuf Haroon, a famous industrialist, was 
First Chief Minister of Sindh
42
. Ahmed Dawood (from Dawood group) and Rafiq Saigol 
(from Saigol group) are popular industrialists, and also have important official posts in the 
ruling parties. The chairman of Nishat group, Mian Muhammad Munsha, has risen to the 
head of Pakistan‟s richest family under the umbrella of friendship with former Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif. Mian Nawaz Sharif (former Prime Minister) and Asif Zardari (former 
President) secured loans from banks that were in default (Rehman, 2006). Besides easy 
access to loans and loans default, these politicians have faced allegations of a number of 
preferential treatments, such as giving illegal allotments of lands and government properties 
to their favourite officers, awarding of contract of export at favourable prices, and tax 
evasion. 
 
Moreover, the study of Khwaja and Mian (2005) shows that government banks are acting as a 
tool of political rents in Pakistan. This empirical study shows that government banks are 
giving political favours to connected firms by using loan-level dataset for 90,000 firms in 
Pakistan. 
 
2.2 Role of business groups in Pakistan 
 
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) define a business group as a group of firms controlled by a 
single family. Khanna and Rivkin (2006) describe the other forms of groups, where firms 
                                                          
42
 Sindh is the second largest province of Pakistan. 
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come together because of interlocking directorship, cross holdings of equity, or any other 
common interest.  
Business groups are considered an important firm ownership feature of private firms in both 
emerging and developed economies (Manos, et al., 2007). In Pakistan, business groups are 
referred to as the top 38 industrial families. These groups/families have an informal 
relationship (close friends, related through marriages of their children) with politicians of 
famous political parties. The founders of some of the groups are famous politicians in the 
country. In addition, the members of these families are controlling banks and insurance 
companies. The major industrial families and entrepreneurs have connections because of the 
same religious sects and communities. White (1972) highlights that there were 103 cases in 
which one family had at least one member on the board of directors of at least one company 
of another family. White (1972) also mentions that 43 important families and groups 
controlled 98 listed non-financial firms and accounted for 53.1 per cent of the total assets for 
non-financial listed firms in 1968 in Pakistan. Rehman (2006) reports the list of top 38 
business groups (based on their size) and their associated firms in Pakistan.   
 
3. Literature Review 
Previous evidences show that politically connected firms have three main preferential 
treatments from lenders and government. First, politically connected firms have privileged 
access to credit (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). 
Second, these firms get regulatory protections (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998). Third, these 
firms acquire government bailouts easily when in trouble (Faccio, 2006). This biased 
behaviour from government and banks towards politically connected firms makes them 
different from non-politically connected firms.  
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Firms‟ political connections are classified as relationship-based resources of the firms 
(Barney, 1991; Wood and Jones, 1995). Rajan and Zingales (1998) explain the relationship-
based system by attributing three characteristics to this system: first, the financier also has 
firm ownership. Second, there is a weak and inadequate law and order condition of the 
system. Third, this system is opaque in its form to protect the relationship from the danger of 
competition. Khan and Jomo (2000) define political connections of the firms as rent-seeking 
activities of the firms. Khan and Jomo (2000) further define Rents as incomes that are higher 
than they otherwise would have been. In the broad sense, these rents comprise not only of 
monopoly profits, but subsidies and transfers obtained through the political mechanism, 
illegal activities of private mafias, and short-term super profit made by innovators.  
 
3.1 Channels of building political connections and the debate 
Capital control has been taken as a tool to control the free flow of capital by the government, 
central bank, and the regulatory authorities of the country. Capital control promotes such an 
environment that breeds relationship-based capitalism (cronyism) (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998). Hindrances in international capital flows also promote a relationship-based system. 
Johnson and Mitton (2003) look at the impact of capital control on stock returns of the 
politically connected firms for pre- and post-capital control phase in Malaysia. Before 
imposition, politically connected firms had worse stock returns, while these firms started to 
perform better on average after imposition of capital control. During the period of capital 
control, firms started to utilize their connections and got preferential treatment. Political 
connections and foreign securities have also been considered a close substitute. Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee (2006) argue that political patronages receive cheap loans from the 




Lawyers and politically experienced outside directors also play an important role for the 
relationship between government policies and firms. Directors with political experience and 
business acumen deal with political affairs of the firms more skilfully and predict government 
policies more accurately. Government banks have also been considered a vital medium to 
establish the political rents and are politically biased. Khwaja and Mian (2005) highlight that 
preferential access to loans is being given to connected firms by the government banks in 
Pakistan. Moreover, this preferential treatment is more likely for those politically connected 
firms that are bigger in size and have a higher propensity to default. Sapienza (2004) also 
highlights that state-owned banks serve as a medium of supplying political patronage in the 
form of charging lower interest rates in Italy. 
 
The relationship-based system has always been criticised; however, some studies highlight 
the flipside of this system too. Rajan and Zingales (1998) evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of political connections. All developed countries, including USA and UK, had 
been through this system during a period of transition. This study highlights a number of 
advantages of this system. For example, a firm in distress can be bailed out in a relationship-
based system; funding of value-adding projects is better monitored in a relationship-based 
system, and a lower interest rate is charged to younger firms. It is also possible to trade off 
short-run losses for long-term gains in a relationship-based system. Some evidence supports 
these arguments, (such as Fisman, 2001), which considers political connections as a valuable 




However, the costs of a relationship-based system make the advantages of the system 
suspicious. The relationship-based system ignores the price signals of markets. Prices become 
less informative to provide economic directions, leading to costly misallocation of resources. 
The relationship-based system is also distorting the allocation of funds. The economic cost of 
this political corruption is substantial. The defaulting rate of these politically connected firms 
is found to be higher than non-connected firms. It means money is poorly invested or wasted. 
Empirical evidence shows that connected firms have lower productivity and a poorer 
performance level in comparison with non-connected peers. For the case of Pakistan, Khwaja 
and Mian (2005) highlight the loss of 1.6 per cent of GDP because of this investment 
distortion.  
 
In sum, political connections can be used as a measure by the firms to promote development 
and their efficiency. However, most evidence shows that the relationship-based system has 
been used to fulfil managers‟ personal motives, and results in misallocation of resources.   
 
3.2 Theoretical underpinning 
There are three main theories of modern finance, which originate from a firm‟s market value 
maximization principle in the proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958). These theories are 
pecking order theory, trade-off theory, and agency cost theory.  
Pecking order theory argues that cheap internal finance should be preferred over expensive 
external finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984). In the case of politically connected firms, 
literature shows that firms have easier access to bank loans because of links with government. 
It means firms prefer debt financing (expensive) over internal financing (cheaper). In this 
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setting, we can assume that pecking order theory does not work for the case of politically 
connected firms. Political connections may reduce the problem of information asymmetry, as 
Dewenter and Warther (1998) find for the case of Japan. Connected firms may also have easy 
access to external finance through a part in policy making (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; 
Chang and Hong, 2000). Therefore, political connections may reduce the relevance of 
pecking order theory of capital structure.  
 
Political connection may also contradict the prediction of trade-off theory. Trade-off theory 
stresses the trade-off between the benefits from the tax deductibility of interest payments and 
cost of bankruptcy of the firm. The literature shows that politically connected firms reduce 
tax liability and reduce the bankruptcy risk by cheap credit (Adhikari, et al., 2006; Faccio, 
2006). The implication of trade-off theory for politically connected firms is complicated. 
Trade-off theory expects that at the position of optimal capital structure, a firm‟s marginal 
benefit of debt is equal to its marginal cost. The main advantage of having debt in corporate 
structure is tax deductibility of interest payments; however, connected firms may reduce their 
tax liability by utilising political connections. Also, group-affiliated firms may create a fake 
tax shield by moving profit from one firm to another (Chang and Hong, 2000). The cost of 
having debt in capital structure is the risk of bankruptcy/default. Claessens et al. (2008) show 
that firms that have group affiliation may reduce the expected cost of default by using assets 
of another group member as collateral. 
Not only is there easy access to debt financing, but managerial opportunism is another motive 
of politically connected firms. A firm‟s manager may spend more money to establish 
connections with politicians. Even though managers will get different benefits, e.g. if the 
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benefits acquired through these connections offset the cost paid by the managers to establish 
a relationship, this is okay, otherwise it is called agency cost.  
 
However, Rizov (2008) highlights that most of the conventional theories of corporate finance 
were formulated under the assumption of hard budget constraints, while capital structure of 
politically connected firms can be attributed to the environments with soft budget constraints. 
Protection of firms from financial failures is the main characteristic of soft budget constraints 
(SBC) (Kornai, 1980). The characteristics of Soft budget constraints also include provision of 
soft credit, subsidies, and tax relaxations, and some kinds of tariffs to rescue the domestic 
firms. Therefore, political connections of the firms contradict the conventional theories of 
corporate finance, whereas political connections of the firms lie under the soft budget 
constraints.  
 
3.3 The effects of political connections on a firm’s financial status 
 
There are a number of studies in literature showing that politically connected firms are 
different from non-connected firms in terms of debt ratio. As business connections can 
determine easy access to bank credit. Charumilind et al. (2006) examines whether Thai firms 
with connections have easier access to long term debt than firms without such ties. They 
found that firms with connections borrow more long-term debts as these firms need to show 
much less collateral to borrow long term. Moreover, the study further finds that these firms 
were also financially less vulnerable following the financial crisis (1997-1998). 
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Faccio (2009) also find that connected firms are different from non-connected firms across a 
large number of countries. This study uses a database which includes several thousand firms 
in 47 countries to see the differences between connected firms and non-connected firms. He 
finds that politically connected firms have higher leverage, less tax payments, stronger 
market power, and poorer accounting performance relative to non-connected firms.  It further 
highlights that differences are greater when firms are connected through owners rather than 
directors. Likewise, differences are greater when connections are with minister rather than 
with the member of the parliament.  
 
By using a unique loan level data set from Pakistan, Khwaja and Mian (2005) check presence 
of political rents in banking. This study further detects the channels of rent provision and 
economy wide costs this rent imposes.  They find that politically connected firms receive 45 
per cent larger loans, but the ratio of loans default is also 50 per cent higher when compared 
to non-connected firms in Pakistan. Besides, government banks showed political biasedness 
as this preferential treatment is entirely driven by loans from government banks.  
 
Fan et al. (2008) examine the effects of corruption and rent-seeking on corporate financing 
pattern of those firms which bribed or connected with corrupt high-level government 
bureaucrats. The leverage level of these firms decreased substantially following the arresting 
of corrupt bureaucrats. This study further highlights that decline in leverage rate is mainly 




Faccio (2006) study 450 politically connected firms in 35 countries. This study finds 
evidences of greater use of debt financing in connected firms than non-connected firms. 
Similarly, Guo et al. (2014) find that politically connected firms in China have more 
accessibility of loans. 
 
The study connected by Song et al. (2015) sees the effects of political connections on the 
firms‟ level of financial constraints. They find politically connected firms are less financially 
constrained when compared to non-connected firms. Times interest earned
43
 index is used to 
divide firms into financial status. Firms‟ level of financial constraints is regressed on the 
dummy of political connections and other control variables. The results show that politically 
connected firms are less financially constrained.  
 
Xu et al. (2013) use investment–cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraint. 
They find firms with political connections have less dependency on internal funds and, 
therefore, are less financially constrained. 
 
Overall, these all studies show that political connections are influencing firms‟ level of 
financial status significantly. 
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 This is an index used to measure an ability of a firm to pay its interest. Time interest earned is measured as a 




3.4 The impact of political connections on firm performance 
Politically connected firms get preferential treatment in the form of easier access to loans. 
Connected firms are bestowed by patronages either through soft terms related to loans or by 
paying a lower interest rate. This easier access of credit could ultimately influence firm 
performance. If the cheap loan credit is utilised efficiently, firms can obtain comparative 
advantage over their non-connected counterparts, which, in turn, improve firm performance. 
On the other hand, this political interference in terms of resource allocation and project 
selection can affect the performance of firms negatively. The literature on the impact of 
political connections on firms‟ performance give mixed evidences which are elaborated 
below. 
 
Outside directors which are defined as „all non-management members of the board can make 
a difference in firm performance. Peng (2004) checks the effect of affiliated and non-
affiliated outside directors on Chinese firms‟ return on assets and sales growth. The study 
finds that affiliated and non-affiliated outside directors exert insignificant impact on ROA 
however, the impact of affiliated directors on sales growth is positive and significant. 
 
Braggion and Moore (2011) use data on UK firms. They use Company‟s share price to see 
the effects of political connections on firms‟ performance. 2 to 2.5 per cent rise in share price 
is found if one of their directors was elected in General elections of the country. Similarly, 
Asquer and Calderoni (2011) find connections with the governing coalition exert positive 




Dombrovsky(2008) employs Latvanian firms to see the effects of political connections on 
sales. A surge in sales is found when a politician joins the firm. Moreover, the study finds 
that Ex-politicians are positively influencing the performance of the firms.  
 
Capital control is considered as a channel to enhance political connection. Johnson and 
Mitton (2003) used sample of Malaysian firms. They find that without any capital control 
scheme, politically connected firms were suffering from decline in market value. After 
imposition of capital control, the market value of politically connected firms increased. 
Moreover, a number of other studies such as Faccio (2006), Fisman (2001), Roberts (1990) 
and Goldman et al. (2009) find a positive link between politically connected firms and the 
value of firms. 
 
However, there are some other studies which find a negative relationship between firm‟s 
political connections and performance. Boubakri et al. (2008) used number of measures of 
firms‟ performance, i.e. return on sales, sales growth, earning growth, ROA and ROE. The 
results of estimating empirical specification showed that connected firms have poor 
performance. Similarly, Li et al. (2009) find that State-owned firms, which have easy access 




4. Baseline Specification, Estimation, Methodology, and Data 
A large empirical work has found that political connections play a positive role to obtain 
preferential financial treatments from government-owned enterprises, such as loans (Khwaja 
and Mian, 2005; Faccio 2006; Fan, et al., 2008; Li, et al., 2009; Ye, et al., 2012). These 
studies show a positive relationship between a firm‟s political connections and a firm‟s debt 
financing. Other studies show that political connections help firms to get privileged treatment 
in competition for government contracts or bailout support (Faccio, 2006). Nevertheless, 
there are some studies that reject a positive relationship between a firm‟s political 
connections and debt ratio (Asquer and Calderoni, 2011). In general, the literature argues that 
politically connected firms enjoy preferential treatment in a number of forms and hold a 
higher degree of leverage than non-connected firms. 
 
Drawing from the literature, we will examine the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Politically connected firms are different from non-connected firms in terms of 
financial status and performance.  
 
The role of political and business connections is prominent in Pakistan. The incentives for 
businessmen to build political connections breed from corruption and bad governance. It is 
quite common that private banks, in general, and government banks, in particular, extend 
loans to firms on the basis of nepotism and favouritism rather than on the basis of collateral 
(Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Li, et al., 2009). As a result, the cost of external finance (debt 
financing) and premium of external over internal funds would be mitigated. We may observe 
less dependence of investment on internal finance, and firms will become less financially 




Hypothesis 2: Political connections assist connected firms to become less financially 
constrained.  
 
Political connections may also be able to improve the performance level of the firms, if they 
use their resources and experience in a better manner. Politically connected directors are 
considered experts in decision making; they monitor a firm‟s decision better because of 
experience in politics (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The economic advantages include both 
tangible and intangible benefits that politically connected directors bring to firms. It is 
plausible to assume that such preferential lending may also influence a firm‟s performance. If 
this easy access of funding is used efficiently, it will lead to better firm performance. 
Boubakri et al. (2008) report that connected firms perform better than non-connected firms. 
In contrast, there are studies arguing that politically connected firms perform poorly when 
compared to non-connected firms. There is the possibility that politically connected managers 
may not have managerial expertise (Boubakri et al. 2008). In addition, connected managers 
may also use easily available funding for their personal motives rather than maximising profit 
of the firms (Dewenter, et al., 1997).  
 
Hypothesis 3: Firm performance is significantly associated with political connections. 
 
There is the possibility that firms‟ performances may be influenced differently if politically 
connected firms are also less financially constrained. We find evidence in the literature that a 
firm‟s performance is influenced by financial condition of the firm (such as Banerjee, et al., 




Hypothesis 4: The performance of politically connected firms varies across different levels 
of financial constraints.  
 
4.1 Estimation models 
 
We will follow Faccio (2009) to see the difference between politically connected firms and 
politically non-connected firms in terms of finance (WW index, tangibility, leverage, and 
liquidity) and firms‟ performances (ROA, Tobin‟s q, and TFP). We will estimate the 
following model by OLS estimator: 
 
                                                                  (1) 
 
Where Xit will take one of the following variables: WW index, tangibility, leverage ratio, 
liquidity ratio, ROA, Tobin‟s q, and TFP. PolCon is time-invariant dummy variable – it is 
equal to 1 if firm has political connections and 0 otherwise. We will estimate the empirical 
specification given in equation (1) separately for each variable. ROA is calculated by profit 
before taxes divided by total assets. Tobin‟s q is defined by ORBIS database as ratio of 
market capitalization over total assets. TFP is total factor productivity measured by dynamic 
production function stemmed from Cobb-Douglas production function. Size as independent 
variable is measured by log of number of employees. Foreigndum is a time-invariant dummy 




To check the relationship between connected firms and their level of financial constraints, we 
will estimate the following model which resembles to the framework given by Charumilind et 
al.(2006) and Frasen et al.(2006) : 
                                                                        
                                                                   (2)       
 
FC is our measure of financial constraints. Polcon is a dummy, which is equal to 1 if firms 
are politically connected. Polcon is a time-invariant dummy variable. Age is calculated by the 
current year minus the year of incorporation of the firm. Size is measured by number of 
employees of the firm. Collateral is measured by ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Profit is 
measured by the ratio of profit before tax to total assets. A growth opportunity is measured by 
Tobin‟s q. Dummies include regional, year, and industry dummies. We will estimate the 
model by pooled OLS.  
 
To check the effect of political connections on firm performance level, we will estimate the 
following model. This model is similar to the models used by Saeed et al. (2015), Boubakri et 
al. (2008), and Wu et al. (2010). 
                                                                         
                             (3) 
Where a firm‟s performance is measured by ROA, Tobin‟s q, or TFP. Polcon is time-
invariant dummy variable. It is equal to 1 if the firm has political connections and 0 
otherwise. Size is found in the literature to be an important factor in affecting firm 
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performance level. Large firms can positively affect firm performance via diverse capabilities 
and economies of scale. On the other hand, complex and extensive bureaucratization and 
hierarchies may reduce the efficiency of managers and affect a firm‟s performance 
negatively.  Capinten is capital intensiveness which is calculated by the ratio of capital to 
labour. 
 
FC is a measure of financial condition of the firm. Theoretically, the impact of financial 
status on a firm‟s performance is given by Fama and Jensen (1983), who suggest that debt 
affects a firm‟s performance by reducing the problem of agency cost. Mao and Gu (2008) 
also empirically prove that leverage policy is influencing a firm‟s performance in the 
restaurant industry in US. We will use WW index and leverage ratio, two different measures 
of financial conditions, in our robustness check study.   
 
The effect of firm ownership on performance level has also been discussed extensively, 
especially in the context of the effects of foreign direct investment on the host country 
(Malek, 1974). Malek (1974) blames foreign direct investment as foreign-owned firms are 
performing worse than domestic firms in the sample of his study. However, other studies, 
such as Dunning (1981), argue that foreign-owned firms have superior capabilities/techniques 
in productivity, and therefore positively influence a firm‟s performance.  
 
There is the possibility of endogeneity in our model (3), as firm performance may have an 
effect on the lending decision, as level of leverage may influence the firm‟s performance and 
vice versa (Dessi and Robertson, 2003). We can assume that financial variable is the 
endogeneous variable and the error term of equation (3) will be correlated to WW index and 
leverage ratio, which may give biased results if the equation is estimated by OLS. To check 
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this issue, we use two different tests to check the endogeneity of WW index and leverage 
ratio in our model. First, we test under the null hypothesis of the Durbin and Wu-Hausman 
tests are that the financial variable (WW index, leverage ratio) can be treated as exogenous 
(Hausman, 1978). We reject the null hypothesis as we get a statistically significant result and, 
alternatively, the financial variable is endogenous in our model. Second, we follow 
Wooldridge (2002) to check the assumption of strict exogeneity by using fixed effect model. 
Our test also proves those WW index and leverage ratios are endogenous variables.  
Therefore, we need an instrument variable that is highly correlated to a financial variable, and 
that can be correlated to a firm‟s performance but only via a financial variable (Wooldridge, 
2002). Following the work of Cho (1998) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), we will use 
instrument variable approach, two-stage least square (2SLS), to tackle the problem of 
endogeneity. Following the work of Campello (2005) and Saeed et al. (2015), we argue that 
due to the presence of underdeveloped financial markets and contracting imperfection, the 
demand of collateral by the lenders is quite common, particularly in our case. Campello 
(2005) argues that a firm‟s collateral establishes a firm‟s financing capacity; however, a 
firm‟s tangible assets do not affect a firm‟s performance, except for the connection with 
financing itself. In our sample, the correlation between leverage and collateral (0.26) is higher 
than the correlation between leverage and assets tangibility (0.15). Hence, a firm‟s collateral 






As our financial variables have different formations, WW index is calculated by six 
accounting variables, and we cannot use the same instrument (collateral) for WW index
45
. 
We do not find any suitable instrument for WW index in the literature, as literature is mainly 
relying on the old measures. Equity financing is the second important component of external 
                                                          
44
 The exogeneity and suitability of instrument have been tested by a number of tests in the study.  
45
 Some tests of valid instruments also show that collateral is a weak instrument for WW index. 
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finance of the firms. Equity financing can be highly correlated to the measure of financial 
constraint i.e., WW index, as higher equity financing means higher access to external finance. 
We check the correlation between WW index and shareholders‟ equity of the firms and find it 
around 0.15, we use shareholder‟s equity as the instrument for WW index as it passes various 
tests. Econometrically, firm‟s financial status (WWindex and leverage ratio) is regressed on 
instruments (shareholders equity and collateral respectively) alongside other controlled 
variables of equation 3. Consequently, the fitted value of financial status variables is used as 
a regressor in second stage. In addition to the test of endogeneity for endogenous variables, 
we also perform the test to check the validity of instrument by F-test for the joint significance 
of the instruments (Stock et al., 2002). We get significant F-statistics which reject the null 
hypothesis of instruments are weak. Our F- statistics also exceed 10 for inference based on 





To check the effect of political connections on a firm‟s performance across different levels of 
financial constraints, we will include an additional term to the equation (3). The new equation 
takes the following form: 
 
                                                                        
                                                     (4) 
 
Here, the additional term, Polcon dummy *FC, is an interaction term between the dummy of 
political connection and the measure of financial constraint.  
 
                                                          
46
 We perform these all tests of valid instrument after each specification, with different measures of financial 
status and different measures of performance.  
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In order to resolve the issue of endogeneity due to the WW index and leverage ratio, as we 
explained earlier, we will use 2SLS to estimate our empirical specification given in equation 
(4). In addition to the financial variables (WW index and leverage ratio), the interaction term 
will also be considered as endogenous because of including financial status variable. 
Moreover, there could be the issue that political connection affects the financial constraint in 
advance, i.e. financial status may already contain the effect of political connection. 2SLS is 
the best choice where FC and Polcon dummy *FC will be estimated in the first stage, and 
then predicted value will be used in the second stage. In the light of the explanation given 
before, we will use collateral as a dummy for leverage ratio and collateral *Polconnection 
dummy as an instrument for interaction term (Polcon dummy*FC). For WW index, we will 
use shareholder‟s equity as an instrument. For interaction term (WW index*politic 
connection), we will use equity *political connection as an instrument in 2SLS.  
 
 
4.2 Measures of political connections 
We will use two measures of political connections. Our first measure comes from the 
mainstream literature (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006). According to this academic 
literature, “A firm is connected with a politician if at least one member of the company‟s 
board of directors is also a politician”. In this study, a politician is defined as an individual 
who participated in national or provincial elections, held in 2008 and 2013. A politician‟s full 
name (first, middle, and last) is matched to the full name of the firm‟s director. If the name 
matches, that firm is then taken as a politically connected firm. In doing so, one politician 
was matched to one firm. In our sample firms, 134 firms are considered politically connected 




For our second measure of political connection (better known as measure of informal 
political connections), we take informal political and business connections of the firms. 
According to this measure, a firm is politically connected if it belongs to 30 industrial groups 
of Pakistan. The top 30 industrial families are dominating the corporate sector in Pakistan. 
These groups/families have informal relationships (close friends, relationships through 
marriages of their children) with politicians of famous political parties. The founders of some 
groups are also famous politicians in Pakistan. 
 
 
Table 4.1 presents the distribution of the sample firms through Measure I and Measure II of 
political connections. Following Measure I, 134 firms out of 326 are politically connected, 
while 192 firms are stand-alone. Following Measure II, 101 firms out of 326 are politically 




Table4.1: Sample description 
 Total sample 
Number    Percentage     
Politically connected 
Number  Percentage 
Politically non-connected 
Number       Percentage 
Measure- I 
Formal (Politician) 
326 100 134     41 192        59 
Measure- II 
Informal (Group) 





4.3 Measures of financial constraints and firm performance 
Testing our research questions includes measuring a firm‟s level of financial constraint. One 
perfect and particular measure of financial constraint is a matter of controversial debate in 
literature. There are a number of measures, as discussed in chapter 2. We will use four 
different measures of financial constraints.  
Our first measure of financial constraint is WW index, given by Whited and Wu (2006)
47
. 
The higher value of WW index means a higher level of financial constraints.  
Our second measure of financial constraint is asset tangibility (tangibility).The concept of 
asset tangibility is given by Almeida and Campello (2004), who argue theoretically that 
tangible assets encourage external financing. ? 
We also use widely used measures, leverage ratio, and liquidity ratio, in existing literature. 
The third measure is leverage ratio. It has been commonly used in the literature of effects of 
political connections on a firm‟s financial condition. Debt is an important element of external 
funding of the firms. The positive relation between leverage and default probability suggests 
that firms with higher leverage ratio are more financially constrained in the literature, but on 
the other hand, it also shows that firms are able to access external funds. Leverage is 
measured as the ratio of a firm‟s total debt to total assets. 
Our final measure of financial constraints is liquidity ratio. Holmström and Tirole (2000) 
argue that firms should have enough liquidity to cope to investment and production plans in 
the case of negative liquidity shocks. Hence, financially non-constrained firms have higher 
liquidity. Liquidity ratio is measured by a ratio of a firm‟s current assets minus its short-term 
debt over total assets. 
                                                          
47
 The calculation of WW index is provided in chapter 1. We will prefer this measure as this technique avoids 




However, we argue that WW index and asset tangibility are better to indicate the level of 
financial constraint of firms, as Almeida and Campello (2006) argue that financially 
constrained firms may hoard cash and have higher liquidity ratio. Similarly, a higher leverage 
ratio could imply that firms are enjoying easy external funds, which means firms are not 
financially constrained.  Nevertheless, even with the criticism of leverage ratio and liquidity 
ratio as measures of financial constraints, the literature relies mainly on these two measures.  
 
 
Firm performance has been measured in the literature by different measures such as profit 
maximization, return on assets, and return on investment (e.g. Boubakri, et al., 2008; 
Dombrovsky, 2008; Fan, et al., 2008). Some other studies have measured a firm‟s 
performance by a firms‟ growth opportunities, e.g. growth in sales, employment growth, and 
Tobin‟s q. TFP has also been used as a measure of a firm‟s performance (such as 
Abramovitz, 1956; Hulten, 2000). Although there are many measures to calculate a firm‟s 
performance, for the purpose of this study, we will use ROA, growth opportunities (Tobin‟s 
q), and TFP. 
 
 
4.4 Sample data and summary statistics 
For information on the firm‟s political connections, we rely on the Election Commission of 
Pakistan (ECP). ECP provides the list of all the candidates participating in the previous 
elections, both at national and provincial levels. Given the study covers the time period 2006–
2015, this study needs the information of those candidates who participated in the general 
elections held in 2008 and 2013. The lists of information provided by ECP do not only 
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include the full names of participating candidates, but also the information of affiliated 
parties and information about the votes each candidate received. Following Khwaja and Mian 
(2005), all participating candidates have been considered as politicians.  
 
To get the information about the major economic groups that are well-known for their 
informal relationships with politicians in Pakistan, our study follows Rehman (2006). A list 
of top 30 groups alongside their affiliated listed and unlisted, financial and non-financial 
firms, is provided by Rehman (2006). Ashraf and Ghani (2005) and Masulis et al. (2011) 
have also used the same source to identify the business group affiliation.  
 
Firm data remains the same as given in chapter 2. The important sample selection criteria is 
that firms need to report a minimum of two consecutive years‟ information to assess the 
changing in the financing structure of the firms. The final sample consists of an unbalanced 
panel of 1829 firm-year observations of 326 firms.  
 
Summary statistics 
The preliminary univariate of comparison of financing pattern and other characteristics 
between politically connected firms and non-connected firms is provided in table 4.2. 
Column 1 of table 4.2 gives the mean value of important variables for the full sample. 
Columns 2, 3, and 4 give mean values of variables for politically connected and non-
connected firms according to Measure I of political connection. Columns 5, 6, and 7 give 
mean values for connected and non-connected firms according to Measure II of political 
connection. 
 
When political connection is measured by Measure I, we get lower value of WW index for 
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connected firms (-.049). This difference is also significant at 5 per cent level. Similarly, 
connected firms also have higher tangible assets. The difference is also highly significant. 
Connected firms have higher leverage but lower liquidity ratio with formal measure of 
political connections. We also find that connected firms are larger in size. Further, they have 
higher collateral. All these differences are also statistically significant. For a firm‟s age, 
Tobin‟s q, TFP, and ROA, we do not find a significant difference between politically 
connected and non-connected firms. Politically connected firms are also larger in size, have 
more exporters and have larger size of board of director as compared to non-connected firms.  
 
When political connection is proxied by informal connections of the firms, we do not find a 
significant difference for mean values between politically connected and non-connected firms 
for any measure of financial condition of the firm. However, informal connections bring a 
significant difference in investment opportunities of connected and non-connected firms. 
Even firms with informal political connections are larger in size are older in age as compared 
to politically non-connected firms. Connected firms have also more foreign firms and larger 
size of board of director as compared to stand-alone firms.  
 
Overall, the summary statistics show that formal political connections affect the financial 
condition of the firms. As far as the impacts of political connections on a firm‟s performance 
are concerned, the summary statistics do not give any significant differences, except for 
evidence of bad performance of politically connected firms by informal measure. We can 
assume that formal measure of political connection seems stronger than informal measure of 





Table4.2: Summary statistics for key variables 
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.0168   
No of 
observations 
1829 722 1107  569 1260  
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. No of 
observations for age and lntfp are different, that is, 1828 and 1669 respectively. For Measure I 653, 1016 for 
connected and non-connected respectively. For Measure II, 525 and 1144 respectively. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Difference between connected firms and non-connected firms 
We test for our first research question: whether politically connected firms are different from 
politically non-connected firms. Equation (1) is estimated by OLS. Empirical model also 
controls for region, industry, and year fixed effects.  
 
Panel I of table 4.3 shows the results of empirical specification, given in equation (1), 
corresponding to Measure I of political connections. Panel II of table 4.3 gives the results of 
empirical specification, given in equation (1), corresponding to Measure II of political 
connections. Panel I reports that connected firms are different from non-connected firms in 
terms of finance. Connected firms have a lower WW index, which shows these firms are less 
financially constrained. The coefficient of assets tangibility is also significant and positive, 
meaning connected firms have higher assets tangibility, which shows connected firms are less 
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financially constrained. The coefficients of leverage ratio and liquidity ratio are also 
significant. Connected firms are more levered; it justifies the theoretical prediction that 
connected firms have preferential treatments. Hence, it contrasts the definition of financial 
constraints, as literature says the higher the value of leverage ratio, the more the firms are 
considered financially constrained. This definition of leverage ratio as a measure of financial 
constraint has been questioned/ criticised by Almeida et al. (2004). Moreover, our results 
highlight that connected firms have lower liquidity ratio. If connected firms get preferential 
treatments in the form of easy access to loans, which would show a higher leverage ratio of 
connected firms, the connected firms should have higher liquidity ratio. There is a possibility 
that these loans are being used for personal motives by the managers, with a subsequent 
presence of agency cost. There might be another possibility of holding less cash, as connected 
firms can always get access to funds; therefore, there is no need to hold much cash due to soft 
budget constraints (Megginson et al., 2014). Overall, connected firms are different from non-
politically connected firms in terms of finance. All four measures of financial constraints give 
significant results. 
 
As far as measures of performance are concerned, we do not find a different performance for 
politically connected firms when using ROA and Tobin‟s q as measures of performance. We 
find politically connected firms are performing worse than non-connected firms when using 
TFP as a measure of performance.  It implies that political connections do not affect a firm‟s 
ROA and growth opportunities (Tobin‟s q), but do negatively affect a firm‟s productivity.  
 
Panel II of table 4.3 reports that informally connected firms are different from non-connected 
firms in terms of growth opportunities (Tobin‟s q) only. Our informal measure of political 
connections does not suggest that connected firms are different from non-connected firms in 
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terms of finance. It shows informal connections play an insignificant role in a firm‟s financial 
condition. It further highlights that firms might not use informal connections to get easy 
access to external funds, but for some other forms of preferential treatments. However, these 
informal relations are associated with a firm‟s performance in terms of reducing investment 
opportunities.  
 
This initial analysis, to see the difference between politically connected and non-connected 
firms in terms of finance and performance, gives us a clue that connected firms are different 
from non-connected firms, and the formal measure of political connections gives more 
significant differences when compared to the informal measure of political connections. 
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Table4.3: Differences between politically connected and non-connected firms in terms of financial status and performance 
Panel I 
Dependent variables = WW index Tangibility Leverage Liquidity ROA q Ln(tfp) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Polcon -0.649** 0.0170*** 0.0890*** -0.0960*** -0.00317 -0.0261 -0.0128* 
 (0.327) (0.00606) (0.0157) (0.0171) (0.00766) (0.0571) (0.00742) 
Size -0.205 -0.000461 -0.0606*** 0.0653*** 0.0103*** 0.0568** 0.0527*** 
 (0.148) (0.00274) (0.00710) (0.00771) (0.00347) (0.0258) (0.00339) 
Foreigndum -0.958* 0.00130 -0.0450* 0.0633** 0.0281** 0.678*** -0.00811 
 (0.560) (0.0104) (0.0269) (0.0293) (0.0131) (0.0980) (0.0126) 
Constant -0.0372 1.144*** 0.664*** -0.0887 -0.0147 0.365 1.713*** 
 (2.583) (0.0479) (0.124) (0.135) (0.0606) (0.452) (0.0574) 
Observations 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,669 
R-squared 0.161 0.101 0.117 0.085 0.033 0.134 0.197 
Panel II 
Dependent variables = WW index Tangibility Leverage Liquidity ROA q Ln(tfp) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Polcon 0.438 -0.00328 -0.0232 0.0154 0.00393 -0.143** 0.00500 
 (0.366) (0.00680) (0.0177) (0.0193) (0.00858) (0.0639) (0.00833) 
Size -0.237 8.72e-05 -0.0575*** 0.0623*** 0.0101*** 0.0610** 0.0521*** 
 (0.148) (0.00275) (0.00717) (0.00779) (0.00347) (0.0258) (0.00340) 
Foreigndum -0.861 0.000596 -0.0500* 0.0665** 0.0289** 0.645*** -0.00704 
 (0.567) (0.0105) (0.0274) (0.0298) (0.0133) (0.0989) (0.0128) 
Constant -0.346 1.154*** 0.713*** -0.144 -0.0159 0.323 1.706*** 
 (2.579) (0.0479) (0.125) (0.136) (0.0605) (0.450) (0.0573) 
Observations 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,669 
R-squared 0.160 0.097 0.102 0.069 0.033 0.136 0.195 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. PolCon is a dummy of political connection. Size is measured by number 




5.2 Financial constraints and politically connected firms 
We use equation (2) to test our second hypothesis that politically connected firms are 
financially less constrained than their non-politically connected peers. Table 4.4 shows the 
pooled regression results. All regressions include regional, industry, and time-fixed effects. In 
panel I, column 1 reports the regression results of political connection alongside other control 
variables on the WW index. The estimated coefficient on political connection is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The magnitude of coefficient shows that firms 
with political connections have a lower level of financial constraints with 86 per cent less 
WW index. In column 2, the regression results of political connections and other control 
variables on the assets tangibility is provided. The estimated coefficient on political 
connections is positive and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The magnitude of 
coefficient shows that firms with political connections are less financially constrained with 
1% higher assets tangibility. In column 3, the estimated coefficient of leverage ratio is highly 
significant with magnitude revealing that connected firms have 7 per cent higher debt ratio 
than non-connected peers. In column 4, the estimated coefficient of liquidity ratio is negative 
and highly significant. It means connected firms have 7 per cent less liquidity than non-
connected firms.  
Panel II of table 4.4 reports the estimated results of the same regression, but with Measure II 
of political connections. The regression results with our initial two measures of financial 
constraints, WW index and assets tangibility, give insignificant coefficients. The regression 
result with leverage ratio reports negative and significant coefficient. It means informally 
connected firms have 2 per cent lower debt ratio than non-connected firms. The coefficient of 
liquidity ratio is positive and significant. The results show that connected firms have 3 per 
cent higher liquidity level than non-connected firms.  
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If we compare the results of two different measures of political connections, it shows that 
firms which have formal political connections get clear preferential treatments (in terms of 
leverage) and are less financially constrained (in terms of WW index and assets tangibility). 
However, the informal relationship through group connections is not shown to get 
preferential treatment in terms of easy access of borrowing. Instead, these informal relations 
are making them more liquid.   
 




WW index Tangibility Leverage Liquidity 
 1 2 3 4 
Pol connection -0.863** 0.0155** 0.0737*** -0.0786*** 
 (0.366) (0.00621) (0.0150) (0.0152) 
Collateralt-1 -0.370 0.0973*** -0.282*** -0.590*** 
 (1.063) (0.0180) (0.0434) (0.0440) 
ROAt-1 -2.711* -0.131*** -0.683*** 0.735*** 
 (1.441) (0.0244) (0.0589) (0.0596) 
Employeest-1 -0.0254 0.00249 -0.0352*** 0.0354*** 
 (0.181) (0.00307) (0.00739) (0.00748) 
Qt-1 0.0335 -0.00676** 0.0107 -0.0106 
 (0.177) (0.00300) (0.00723) (0.00732) 
age 0.00613 0.000391** -0.00138*** 0.00128*** 
 (0.00958) (0.000162) (0.000391) (0.000396) 
Foreigndum -0.932 0.0124 -0.0320 0.0236 
 (0.634) (0.0107) (0.0259) (0.0262) 
Observations 1,503 1,503 1,503 1,503 








WW index Tangibility Leverage Liquidity 
 1 2 3 4 
     
Pol Connection 0.353 -0.00322 -0.0293* 0.0342** 
 (0.412) (0.00698) (0.0169) (0.0171) 
Collateralt-1 -0.434 0.0982*** -0.276*** -0.596*** 
 (1.065) (0.0181) (0.0438) (0.0443) 
ROAt-1 -2.614* -0.132*** -0.691*** 0.743*** 
 (1.442) (0.0245) (0.0593) (0.0601) 
Employeest-1 -0.0662 0.00313 -0.0318*** 0.0316*** 
 (0.181) (0.00307) (0.00744) (0.00754) 
Qt-1 0.0341 -0.00671** 0.0107 -0.0105 
 (0.177) (0.00301) (0.00729) (0.00738) 
age 0.00547 0.000397** -0.00133*** 0.00122*** 
 (0.00963) (0.000163) (0.000396) (0.000401) 
foreigndum -0.863 0.0118 -0.0377 0.0303 
 (0.641) (0.0109) (0.0263) (0.0267) 
Observations 1,503 1,503 1,503 1,503 
R-squared 0.173 0.154 0.204 0.306 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Pol Connection is a dummy equal to 1 if firms are politically connected and 0 
otherwise. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Panel I reports the results when we 




Endogeneity between political connection and financial condition can be a concern in our 
study. For example, some firms may have easier access to make political connections because 
of having different resources. Similar to Wu et al. (2012) and Xu et al. (2013), to take into 
account the possibility of self-selection, we will now apply Heckman‟s (1979) two-stage 
treatment effect model. 
 
Econometrically, the Heckman model is used to correct the sample selection bias. This 
sample selection bias arises due to the possibility of a non-random selection of samples. The 
Heckman model is an estimation procedure that eliminates the specification error for the case 




In our study, Heckman sample selection model is based on the assumption that the problem 
of non-random sample selection occurs as firms may self-select into the political activity that 
offers a better match with their resources and thereby, their economic output. Therefore, our 
selection equation will see whether firms are politically connected or not. Without modelling 
such self-selection, a regression of financial constraint measures on the choice of political 
connectedness may lead to erroneous results for each connected and non-connected category. 
  
The first stage of the procedure includes a probit estimation, in which a dummy variable 
indicates the political connection of the firms. We regress this dummy variable against the 
same independent variable used in the main model plus three additional variables 
(instruments). For the case of Pakistan, the ethnic background of Pakistan‟s leading business 
elites has been established (Rehman, 2006). The major industrial families belong to five 
ethnic groups, which are settled into two developed provinces: Punjab and Sindh. Therefore, 
firms located in these two provinces are more likely to have political connections. In addition, 
previous studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Boubakri, 2008) have proved that a firm‟s 
location is related to political connections. Therefore, we will use location dummy as our first 
instrument variable. Firms with a larger size of board of directors (BOD) tend to have 
political connections. Boubakri (2008) highlights that politically connected firms have a 
larger board of director than non-connected firms. It means the size of the board is positively 
related to the firm‟s political connections. Hence, we will use dummy of Board of director as 
our second instrument variable.  Apart from this, a firm‟s status to foreign trade is also linked 
with political connections of the firms; therefore, our third instrument variable is dummy of 




The second stage regression will use the estimated probability of political connections, which 
has been estimated in the first stage and is called the treatment effect instrument. Inverse 
Mills Ratio (IMR) will be generated from these estimated probabilities of first stage 
regression. This IMR will be included in the second stage regression equation. The rest of the 
control variables remain the same.  
 
Our regression equations for stage one and stage two will be as follows: 
 
                                                               
                                                                         
                                                                       Stage I 
In stage I, Polcon is dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the firm is politically connected 
and 0 otherwise. Location dummy is equal to 1 if firms are located in two large provinces: 
Punjab or Sindh, and 0 otherwise. BOD dummy is equal to 1 if the firm has more than two 
board of directors, and 0 otherwise. Export dummy is equal to 1 if the firm exports to foreign 
market, and 0 otherwise. All other controlled variables are calculated the same as were used 
before.  
 
                                                                        
                                                                    Stage II 
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Panel I gives the estimation results corresponding to Measure I (formal) of political 
connections. Panel II gives the estimation results corresponding to Measure II (informal) of 
political connections.      
 
Panel I(A) of table 4.5 shows that the number of board of directors‟ members and firm size 
are positively connected to the firm‟s political connections. In Panel I(B),  IMR for WW 
index and assets tangibility are not significant, which means that there is no sample selection 
problem. The coefficients of both are somehow decreased in panel B of table 4.5, in 
comparison with the coefficients of both variables in panel I of table 4.4. The coefficients of 
IMR of leverage and liquidity are significant, which shows that a sample selection problem 
may exist. We get significant coefficient of political connection dummy while using leverage 
ratio and liquidity ratio as a measure of financial status. The coefficients of both leverage and 
liquidity ratios have increased somehow.  
Panel II (B) of table 4.5 shows that sample selection was a problem for leverage and liquidity 
ratio, as coefficients of IMRs are weakly significant in panel B. The results, even after 
controlling for endogeneity, show that informal relations do not bring significant financial 
patronage to firms.  
Overall, on the basis of all these econometric estimations, we can argue that formal political 
relationships of firms bring significant financial advantages to firms when compared with 




Table4.5: Heckman treatment model 
Panel I 
Dependent variable = Dummy of political 
connections 
Measure I 





Location dummy -0.100 
 (0.132) 
BOD dummy 0.385*** 
 (0.0767) 






Growth opportunitiest-1 0.0202 
 (0.0333) 










 WW index Tangibility Leverage Liquidity 
 1 2 3 4 
Panel B: Second stage regression after controlling for selection bias 
     
Pol connection -0.853** 0.0165*** 0.0809*** -0.0859*** 
 (0.369) (0.00628) (0.0151) (0.0153) 
Collt-1 -0.212 0.0943*** -0.257*** -0.617*** 
 (1.069) (0.0182) (0.0438) (0.0443) 
ROAt-1 -2.542* -0.138*** -0.739*** 0.791*** 
 (1.468) (0.0250) (0.0602) (0.0608) 
Employeest-1 -0.00561 0.00253 -0.0148* 0.0153* 
 (0.198) (0.00337) (0.00811) (0.00820) 
Qt-1 -0.0138 -0.00596** 0.0128* -0.0130* 
 (0.175) (0.00298) (0.00719) (0.00726) 
Aget 0.00407 0.000459*** -0.00149*** 0.00138*** 
 (0.00949) (0.000162) (0.000389) (0.000394) 
invmills1 -2.793 0.130 1.045*** -1.039*** 
 (4.889) (0.0832) (0.200) (0.203) 
Constant 1.247 0.909*** 0.148 0.778*** 
 (3.735) (0.0636) (0.153) (0.155) 
Observations 1,503 1,503 1,503 1,503 
R-squared 0.172 0.147 0.207 0.312 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Pol connection is a dummy equal to „1‟ if firms are politically connected and „0‟ 
otherwise. Location dummy is equal to 1 if firms are located in two large provinces: Punjab or Sindh, and 0 otherwise. BOD 
dummy is equal to 1 if the firm has more than two board of directors, and 0 otherwise. Export dummy is equal to 1 if the 







Dependent variable = Dummy of political 
connections 
Measure II 





Location dummy -0.279* 
 (0.144) 
BOD dummy 0.0448 
 (0.0808) 






Growth opportunitiest-1 -0.124** 
 (0.0564) 







 WW index Tangibility Leverage Liquidity 
 1 2 3 4 
Panel B: Second stage regression after controlling for selection bias 
Pol connection 0.413 -0.00629 -0.0164 0.0212 
 (0.409) (0.00679) (0.0173) (0.0175) 
Collt-1 -0.355 0.0705*** -0.255*** -0.620*** 
 (1.121) (0.0186) (0.0475) (0.0480) 
ROAt-1 -2.932** -0.104*** -0.704*** 0.758*** 
 (1.483) (0.0247) (0.0628) (0.0635) 
Employeest-1 -0.206 -0.00179 -0.0246*** 0.0243** 
 (0.223) (0.00371) (0.00946) (0.00956) 
Qt-1 0.107 -0.00753** 0.00626 -0.00593 
 (0.187) (0.00310) (0.00791) (0.00799) 
age 0.00217 0.000482*** -0.00100** 0.000905** 
 (0.0102) (0.000170) (0.000432) (0.000437) 
invmills1 -5.943 -0.0453 0.433* -0.457* 
 (5.849) (0.0972) (0.248) (0.250) 
Constant 2.741 1.058*** 0.619*** 0.321* 
 (4.297) (0.0714) (0.182) (0.184) 
Observations 1,425 1,425 1,425 1,425 
R-squared 0.174 0.140 0.166 0.291 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Pol connection is a dummy equal to „1‟ if firms are politically connected and „0‟ 
otherwise. Location dummy is equal to 1 if firms are located in two large provinces: Punjab or Sindh, and 0 otherwise. BOD 
dummy is equal to 1 if the firm has more than two board of directors, and 0 otherwise. Export dummy is equal to 1 if the 
firm exports to foreign market, and 0 otherwise. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
5.3 The effects of political connection on firm performance 
We then present the results estimated by the equation 3 to see the impacts of political 
connections on firm performance for the period 2006-2015.  To see the impact of political 
connections on performance, we use WW index and Leverage ratio as measures of financial 
constraints
48
. We use Return on Assets (ROA), Tobin‟s Q and Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) to measure firms‟ performance. All specifications include regional, time and industry 
dummies.  In the previous section, we have seen that Measure I of Political connections is far 
stronger than Measure II. For the remaining analysis of our study, we will only report the 
results with Measure I of Political connection. 
 
                                                          
48
 The reason to use Leverage ratio is the popularity of this variable in the literature. We also use WW index as 
it is a popular measure of financial constraint.  
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.6 report the results when dependent variable is Return on Assets 
(ROA). Column 1 gives the results when measure for financial constraint is WW Index.  
Column 2 gives the results when measure for financial status is Leverage ratio. Firm 
performance is regressed on dummy of political connection, financial variable and other 
controlled variables. The coefficient of dummy of political connection is significant and 
negative with our both measures of financial constraint in column 1 and 2.  It shows that 
firms with political connections have lower return on assets relative to non-connected firms. 
More specifically, it shows that firms with political connections have 4 per cent lesser return 
on assets as compared to non-connected firms. To establish this result more strongly, we will 
re estimate the equation 3 with alternative measure of firm performance. Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 4.8 report the results when dependent variable is Tobin‟s Q (growth opportunities). The 
coefficients of dummy of political connection are significant and negative with both measures 
of financial status; WW index and leverage ratio. It further proves that firms with political 
connections have lower investment opportunities as compared to with those which have no 
political connections by 10 per cent and 8 per cent, when using two different measures of 
financial status; WW index and Leverage respectively. Columns 5 and 6 report the results 
when dependent variable is Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The coefficients of dummy of 
political connections are significant and negative with both measures of financial constraints. 
It shows firms with political connections have lesser productivity by 2 and 3 per cent. Our 
results of effects of political connections on firms performance are consistent to previous 
studies (such as Saeed et al., 2015, Fan et al., 2008 ; Khawja and Mian, 2005).  
 
These results are robust for all three different measures of firms‟ performance.  The negative 
impact of political connections on firm‟s performance shown by leverage ratio further 
suggests that managers of connected firms are exacerbating agency problem by utilising 
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easily available funding to personal interests. This also shows that Pakistani financial 
institutions are not only biased to politically connected firms but also highlight the 
misallocation of resources. It also rejects the possibility that financial capital is provided to 
politically connected firms as they are efficient.  
 
The control variable like Size is expectedly and consistently positive and significant in all 
regression estimations. It means that large firms are more expected to perform better as these 
have more market power and resources. Foreign ownership is also performing positively in 
most of estimation results. The coefficient of capital intensiveness is also significant and 
positive in all empirical specifications. It shows higher the firms are capital intensive, better 
the firm‟s performance is.  
 
 
Next, WW index (measure of financial condition) and leverage are both positively correlated 
with all measures of firms‟ performance. These results are consistent with some studies in 
literatures (such as, Cull etal., 2014 ; Musso and Schiavo, 2008). One possible explanation of 
a positive correlation between financially constrained firms and firm‟s performance could be 
that constrained firms are good firms and quickly transform internal and external finance into 
high return of assets, high investment opportunities and high productivity. There could also 
be the possibility that constrained firms have to improve the productivity in order to stay in 
the market, this also refers to the role of financial pressure on firms‟ performance highlighted 




On the other hand, it could also be regarded the evidence to show the severe misallocation of 
financial capital by politically connected firms in Pakistan.
 49
  It may be an evidence of the 
misuse of easy access of external funds of privileged firms in Pakistani firms. Weak legal 
system, less accountability in the end of managers and high corruption rate could justify the 




                                                          
49
 Cull et al.(2015) finds that Chinese large non-state firms with weak government connections, likely the 
engine for innovation in China, are especially financially constrained, due perhaps to the formidable hold that 
their state rivals have on financial resources in China. On the other hand, it is well-known that Chinese non-
state firms have much better TFP than state-owned firms as shown in the literature. Their empirical results 
suggest that government connections play an important role in explaining Chinese firms' financing conditions, 




Table4.6: Firm performance and political connections 
Dependent Variables      
             = 
ROA Tobin’s Q TFP 












Polcon dummy -0.0414** -0.0396*** -0.108** -0.0811*** -0.0220* -0.0345*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0139) (0.0441) (0.0221) (0.0131) (0.0120) 
WW indext-1 0.0702***  0.157***  0.0384***  
 (0.0182)  (0.0396)  (0.0127)  
Leveraget-1  0.576***  0.876***  0.508*** 
  (0.160)  (0.222)  (0.130) 
Capitalintent-1 0.222*** 0.00324 0.503*** -0.0115 0.295*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0672) (0.0340) (0.149) (0.0527) (0.0476) (0.0260) 
Sizet-1 0.160*** 0.0403*** 0.356*** 0.0617*** 0.166*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0148) (0.0683) (0.0212) (0.0245) (0.00938) 
Foreigndum 0.0827* 0.0517*** 0.189* 0.106*** 0.0252 0.0176 
 (0.0457) (0.0182) (0.0996) (0.0326) (0.0268) (0.0161) 
Darbin-Hausman test(p-
value) 















Observations 1,498 1,503 1,498 1,503 1,498 1,503 
                  Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Darbin-Hausman test is a test to determine whether  
endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous. This is a test with a null of variables are exogenous. if the test statistics are significant then the variable being 
tested must be treated as endogenous. For the validity of the instruments, whether instruments are weak or strong, we use F-test. This is a test with the null of instruments are 




5.4 The effects of political connections on a firm’s performance across firms 
with different levels of financial constraint 
 
Our next test scrutinizes variations in the effects of political connectedness on firms‟ 
performance across different degrees of financial constraints. We argue that political 
connections decrease the frictions and information asymmetry of connected firms and reduce 
the cost of external finance for those firms
50
. In turn, these firms become less financially 
constrained. Whether these less financially constrained politically connected firms affect 
firms‟ performance differently? In the previous section, we found strong evidences that 
politically connected firms are performing poorly as compared to stand alone firms.  In 
particular, to see whether the negative relationship between political connected firms and 
firms‟ performance varies across different level of financial constraints, we look at the 
interaction term (PCdummy *FC) in equation 4. We estimate equation 4 by 2SLS estimator, 
the results are provided in table 4.7.  
 
Columns 1 and 2 of table 4.7, report the results of estimation equation 4 when using Return 
on Assets (ROA) as measure of firm performance. Our measure of financial constraint is 
WW index for column 1 and Leverage ratio for column 2.  Regarding the variable of interest, 
our key interaction term (PC dummy*FC) appear with significant and positive sign when our 
measure of financial constraint is WW index. It suggests that firm‟s financial status 
stimulates positive impact on firms return on assets. The possible explanation of higher 
WWindex (higher the financial constraints) and higher performance can be the result of 
financial pressure on firm‟s performance or the misallocation of the financial resources as 
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 As we find politically connected firms are financially less constraints in previous section 
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explained in the previous section. The interaction term is insignificant when we use leverage 
ratio as a measure of financial constraints in empirical specification.   
To the further validation of our results, equation 4 is re estimated with other measure of 
firms‟ performance (Tobin‟s q). It gives insignificant coefficients of interaction term with 
both measures of financial constraints in columns 4 and 5. We re estimate equation 4 with our 
third measure of financial constraints (TFP) and give the results in columns 5 and 6.  We find 
significant and positive coefficient of interaction term with WW Index, but insignificant 
coefficient of interaction term with Leverage ratio. 
 
The coefficient on the interaction term (PC*FC) shows the way in which the link between 
political connections and firm‟s performance differ across the firm‟s financial status. The 
positive sign of interaction term with measures of performance (ROA and TFP ) show that 
higher level of firm‟s financial constraints are positively correlated with the performance of 
politically connected firms. We can associate these results with the argument of financial 
pressure on firms performance given by Nickell and Nicolitsas(1999). 
 
The dummy of political connection remains significant and negative with WW index only. In 
most of the specifications in table 4.7, capital intensiveness, size of the firms and foreign 
status dummy are positively associated to firm‟s performance, showing a positive relationship 
between these controlled variables and firms‟ performance.  
 
Overall, the effects of financial status remains significant and positive even after controlling 
the joint effect of political connections and financial status. It shows that the relationship 
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between firm‟s financial status and performance is quite strong in Pakistani listed firms. 
Similar to previous section, we find positive relationship between level of financial 
constraints and firm‟s performance. The possible explanations of this correlation lie in 
pressure of firm‟s financial status on firms‟ performance and swift transforming of financial 







Table 4.7: Political connections, financial constraints, and performance 
Dependent variables = ROA q lntfp 
 WW Index Leverage WW Index Leverage WW Index Leverage 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8) 
Polcon dummy -0.0863*** -0.150 -0.168*** -0.123 -0.0849*** 0.0625 
 (0.0203) (0.0993) (0.0481) (0.169) (0.0168) (0.104) 
WWIndext-1 0.0503***  0.131***  0.0105  
 (0.0148)  (0.0337)  (0.0131)  
Leveraget-1  0.446**  0.870***  0.671*** 
  (0.214)  (0.326)  (0.174) 
Polcon*FC 0.0541** 0.287 0.0715 0.133 0.0757*** -0.217 
 (0.0269) (0.234) (0.0578) (0.402) (0.0245) (0.237) 
Capitalintent-1 0.190*** -0.0364 0.461*** -0.0382 0.251*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0601) (0.0431) (0.135) (0.0677) (0.0573) (0.0301) 
Sizet-1 0.156*** 0.0257* 0.351*** 0.0486** 0.161*** 0.111*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0144) (0.0587) (0.0215) (0.0254) (0.00943) 
Foreigndum 0.0881** 0.0488*** 0.196** 0.0972*** 0.0329 0.00829 
 (0.0390) (0.0176) (0.0882) (0.0329) (0.0304) (0.0168) 
Darbin-Hausman test(p-
value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observation 1,498 1,497 1,498 1,497 1,498 1,497 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Darbin-Hausman test is a test to determine whether  endogenous 
regressors in the model are in fact exogenous. This is a test with a null of variables are exogenous. if the test statistics are significant then the variable being tested must be 




This study investigates the effects of political connections on a firm‟s financial condition and 
corporate performance. In an attempt to test the related hypotheses, firm-level data from 
Pakistani listed firms is used over the period 2006–2015. This study first addresses whether 
politically connected firms are different from non-connected firms, particularly in terms of 
finance. While using two different measures of political connections, formal and informal 
political connections of the firms, we find that firms with formal connections are vividly 
different from stand-alone firms, not only in terms of finance but also in productivity. The 
informal political connections, however, do not bring financial advantages to firms in terms 
of our financial measures. 
 
This paper then addresses the question whether a firm‟s political connections influence a 
firm‟s level of financial constraint. Our results show that formal political connections have a 
positive influence on a firm‟s level of financial constraint; it means politically connected 
firms are found less financially constrained. We also find that balance sheets of politically 
connected firms show high leverage rate and low liquidity ratio. We do not find any 
significant evidence for the case of informal political connections; therefore, we conclude 
that formal political connections (via board of directors to participate in elections) are more 
appropriate to see the effects of a relationship-based system on the economy in Pakistan.  
 
This chapter further checks the effects of formal political connection on the level of corporate 
performance. We find robust evidences that firms with formal political connections are 
performing worse than non-connected firms. This provides the evidence of mismanagement 
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of firms resources and existence of agency cost in Pakistani listed firms. In addition, we also 
check the effects of political connections on firms‟ performance across different levels of 
financial constraints.  We find some evidences to support our hypothesis that effects of 
political connections on firms‟ ROA and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) vary across 
different level of financial constraints. However, we find strong evidence that firm‟s financial 
status is significantly affecting firm‟s performance in all specifications.  
In summary, our results give support to the view that crony capitalism exists in Pakistan, 
even though managers of connected firms are utilising these privileges to their personal gains 
and subsequently these firms perform bad. These results also cast doubt on the efficiency of 
Pakistani government reforms to tackle corrupt politicians. These results further draw the 
attention of policy makers to form such policies which can help to obtain the advantages of a 
relationship-based system when a firm‟s performance relies on a firm‟s financial condition 






















This chapter summarizes the results of this research and gives some new ideas for future 
research. The following section briefly paraphrases the main purpose of this study. This will 
be followed by the main results of our three empirical studies. The final section discusses the 
policy implications from our results and suggests some future research avenues.  
 
1. Summary of Main Findings 
 
1.2 Financial constraints of Pakistani listed firms 
The first empirical chapter checks the presence of financial constraints in Pakistani listed 
non-financial firms. Our results based on the full sample show that Pakistani listed non-
financial firms are financially constrained. It highlights the presence of information 
asymmetry in capital markets which makes external funds expensive. We then check whether 
size of the firms; group affiliation of the firms and dividend policy of the firms cause lending 
bias in Pakistan.  Our results find that listed large firms have easy access to external finance, 
and they are less financially constrained in comparison with small firms. We further find that 
group-affiliation does not make a difference in term of financial status of the affiliated 
firms
51
. Dividend paying firms are financially less constrained as these have an easy access to 
external finance. These results are consistent with the findings of previous studies, that large 
and dividend-paying firms are less financially constrained. However, our results for the 
group-affiliated firms are not consistent with the previous studies.  
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 In our fourth chapter of the thesis, we also find that informal political connections of the firms (measured by 
the group affiliation of the firms) do not bring privileged treatments in term of financial advantages.  
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Next we check whether latest measures of financial constraints (KZ index, WW index, HP 
index, Assets tangibility) are applicable for the case of developing country. When we sort 
firms into quartiles by these measures, we find that all the accounting variables of WW index 
and HP index move according to the prediction of these indices for Pakistani firms. For 
instance, we find that least constrained firms have lower leverage ratio, higher dividend ratio, 
higher cash flow, higher firm growth, lower industry growth, and higher total assets in 
Pakistan (WW index predicts the same for least constrained firms). Similarly, we find that 
least constrained firms are larger in size and older in age for Pakistani listed firms (HP index 
predicts the same for least constrained firms). However, KZ index is not fully applicable for 
Pakistani firms as one of the five variables (Tobin‟s q) behaves differently. This negates the 
functioning of KZ index for the case of Pakistani listed firms. We find that the most 
constrained firms have low cash flow, high leverage ratio, low dividend ratio, low q value, 
and low cash, as compared to most constrained firms (KZ index predicts lower q for least 
constrained firms). The low cash flow of least constrained firms is conditional to high growth 
opportunities in the original KZ index.  We also sort firms according to another latest 
measure of financial constraints; Assets Tangibility. Having higher tangible assets means, 
firms are financially less constrained. We find a negative relationship between the indices and 
Assets tangibility. As firms with high assets tangibility (less financially constrained) have 
also high value of all three indices (more financially constrained). We find positive 
relationship between leverage ratio and assets tangibility as both moves in the same direction. 
We further find negative relationship between Liquidity ratio and assets tangibility. This 
exercise shows the lack of correlation between different measures of financial constraints for 




We further evaluate whether these latest measures of financial constraints are valid for the 
case of Pakistani firms by estimating regression. We find cash flow, total debt, age, and cash 
holdings as consistently significant elements to a firm‟s financially constrained status with 
the predicted signs. Tobin‟s q and industry sales growth appear insignificant, while size and 
assets tangibility appear significant but with negative signs. We argue that negative signs of 
assets tangibility and total assets could due to our criterion of division of firms (which is 
liquidity ratio). We have previously seen that liquidity and assets tangibility of firms are 
negatively correlated. However, this practice gives complete confidence on some sorting 
variables; such as cash flow, debt, age and cash holdings which remain significant in all 
specifications. We can further conclude that WW index is performing well with maximum 
number of significant components in our sample firms. It shows that WW index, as 
summation of different financial ratios, is valid to use for the case of Pakistani firms. 
Moreover, these sorting variables i.e. cash flow, age, assets tangibility and debt are also valid 
to use individually as measures of financial constraints.  
 
1.2 Export decision and financial constraints 
 
In chapter 3, we study the relationship of financial constraint and export decision of the firms 
in Pakistan. Using a panel of listed firms between 2006 and 2014, we estimate the role of 
financial status on export decisions of the firms.  
 
The results indicate that exporters are different from non-exporters in terms of level of 
financial constraints. It means exporters are not only different from non-exporters in terms of 
age, size, quality of labour, and productivity, but also in the level of financial constraints. We 
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find exporters are less financially constrained by using WW index and assets tangibility as 
measures of financial constraints. We find less financially constrained firms are more 
inclined to export as compared to non-exporters. It points to the fact that exporters have to 
bear some additional expenses to meet the requirement of the international export market. 
Consequently, the less financially constrained firms would be more capable of facing these 
challenges as compared to the more financially constrained firms. We also check the link 
between leverage ratio and export decision of the firm and link between liquidity ratio and 
export decision of the firm. We find that exporters are highly leveraged; it shows that 
exporters are borrowing heavily. We do not find any significant role of the position of 
liquidity of the firm in export decision.  
 
Moreover, when we check  whether export starters become financially different from non-
exporters before entering the export market, we find that starters become financially less 
constraints only in terms of assets tangibility for one or two years before entering the export 
market. We further check for the ex-post effects of export on the financial condition of the 
firms. None of our measures of financial status give a significant result, showing no financial 
advantage of export to firms in a span of three years post-export. 
 
1.3 Political connections, financial constraints, and performance of the firms 
 
In chapter 4, we see the effects of political connections on a firm‟s financial status and 
performance. Using a panel of Pakistani listed firms between 2006 and 2015, we first see 
whether politically connected and politically non-connected firms are different in terms of 
finance and productivity. Our results categorically show that firms with formal political 
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connections are different from politically non-connected firms in terms of finance and 
productivity (a measure of a firm‟s performance).  We then see the effects of political 
connections on a firm‟s level of financial constraints. By using formal and informal measures 
of political connections, we find that connected firms – defined as if its directors participate 
in an election – are less financially constrained (in terms of WW index and assets tangibility) 
but more levered and less liquid. We further find that political connections via formal 
relationships are far stronger to get financial advantages from government than informal 
relationships in Pakistan. The results give overall support to the preferential treatment of 
connected firms via formal relations among Pakistani firms. Next, we check the effects of 
political connections on a firm‟s level of performance. The results suggest that political 
connections are negatively influencing a firm‟s ROA, investment opportunities, and level of 
productivity. These results support the existing evidence of managerial inefficiencies and rent 
extraction of affiliated politicians for personal motives.   
From the above analysis, it can be seen that there is a direct relationship between a firm‟s 
political connections and financial constraints and a firm‟s political connections and 
performance. We further check the effect of political connections on a firm‟s performance 
across different levels of financial constraints. We find significant and positive coefficients of 
interaction term when using WW index as a measure of financial constraints. These results 
remain robust while using two different measures of a firm‟s performance (ROA and lntfp). 
We do not find significant coefficients of interaction term when using Leverage ratio as a 
measure of financial status. On the basis of these results we cannot firmly argue that the 
effects of political connections on firms‟ performance vary across different level of financial 
constraints. However, some results show that higher level of financial constraints is positively 




2. Policy Implications 
 
The empirical study of this thesis suggests that listed firms in Pakistan are relying on internal 
sources of funds. Even though these listed firms are big companies in the country, they are 
still financially constrained; therefore, it is substantially important for Pakistan to develop its 
financial markets to facilitate the financial demand of the firms. Failure to do so, will further 
slowdown the process of economic growth that the economy has been encountering for 
almost the last two decades. Financially constrained listed firms further highlight the 
underdeveloped stock markets in Pakistan. These stock markets are not fully equipped to 
fulfil the financial demands of listed firms. It further shows that because of strict borrowing 
conditions and transparency requirements, listed firms might rely more on internal firms. 
Moreover, our results indicate a strong lending bias on the basis of size and dividend 
payments. The results indicate that capital market imperfections lead to binding financial 
constraints on investment. Therefore, it is crucial that policy makers should form some 
policies of the banking sector to reduce the lending bias in capital markets.  
 
Second, our study shows the role of financial status for the decision to export. Given the 
importance of export sector to the development of the economy and deteriorating export level 
in Pakistan, policy makers should plan reorganization of financial markets to reduce the 
capital market imperfections. This may reduce the level of financial constraints of 
prospective exporters, and encourage them to compete at international level.  
 
Third, our study confirms a superior position of politically connected firms in terms of 
getting preferential treatment from governments and banks. Our results lend support to the 
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crony capitalism view that Pakistani firms benefit from the political connections. Our 
analysis emphasises the significance of political connectedness an important determinant of 
financial policy that cannot be overlooked. We highlight that political connections are acting 
like a tool of agency problem by deteriorating a firm‟s performance. These preferential 
treatments could be used in enhancing a firm‟s performance if managers would be held 
strictly accountable to their actions. Policy makers can play an important role in this regard 
by introducing strict laws of accountability. Further more, firms can use these re  
 
3. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
The effects of financial constraints on a firm‟s behaviour are an important topic for 
researchers. This section of the topic intends to provide some suggestions for future 
researchers to extend our research. 
 
First, due to data unavailability, our study could only rely on quantitative information to 
categorise firms into financial status to check the validity of well-known measures of 
financial constraints. The division of firms on qualitative information alongside quantitative 
information of firms for partitioning firms in to financial status can be a good idea for further 
extending this research. Moreover, building a new index on the significant financial variables 
for developing countries that may pass all the robustness tests will be important contribution. 
 
Second, our research on the relationship between financial constraints and the extensive 
margin of trade gives an idea for future researchers to also check the effects of financial 




Third, we use time-invariant dummy of political connections to see the effect of political 
connections on financial constraints and performance. Time-variant dummy of political 
connections can help to see the pre- and post-effects of these political connections on 
financial status and level of performance of the firms. Moreover, our measure of informal 
political connections looks weak, so any other measure to check informal relations of 
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